One-Time Sensors: A Novel Concept to Mitigate Node-Capture Attacks

  • Kemal Bicakci
  • Chandana Gamage
  • Bruno Crispo
  • Andrew S. Tanenbaum
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3813)


Dealing with captured nodes is generally accepted as the most difficult challenge to wireless sensor network security. By utilizing the low-cost property of sensor nodes, we introduce the novel concept of one-time sensors to mitigate node-capture attacks. The basic idea is to load each sensor with only one cryptographic token so that the captured node can inject only a single malicious message into the network. In addition, sybil attacks are avoided and explicit revocation is not necessary using one-time sensors. By using public key techniques, one-way hash functions and Merkle’s hash tree, we also show efficient implementations and interesting tradeoffs for one-time sensors.


Sensor network security one-time sensor node-capture attack sybil attack Merkle’s hash tree 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kemal Bicakci
    • 1
  • Chandana Gamage
    • 1
  • Bruno Crispo
    • 1
  • Andrew S. Tanenbaum
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceVrije Universiteit AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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