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Attitudes and information

  • Marie DužíEmail author
  • Bjørn Jespersen
  • Pavel Materna
Chapter
  • 483 Downloads
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 17)

Abstract

Contexts involving attitudes are notorious for challenging the principle of compositionality and for occasioning reference shift from extensions to intensions.1 It is a widespread prejudice that the logic and semantics of attitudes will have to be different than the logic and semantics of so-called extensional contexts. It is commonly held, in particular, that Leibniz’s Law is invalid in attitude contexts and that its invalidity may even define intensional contexts, whereby ‘intensional’ is simply synonymous with ‘non-extensional’. In  Section 1.5.2 we presented Tichý’s objection to identifying intensionality with non-extensionality, as well as his circularity argument to the effect that the definitions of extensional context and the validity of the substitution of co-referential singular terms and existential generalization presuppose one another.

Keywords

Propositional Attitude Literal Meaning Valid Argument Empirical Content True Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marie Duží
    • 1
    Email author
  • Bjørn Jespersen
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Pavel Materna
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Fac. Electric Engineering and Computer Science, VSB-Technical University OstravaOstravaCzech Republic
  2. 2.Fac. Technology, Policy & Management, Delft University of TechnologyDelftNetherlands
  3. 3.Dept. LogicASCR Prague, Inst. PhilosophyPraha 1Czech Republic
  4. 4.Dept. LogicASCR Praha, Inst. PhilosophyPraha 1Czech Republic
  5. 5.Faculty of Informatics, Faculty of Arts, A. Nováka 1, Masaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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