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Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?

  • Jeffrie G. Murphy
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 54)

Abstract

Several years ago I thought that I understood Kant’s theory of criminal punishment—an understanding aided by a Rawlsian reconstruction of certain aspects of that theory.1 I thought that Kant’s theory was profound, inspiring, and—although subject to certain problems—the only morally acceptable theory of punishment.2 I was confident that all philosophical work on problems of crime and punishment could be done within a generally Kantian perspective (which I took to be an unambiguously retributive perspective), and some of my own work exhibited that confidence to an uncritical degree.3

Keywords

Supra Note State Coercion Criminal Punishment Moral Justification Moral Evil 
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References

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    It would still be an important concern, of course, for it attempts to deal with the problem of free riding. But it must be a secondary concern. One will seek to prevent free riding in a practice that provides for a common benefit, but the common benefit (which gives the practice its primary point or justification) cannot itself be the prevention of free riding.Google Scholar
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    see A. Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law (1984). The main focus of Simpson’s book is the famous 1884 English case, familiar to all law students, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884). With respect to this case, Simpson claims that various parties involved for the government felt a conflict between two values: (i) that the law should assert an absolute prohibition against the killing of the innocent and (ii) that the defendants in this particular case, because of the terrible pressure they had been under, should not be made to suffer very much in the way of punishment. A way to satisfy both demands, proposed by various government parties prior to the trial, was this: convict Dudley and Stephens of murder, sentence them to death, and then have the Crown pardon them or commute their sentences. A. Simpson, supra, at 198–255. The latter was in fact the outcome. Id. at 247–48. The scenario was to be an application of strict legal justice conjoined with sovereign mercy and compassion. Given that Kant sometimes seems to care about issues of excuse and is sometimes sensitive to human frailty and vulnerability to powerful temptation, but given also that his theory of the strictly external nature of legal justice seems to preclude his working a strong theory of excuse into the law itself, we might have expected him to follow a similar course—namely,to suggest that when the law as interpreted and administered by the court fails (perhaps necessarily) to take due account of such “inner” factors, then perhaps it is proper for the sovereign to use the power of pardon to show mercy or compassion (or at least administer highly individuated justice) in these cases. Kant does not, however, take this line. Indeed, he explicitly argues that the sovereign should not exercise the power of pardon in such cases. His reason is not one we might expect (e.g.,that the sovereign is no better at reading the inner heart than anyone else) but is rather the following: The right to pardon a criminal (jus aggratiandi), either by mitigating or by entirely remitting the punishment, is certainly the most slippery of all the rights of the sovereign. By exercising it he can demonstrate the splendor of his majesty and yet thereby wreak injustice [unrecht] to a high degree. With respect to a crime of one subject against another, he absolutely cannot exercise this right, for in such cases exemption from punishment (impunitas criminis) constitutes the greatest injustice toward his subjects. Consequently, he can make use of this right of pardon only in connection with an injury committed against himself (crimen laesae majestatis). But, even in these cases, he cannot allow a crime to go unpunished if the safety of the people might be endangered thereby. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 22, at *337.Kant does suggest, however, that the sovereign should exercise his power of pardon when social utility demands it: Anyone who is a murderer—that is, has committed a murder, commanded one, or taken part in one—must suffer death. This is what [legal] justice as the Idea of the judicial authority wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded a priori. The number of accomplices...in such a deed might, however, be so large that the state would soon approach the condition of having no more subjects if it were to rid itself of these criminals, and this would lead to its dissolution and a return to the state of nature, which is much worse, because it would be a state of affairs without any external legal justice whatsoever. Since a sovereign will want to avoid such consequences and, above all, will want to avoid adversely affecting the feelings of the people by the spectacle of such butchery, he must have it within his power in case of necessity (casus necesitatis) to assume the role of judge and to pronounce a judgment that, instead of imposing the death penalty on the criminals, assigns some other punishment that will make the preservation of the mass of the people possible, such as, for example, deportation. Id. at *334. This is puzzling. According to Kant’s theory of public crimes (crimes for which punishments are appropriate), all crimes are in some sense crimes against sovereignty. And thus all crimes, not simply ones directed against the person who happens to hold sovereign office, should be equally eligible for pardon. And if social utility (of all things!—given Kant’s frequent sermons on the priority of justice over utility) serves to justify pardon, then it is unclear why mercy, compassion, and a desire to attain greater precision and individuation with respect to justice (than is possible for the courts) might not also serve as justification. The issues of forgiveness, mercy, and individuated justice (and the relation of these virtues to the power of pardon) are simply too rich for the superficial treatment Kant here accords them. For further discussion of these matters, seeGoogle Scholar
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    Let me again remind the reader that part of my argument in this essay is that we must not simply assume the correctness of the common interpretation of Kant as an unambiguous retributivist.Google Scholar
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    For example: Kant claims that children born out of wedlock—and thus in the state of nature rather than in civil society—may be thought to have less value and fewer rights than legitimate children. The child has, after all, “crept surreptitiously into the commonwealth (...like prohibited wares), so that its existence as well as its destruction can be ignored.” Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 22, at *336.Google Scholar
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    There is another problem here for the “fair play” interpretation of Kantian retributivism. If the wrongness of criminal conduct simply consists in the unfairness of failing to exercise the self-restraint of obeying the law in cases where one expects others to do this, it is hard to see how—on this theory of wrongness—criminaloffenses could be graded on a scale of seriousness so that any form of a proportionality principle could be applied. Murder seems worse than robbery, but it is not in any obvious way more unfair in the relevant sense.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeffrie G. Murphy
    • 1
  1. 1.College of LawArizona State UniversityTempeUSA

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