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Strategic Voting in the 2002 French Presidential Election

  • André Blais
Chapter
Part of the French Politics, Society and Culture Series book series (FPSC)

Abstract

One of the arguments in favor of the two round system is that people can express their preference among all the candidates in the first round and then decide, in the second round, which of the top two contenders they find acceptable. According to that perspective, voters are allowed to vote “sincerely” on the first ballot and do not have to worry about the candidates’ chances of winning. Furthermore, because there are only two candidates on the second ballot, there is no reason or purpose in thinking strategically on the second ballot either. In both instances, voters do not have to get into complex strategic considerations. They simply express their preference among all the candidates on the first ballot and among the top two contenders on the second.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • André Blais

There are no affiliations available

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