Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value

Theory and Evidence

  • Jennifer Carpenter
  • David Yermack

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-ix
  2. Part One

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Martin J. Conyon, Joachim Schwalbach
      Pages 13-33
    3. Brian J. Hall
      Pages 35-46
  3. Part Two

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 53-53
    2. Arthur H. Rosenbloom
      Pages 77-79
  4. Part Three

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 81-81
    2. Steve Matsunaga
      Pages 143-146
    3. John Samuels
      Pages 147-148
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 149-159

About this book


Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.


CEO Shareholder Shareholder Value performance

Editors and affiliations

  • Jennifer Carpenter
    • 1
  • David Yermack
    • 1
  1. 1.Stern School of BusinessNew York UniversityUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag US 1999
  • Publisher Name Springer, Boston, MA
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-1-4419-5041-3
  • Online ISBN 978-1-4757-5192-5
  • Series Print ISSN 1387-6899
  • Buy this book on publisher's site