Requisites: the logic of intensions

  • Marie DužíEmail author
  • Bjørn Jespersen
  • Pavel Materna
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 17)


In Section 2.4.1 we argued in favour of semantic anti-actualism: the actual of all the possible worlds should play no semantic role. In this and the following sections we outline an essentialism that likewise accords no privileged status to the actual world by making the notion of essence independent of world and time and a priori instead .1 At the same time we are arguing in favour of ontological actualism: all the individuals at the actual world are all the individuals there are at all the other possible worlds as well (hence, there are no merely possible individuals, or possibilia).


Actual World Natural Kind Tall Building Metaphysical Necessity Individual Office 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marie Duží
    • 1
    Email author
  • Bjørn Jespersen
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Pavel Materna
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Fac. Electric Engineering and Computer Science, VSB-Technical University OstravaOstravaCzech Republic
  2. 2.Fac. Technology, Policy & Management, Delft University of TechnologyDelftNetherlands
  3. 3.Dept. LogicASCR Prague, Inst. PhilosophyPraha 1Czech Republic
  4. 4.Dept. LogicASCR Praha, Inst. PhilosophyPraha 1Czech Republic
  5. 5.Faculty of Informatics, Faculty of Arts, A. Nováka 1, Masaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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