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Misunderstanding Terrorism: The Sword

  • Robert J. Jackson
  • Philip Towle
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Abstract

After 9/11, the Bush administration was tempted into adopting a strategy as old as war itself to avenge and protect America: the use of both the sword and the shield. But that choice was based on a serious misunderstanding of the terrorist threat, and consequently the government made grave mistakes in its foreign policy. The administration should have attempted to win over the terrorists’ supporters in the wider community, and formed an international coalition against the threat and to isolate the extremists. Its bellicose policies had the reverse effects because terrorism cannot be curbed by military force.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Terrorist Attack Terrorist Organization Bush Administration Suicide Bomber 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 2.
    see Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, ‘Misunderstanding Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004), 8–13.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    See Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 5.
    Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins and Konrad Kellen, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1985).Google Scholar
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    Philip Jenkins, Images of Terror: What We Can and Can’t Know about Terrorism (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003).Google Scholar
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    Cited in Bruce Hoffman, ‘AI Qaeda and the War on Terrorism: An Update’, Current History (December 2004), 423–6.Google Scholar
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    Robert S. Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005), 120–35.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Robert J. Jackson and Philip Towle 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert J. Jackson
    • 1
  • Philip Towle
    • 2
  1. 1.University of RedlandsUSA
  2. 2.Centre of International StudiesCambridge UniversityUK

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