Skepticism between Beginner’s and Lottery Luck
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No Issue has occupied epistemologists more than the problem of skepticism; and for good reason, since the seductive siren song of the skeptic presumes to show that nobody has any knowledge. In a popular version of skepticism, the skeptic works her magic by convincing the opponent both that he doesn’t know some possible, alternative world isn’t happening, and that this deficiency nullifies any ordinary knowledge. Because responses to skeptical challenges so closely parallel responses to ordinary and, ultimately, religious disagreements, a closer look at skepticism will pay great dividends for understanding disagreements. The problem of skepticism, like the Gettier, lottery, and disagreement Issues, Is about how to cope with the ever-present possibility of making a mistake when forming and retaining beliefs. The treatment of skepticism here focuses on describing the structure of an important version of skepticism as it relates to disagreement, rather than on describing every variety of skepticism and on exhaustively detailing all the excellent literature on skepticism.
KeywordsActual World True Belief Parity Principle Modus Ponens Religious Disagreement
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