Provable Security of On-Demand Distance Vector Routing in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

  • Gergely Ács
  • Levente Buttyán
  • István Vajda
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3813)


In this paper, we propose a framework for the security analysis of on-demand, distance vector routing protocols for ad hoc networks, such as AODV, SAODV, and ARAN. The proposed approach is an adaptation of the simulation paradigm that is used extensively for the analysis of cryptographic algorithms and protocols, and it provides a rigorous method for proving that a given routing protocol is secure. We demonstrate the approach by representing known and new attacks on SAODV in our framework, and by proving that ARAN is secure in our model.


Route Discovery Route Request Route Reply Route Discovery Process Provable Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gergely Ács
    • 1
  • Levente Buttyán
    • 1
  • István Vajda
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Department of TelecommunicationsBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsHungary

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