Principle of Conservatism:
If there are no decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief, then conserve the belief with just as much confidence in its justification.
If relevant symmetries surface making error possibilities relevant because one sees no way in which one is better epistemically situated for a belief than the other person, then there are decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief.
Conservatism Frustrater, Possible Worlds:
If relevant symmetries surface making one suspect that an error-producing or belief-abandoning possible world is nearby, then there are decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief.
KeywordsReligious Belief True Belief Religious Experience Religious Disagreement Epistemic Situation
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