Game Theory and Fairness Preferences

  • Christian KorthEmail author
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 627)


During the last three decades a lot of attention was given to experimental investigations of the ultimatum game. Contrary to the theoretical “standard” prediction based on maximization of the monetary payoff (responders accepting the smallest possible offer and proposers offering the minimum possible offer), experiments with ultimatum games show that players are typically not simply maximizing their monetary payoff. Instead, responders frequently reject offers they perceive as unfair and proposers anticipate this by offering a substantial share, usually with modal and median offers between 40 and 50 percent. A good overview of the various experiments done with ultimatum games is given by Camerer (2003, chap. 3, tables 2–5). The following section 2.1 very briefly summarizes further experimental evidence that subjects are not always maximizing material payoffs.


Ultimatum Game Dictator Game Monetary Payoff Material Payoff Inequity Aversion 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Law, Business and EconomicsUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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