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Justified True Belief?

  • James Kraft
Chapter
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Abstract

The reader might not be convinced that problems In mainstream epistemology are relevant for the discussion of ordinary and religious disagreements, problems discussed soon like the Gettler problem, the debate between internalism and externallsm, and the lottery problem. Yet, in the process of describing such problems, a framework will surface that deeply Informs the discussion of disagreements. In fact, disagreements can’t be understood at the deepest level without an understanding of such problems as the Gettler phenomenon and its aftermath, as we shall see.

Keywords

True Belief Fourth Condition Gettier Case Virtue Epistemology False Assumption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© James Kraft 2012

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  • James Kraft

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