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BSCA-P: Privacy Preserving Coalition Formation

  • Bastian Blankenburg
  • Matthias Klusch
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3550)

Abstract

In the setting of cooperation of rational web service agents via coalition formation, we devise an algorithm BSCA-P to form recursively bilateral Shapley value stable coalitions. The main focus lies on privacy aspects: we show that the BSCA-P enables the formation of subgame stable and individually rational coalitions while hiding absolute coalition values and payoffs, as well as allowing for anonymous service requests and access.

Keywords

Multiagent System Coalition Formation Coalition Game Cooperative Game Theory Stable Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bastian Blankenburg
    • 1
  • Matthias Klusch
    • 1
  1. 1.DFKI – German Research Center for Artificial IntelligenceSaarbrückenGermany

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