• Oche OnaziEmail author
Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT, volume 78)


This chapter introduces the argument of the book. After distinguishing between African group-based and relational conceptions of community, the chapter argues that the latter, with certain modifications, offers a more attractive basis to develop a novel African legal philosophy of disability justice. Building on this foundation, the chapter outlines an African legal philosophy of disability justice comprised of ethical ideals of community, relationships and obligations. Although the scope of this book is limited to setting out as clearly as possible what the proposed African legal philosophy of disability justice would look like, the chapter introduces a civic and citizenship education agenda and a hypothecated tax scheme to concretely nurture and institutionalise a new public moral culture of obligations of people without disabilities to people with disabilities. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the book.


African philosophy African legal philosophy Disability Justice Group-based Conception of Community Relational Conception of Community 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK

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