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Ordinary Disagreements

  • James Kraft
Chapter
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Abstract

Disagreements involve one person telling another she is wrong. But this is only half the story. A conversation where people merely state their perspectives in relation to alternatives is more like a report or lecture, than a disagreement. In a disagreement the person tries to show the other how she is wrong while attempting to win the other over. People also engage in disagreements in order to reconfirm that they are thinking properly. Without these motives one might as well save one’s breath.

Keywords

Actual World True Belief Epistemic Principle Relevant Similarity Error Possibility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© James Kraft 2012

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  • James Kraft

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