Collective Decision Making

Views from Social Choice and Game Theory

  • Adrian Van Deemen
  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

Part of the Theory and Decision Library C book series (TDLC, volume 43)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xiv
  2. Adrian van Deemen, M. Elena Saiz
    Pages 69-83
  3. Maurice Salles, Feng Zhang
    Pages 85-97
  4. Wulf Gaertner
    Pages 125-136
  5. Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman
    Pages 137-150
  6. Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour
    Pages 169-184
  7. Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska
    Pages 185-209
  8. René Janssen, Herman Monsuur
    Pages 211-230

About this book


This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.


Alternative Coalition Formation Electoral Systems Social Choice Social Choice Theory Voting Systems game theory

Editors and affiliations

  • Adrian Van Deemen
    • 1
  • Agnieszka Rusinowska
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for Management ResearchRadboud UniversityNijmegenNetherlands
  2. 2.CNRS UMR 5824, Groupe d'Analyse et de ThéorieUniversité Lyon 2Ecully CXFrance

Bibliographic information