The Effects



The preceding chapter dealt with two factors that are decisive for a politi- cal economy moving to the right side of the continuum. In both cases, the market is assumed to be the most efficient instrument for the pursuit of individual wealth. It is with a certain euphoria that Western political leaders claim the success of this market.


Poverty Line Private Security Unemployed People Gated Community Corporate Business 
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Chapter 4

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