Advertisement

Behavioural Assumptions in Decentralised Stabilisation Policies

  • J. W. Neese
  • R. S. Pindyck
Chapter
Part of the Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics book series (ASTA, volume 3)

Abstract

Macroeconomic policy in the United States is very much the product of a decentralised control process, as is best exemplifed by the separation of monetary and fiscal policy. In the past two or three decades monetary and fiscal policy have not always been coordinated or based on the same objectives. There have been periods in which the objectives differed, and also periods in which the objectives were the same but the world views on which policies are based differed. It has been argued that decentralisation has limited our ability to control the economy effectively.

Keywords

Unemployment Rate Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy Open Loop Monetary Authority 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Fair, R.C. (1976), A Model of Macroeconomic Activeity, Volume II: The Empirical Model, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  2. Fair, R.C. (1978), ‘The sensitivity of fiscal policy effects to assumptions about the behaviour of the Federal Reserve’, Econometrica, 46, pp. 1165–1180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Hnyilicza, E. and R.S. Pindyck (1976), ‘Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC’, European Economic Review, 8, pp. 139–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Ho, Y.C. (1970), ‘Differential games, dynamic optimisation and generalised control theory’, Journal of Optimisation Theory and Applications, 16, pp. 179–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Kydland, F.E. (1975), ‘Non-cooperative and dominant player solutions in discrete dynamic games’, International Economic Review, 16, pp. 321–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Nash, J.F. (1953), ‘Two-person cooperative games’, Econometrica, 21, pp. 128–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Neese, J.W. (1979), ‘Optimal control studies of interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities in the U.S. economy’, Master’s theses, MIT, Department of Ocean Engineering.Google Scholar
  8. Owen, G. (1968), Game Theory, W.B. Saunders, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
  9. Pindyck, R.S. (1973), Optimal Planning for Economic Stabilisation, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  10. Pindyck, R.S. (1976), ‘The cost of conflicting objectives in policy formulation’, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5, pp. 239–248.Google Scholar
  11. Pindyck, R.S. (1977), ‘Optimal economic stabilisation policies under decentralised control and conflicting objectives’, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, AC-22, pp. 517–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Pindyck, R.S., and D.L. Rubinfeld (1981), Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. W. Neese
    • 1
  • R. S. Pindyck
    • 1
  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyUSA

Personalised recommendations