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Protection Against Format String Attacks by Binary Rewriting

  • Jin Ho You
  • Seong Chae Seo
  • Young Dae Kim
  • Jun Yong Choi
  • Sang Jun Lee
  • Byung Ki Kim
Conference paper
  • 173 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3802)

Abstract

We propose a binary rewriting system called Kimchi that modifies binary programs to protect them from format string attacks in runtime. Kimchi replaces the machine code calling conventional printf with code calling a safer version of printf, safe_printf, that prevents its format string from accessing arguments exceeding the stack frame of the parent function. With the proposed static analysis and binary rewriting method, it can protect binary programs even if they do not use the frame pointer register or link the printf code statically. In addition, it replaces the printf calls without extra format arguments like printf(buffer) with the safe code printf(”%s”, buffer), which are not vulnerable, and reduces the performance overhead of the patched program by not modifying the calls to printf with the format string argument located in the read-only memory segment, which are not vulnerable to the format string attack.

Keywords

Binary Code Parent Function Machine Code Performance Overhead Format String 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jin Ho You
    • 1
  • Seong Chae Seo
    • 1
  • Young Dae Kim
    • 1
  • Jun Yong Choi
    • 2
  • Sang Jun Lee
    • 3
  • Byung Ki Kim
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceChonnam National UniversityGwangjuKorea
  2. 2.School of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceKyungpook National UniversityDaeguKorea
  3. 3.Department of Internet Information CommunicationShingyeong UniversityGyeonggi-doKorea

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