A Theory of Epistemic Justification

  • Jarrett Leplin

Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 112)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 1-18
  3. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 19-32
  4. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 33-51
  5. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 53-69
  6. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 71-96
  7. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 97-109
  8. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 111-142
  9. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 143-160
  10. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 161-177
  11. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 179-197
  12. Jarrett Leplin
    Pages 199-209
  13. Back Matter
    Pages 211-214

About this book


This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief. The theory is based on a novel analysis of reliable belief-formation that answers classic objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The analysis generates a way of distinguishing justified belief from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation need not be justificatory whereas systemic deception could be. It thereby respects the intuition that standards for justification must be accessible to the believer, while maintaining the essential connection of justification to truth.

The analysis shows how justification relates to, but is distinct from, evidence, rationality, and probability. It provides a unifying treatment of issues central to current debate in epistemology, including epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, virtue theories, the effect of luck on knowledge and justification, the interpretation of subjunctive conditions for justification, the conflict between internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical evaluation of epistemological theories. There are further applications to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and ethics.

The book will engage philosophers working in epistemology or related fields, and their graduate students.


Epistemology Evidence Inference Justification Knowledge Reliabilism Skepticism language metaphysics philosophy of language philosophy of science probability science truth

Authors and affiliations

  • Jarrett Leplin
    • 1
  1. 1.Chapel HillUSA

Bibliographic information