Representation and Warranty Clause and Disclosure of Information in Acquisitions

  • Ryutaro NozakiEmail author
  • Moriki Hosoe


In this study, we analyze that whether represent and warranty clauses can solve information asymmetries between the seller and the buyer concerning with the firm value and the amount of damages in the future. In concrete, we derive the conditions to be solved the asymmetric information among them under anti-sandbagging provision and pro-sandbagging provision.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsKurume UniversityKurume-Shi, FukuokaJapan
  2. 2.Emeritus ProfessorKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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