A Replication Study to Explore Network-Based Co-residency of Virtual Machines in the Cloud

  • Sanchay GuptaEmail author
  • Robert MiceliEmail author
  • Joel CoffmanEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12403)


By deploying virtual machines (VMs) on shared infrastructure in the cloud, users gain flexibility, increase scalability, and decrease their operational costs compared to on-premise infrastructure. However, a cloud environment introduces new vulnerabilities, particularly from untrusted users sharing the same physical hardware. In 2009, Ristenpart et al. demonstrated that an attacker could place a VM on the same physical hardware and extract confidential information from a target using a side-channel attack. We replicated this seminal work on cloud cartography and network-based co-residency tests on Amazon Web Services (AWS) and OpenStack cloud infrastructures. Although the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) cloud cartography remains similar to prior work, current mitigations deter the network-based co-residency tests. OpenStack’s cloud cartography differs from EC2’s, and we found that OpenStack was vulnerable to one network-based co-residency test. Our results indicate that co-residency threats remain a concern more than a decade after their initial description.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Engineering for ProfessionalsJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer and Cyber SciencesUnited States Air Force AcademyAir Force AcademyUSA

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