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A Practical Alternative to Domain and Type Enforcement Integrity Formal Models

  • Liuying Tang
  • Sihan Qing
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4318)

Abstract

Much secure system policy development uses the DTE (Domain and Type Enforcement) model, but the DTE model cannot explicitly provide the security goals of the policy. The invariants of the only based-DTE integrity protection formal model are too complex and make the model impractical. A DTE-Biba integrity formal model is proposed, in which DTE is the underlying component and the Biba integrity is the security goal. The DTE-Biba formal model describes direct Biba control relationships, and ignores the integrity level of objects. The aim is to provide the foundation for supporting effective policy configuration, policy integrity analysis and integrity verification of the DTE secure systems.

Keywords

Security label security goal integrity information flow formal model 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liuying Tang
    • 1
    • 2
    • 4
  • Sihan Qing
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Engineering Research Center of Fundamental Software, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of ScienceBeijingPRC
  2. 2.Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingPRC
  3. 3.ZhongkeAnsheng Corporation of Information TechnologyBeijingPRC
  4. 4.Graduate School of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingPRC

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