Randomized Fault Tolerant Group Testing and Advanced Security

  • My T. ThaiEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Optimization book series (BRIEFSOPTI)


In this chapter, we further optimize the time complexity of the scheme discussed in  Chap. 3 and provide more advanced solutions. In detail, a randomized fault-tolerant group testing construction to reduce the computational cost, compared to the one using irreducible polynomials on Galois Field is introduced. Based on such a new GT construction, a more robust defense solution to an advanced jamming attack is presented for various network scenarios. Theoretical analysis and simulation results are included to validate the performance of this framework.


Jamming Attacks Victim Node Jamming Signal Jam Area Trigger Node 
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Copyright information

© My T. Thai 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer and Information Science and EngineeringUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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