# Some Thoughts on the Logical Aspects of the Problem of Evil

• Ricardo Sousa Silvestre
Chapter
Part of the Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures book series (SCPT, volume 34)

## Abstract

My purpose in this chapter is to take seriously the idea that problem of evil is an incompatibility between the proposition that the world was created and is ruled by an omnipotent, omniscient and unlimitedly good being and one that says that there is evil and suffering in our world. Besides being in accordance with much of the literature on the problem of evil, this idea takes the problem at face value, that is to say, it sees it as a logical and incompatibility problem. More important than that, it allows for a comprehensive and elegant account of the key concepts involved in the debate: the concept of problem of evil itself, the concept of argument from evil, the concepts of logical and evidential problems of evil and the concepts of theodicy and defense can be seen and defined from the standpoint of the same general idea.

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