Civilian Power and International Relations: the EU and Multilateralism from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century

  • Mario Telò


While not neglecting the deep historical roots of the united political entity emerging in Europe, this book looks primarily at the evolution of the EU as a civilian power since the end of the Second World War. The gradual construction of the EU contribution to global governance and of the new Europe’s international identity itself owes less to controversial cultural heritage than it does to the following three factors:
  1. 1.

    the expansive force and attractiveness of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between neighbouring states, as confirmed by the success of the European project so far (1950–2005), its widening and deepening, and the spread of similar regional organizations in the rest of the world. As comparative research tells us, the distinctive feature of the EU is the practice of pooled and shared sovereignty among member states, i.e. the combination of cooperation and supranationality that characterizes the political and institutional structure of the EU, revising the traditional state system which traces its roots back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648);

  2. 2.

    the renewed distinctiveness of the European socioeconomic ‘model’ within the partially globalized economy, as a sophisticated example of the institutional management of global governance, inspired by a pluralistic view of globalization;



Foreign Policy World Trade Organization International Relation Security Council Global Governance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Mario Telò 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mario Telò
    • 1
  1. 1.Brussels Free University, ULBBelgium

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