Varieties of Luck and Possible Worlds

  • James Kraft


Since it is so crucial for understanding knowledge to see that it is Incompatible with luck, let’s take a closer look at the luck element of Gettier and other cases. In essence when we say that someone was lucky In an action or in having a belief, what we mean is the following: the person gets the belief right, but easily could have gotten It wrong. Notice the word “could” In this commonsense understanding of luck. Does the “could” refer to anything in the actual, everyday world we experience? Not necessarily, because It refers to ways the person may have gotten the belief wrong, but didn’t necessarily.


Actual World True Belief Error Possibility Lottery Paradox Nearby World 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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  • James Kraft

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