Modern Tolerance

A Practical and Theoretical Critique
  • Aaron Tyler


Migration has been a potent corollary to globalization. The mass immigration of Muslims to Europe is most significant, with millions of second- and third-generation immigrants now residing in Europe. Muslims from the Maghreb, West Africa, Turkey, the Indian subcontinent, and the Arabian Peninsula continue to immigrate to the European continent in overwhelming numbers. The number of Muslims in Europe is unknown—and estimates vary widely. One study concludes that about 17 million Muslims currently reside in the European Union—some 24 million when those European states currently negotiating membership or candidacy (not including Turkey) are included.1 According to numbers released by the Central Institute’s Islam Archives in Soest, Germany, France has the greatest number of Muslims—primarily from the Maghreb—at well over 5 million, and Germany is next with more than 3 million, mostly of Turkish and Kurdish origin. While still a clear minority in European society (between 4 percent and 5 percent), the number of Muslims in Europe is expanding rapidly, increasing by well over 800,000 since 2003. What is more, the Central Institute has labeled Islam as a “young religion,” with, for instance, 850,000 Muslim minors living in Germany alone.2 In one of his latest studies on religious demographics, Pennsylvania State University professor Philip Jenkins discusses how Muslims in France—who currently represent 25 percent of France’s “under twenty-five” population—could conceivably comprise that same percentage of its entire population by the middle of the century.3


Body Politic Comprehensive Doctrine Civil Unity Ultimate Concern Modern Western Society 
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  1. 1.
    CIA Factbook, available at; cited in Philip Jenkins, God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 16.Google Scholar
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    Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 16.Google Scholar
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© Aaron Tyler 2008

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  • Aaron Tyler

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