- 71 Downloads
Disagreements involve one person telling another she is wrong. But this is only half the story. A conversation where people merely state their perspectives in relation to alternatives is more like a report or lecture, than a disagreement. In a disagreement the person tries to show the other how she is wrong while attempting to win the other over. People also engage in disagreements in order to reconfirm that they are thinking properly. Without these motives one might as well save one’s breath.
KeywordsActual World True Belief Epistemic Principle Relevant Similarity Error Possibility
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.Bryan Frances, “Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors,” forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2011).Google Scholar
- 10.John DePoe, “The Significance of Religious Disagreement,” in Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.Google Scholar
- 12.Peter van Inwagen, “‘It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and For Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence,’” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 137–53, see 142.Google Scholar
- 16.Tyler Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI, 1998), 21–83.Google Scholar
- 20.Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford, 2006), 216–36, 439.Google Scholar
- 22.Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreement,” in Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, ed. Alan Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137–57.Google Scholar
- 23.Michael Thune, “‘Partial Defeaters’ and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” The Philosophical Quarterly (2009).Google Scholar
- 27.Ren Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 11.Google Scholar
- 33.Robert Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 98–112.Google Scholar
- David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973).Google Scholar
- Douglas Kutach, “Similarity is a Bad Guide to Counterfactual Truth” (paper presented at the The American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Portland Oregon, March 22, 2006).Google Scholar
- James Kraft, “An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion,” Ars Disputandi 9 (2009).Google Scholar