The Role(s) of Belief in AI

  • Don Perlis
Part of the The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science book series (SECS, volume 597)


Beliefs play complex and sometimes confusing roles in AI. This paper surveys (i) a variety of notions of belief, (ii) formal efforts to characterize beliefs, and (iii) how beliefs are related to action, to language, and to commonsense. In addition, we will consider certain logical tensions between beliefs and consistency.


Belief consistency modality content 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Don Perlis
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Advanced Computer Studies and Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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