Creating Quagmires: Winning the Wars, Losing the Peace

  • Robert J. Jackson
  • Philip Towle


The ‘war on terrorism’ is a classic illustration of the dangers inherent in succumbing to the temptation to use military power. The consequences of recent unleashed American military power will be with us for decades. A month after September 11 2001 the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the government of Afghanistan, to be followed by Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq on March 19 2003. The names for the operations were, no doubt, chosen to advertise their benevolent objectives, but in each case the question has become not just whether the United States and its allies were justified but whether they have created quagmires: winning the conventional wars but losing the ‘peace’.


Security Council Imperial Police Operation Iraqi Freedom Army Officer Suicide Terrorism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Robert J. Jackson and Philip Towle 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert J. Jackson
    • 1
  • Philip Towle
    • 2
  1. 1.University of RedlandsUSA
  2. 2.Centre of International StudiesCambridge UniversityUK

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