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National Economic Voting in France: Objective versus Subjective Measures

  • Éric Bélanger
  • Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Chapter
Part of the French Politics, Society and Culture Series book series (FPSC)

Abstract

Economic voting work on France is plentiful. Indeed, on that subject, France has been investigated more than any other democracy, except the United States (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). These efforts suggest that the French voter is highly sensitive to swings in the national economy. Investigations generally follow one of two designs: aggregate time series or individual surveys. In both designs the economy is measured, but in apparently irreconcilable ways. The time series studies explore popularity or vote functions, searching for the effects of objective economic indicators, such as growth, unemployment, or inflation. The surveys formulate vote (intention) equations that include subjective economic indicators, such as sociotropic assessments of national economic performance.

Keywords

Economic Indicator Presidential Election Annual Percent Change Macroeconomic Indicator American National Election Study 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Éric Bélanger
  • Michael S. Lewis-Beck

There are no affiliations available

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