• James Kraft


The time has arrived to talk about the view that confidence is reduced in epistemic peer religious disagreements. The treatment here assumes that the Conservatism Principle and the Conservatism Frustrater described in Chapter 4 apply to religious disagreements just as much as they do to ordinary ones, and here they are again:

Principle of Conservatism:

If there are no decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief, then conserve the belief with just as much confidence in its justification.

Conservatism Frustrater:

If relevant symmetries surface making error possibilities relevant because one sees no way in which one is better epistemically situated for a belief than the other person, then there are decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief.

Conservatism Frustrater, Possible Worlds:

If relevant symmetries surface making one suspect that an error-producing or belief-abandoning possible world is nearby, then there are decisive grounds for questioning the justification of the belief.


Religious Belief True Belief Religious Experience Religious Disagreement Epistemic Situation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© James Kraft 2012

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  • James Kraft

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