Semantic Theory of Truth—Informal Aspects

  • Jan WoleńskiEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 45)


This chapter outlines an intuitive approach to STT, very closely related to Tarski’s original approach. The essential role of the Liar antinomy and its solution by introducing the language/metalanguage distinction is stressed as well as the role of interpreted languages is pointed out. Finally, heuristics of forming the semantic truth definition via the concept of satisfaction is reported.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Jagiellonian University (prof. emeritus)KrakówPoland
  2. 2.University of Information, Technology and ManagementRzeszowPoland

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