Nonreductive Religious Disagreement

  • James Kraft


Let’s explore some of the views that think there is no need for a person to reduce confidence in the justification of a belief during epistemic peer religious disagreement. The ensuing selection, though not exhaustive, is meant to yield a wide and deep understanding of the variety of nonreductive perspectives. As a historical note, it is interesting to recognize that intense scholarly discussion of disagreement started among philosophers of religion, many discussed in this chapter, more than a decade before mainstream epistemologists around 2005—like Thomas Kelly, David Christensen, Richard Feldman, and Adam Elga—engaged the issue.


Basic Belief Moral Intuition Religious Disagreement Epistemic Obligation Positive Epistemic Status 
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© James Kraft 2012

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  • James Kraft

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