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Side Channel Attacks on Message Authentication Codes

  • Katsuyuki Okeya
  • Tetsu Iwata
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3813)

Abstract

Side channel attacks are a serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications which are utilized in sensor and ad hoc networks. In this paper we show that side channel attacks can be applied to message authentication codes, even if the countermeasure is applied to the underlying block cipher. In particular, we show that EMAC, OMAC, and PMAC are vulnerable to our attack. Based on simple power analysis, we show that several key bits can be extracted, and based on differential power analysis, we present selective forgery against these MACs. Our results suggest that protecting block ciphers against side channel attacks is not sufficient, and countermeasures are needed for MACs as well.

Keywords

Side Channel Attacks MACs Selective Forgery SPA DPA 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Katsuyuki Okeya
    • 1
  • Tetsu Iwata
    • 2
  1. 1.Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development LaboratoryKawasakiJapan
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer and Information SciencesIbaraki UniversityHitachi, IbarakiJapan

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