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Automated Analysis of Infinite Scenarios

  • Mikael Buchholtz
Conference paper
  • 232 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3705)

Abstract

The security of a network protocol crucially relies on the scenario in which the protocol is deployed. This paper describes syntactic constructs for modelling network scenarios and presents an automated analysis tool, which can guarantee that security properties hold in all of the (infinitely many) instances of a scenario. The tool is based on control flow analysis of the process calculus LySa and is applied to the Bauer, Berson, and Feiertag protocol where is reveals a previously undocumented problem, which occurs in some scenarios but not in other.

Keywords

Automate Analysis Security Protocol Security Property Parallel Composition Static Authentication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mikael Buchholtz
    • 1
  1. 1.Informatics and Mathematical ModellingTechnical University of DenmarkKgs. Lyngby

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