Social Interdependence and Decision Making

  • David M. Messick


When we think about social interdependence and decision making we often tend to think about game theory in contrast to decision theory. Game theory, after all, is the analysis of decision making and strategic planning in environments that are not neutral or indifferent to our goals and actions. These environments consist of others who have their own plans, intentions, and strategies, and of others with whom we must effectively cope to be effective decision makers. Game theory is limited, however, in that is normally begins with assumptions about the preferences of the persons involved, about what the persons know about each other, and about the form of the interdependence that exists among the participants. It does not deal with the problem of how the preferences came about in the first place, for example, or the conditions under which people will opt to change the nature of their interdependence. These two issues are the two foci of this chapter.


Relative Deprivation Approval Vote Plurality Vote Replenishment Rate False Feedback 
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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • David M. Messick
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA

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