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Der freie Wille – eine Illusion?

  • Ruth Metten
Chapter
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Zusammenfassung

In diesem Kapitel kommen Untersuchungen zur Sprache, die belegen sollen, dass Willensfreiheit schlicht eine Illusion ist. Trifft dies zu, wovon namhafte Wissenschaftler durchaus überzeugt sind, würde das unser Leben dramatisch verändern. Doch kann der freie Wille tatsächlich bereits als widerlegt gelten? Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse widersprechen dieser Annahme. Bewusste Prozesse der Entscheidungsfindung sind also keineswegs vom Tisch ...

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Deutschland, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruth Metten
    • 1
  1. 1.GemeinschaftspraxisKempenDeutschland

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