Nonreductive Religious Disagreement
- 71 Downloads
Let’s explore some of the views that think there is no need for a person to reduce confidence in the justification of a belief during epistemic peer religious disagreement. The ensuing selection, though not exhaustive, is meant to yield a wide and deep understanding of the variety of nonreductive perspectives. As a historical note, it is interesting to recognize that intense scholarly discussion of disagreement started among philosophers of religion, many discussed in this chapter, more than a decade before mainstream epistemologists around 2005—like Thomas Kelly, David Christensen, Richard Feldman, and Adam Elga—engaged the issue.
KeywordsBasic Belief Moral Intuition Religious Disagreement Epistemic Obligation Positive Epistemic Status
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).Google Scholar
- 9.Philip Quinn, “The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga,” in Rational Faith, ed. Linda Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 14–47.Google Scholar
- 12.Alvin Plantinga, “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Phillip Quinn and Kevin Meeker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172–92, see 182.Google Scholar
- 23.John DePoe, “The Significance of Religious Disagreement,” in Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.Google Scholar
- 24.David Basinger, Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), 11.Google Scholar
- 30.Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1969), #163.Google Scholar