The Enemy Within: Insurgency and the Failure of the Nigerian State

  • J. N. C. Hill


There are two parts to Nigeria’s failure. First, the Federal Government does not exercise total control over the whole of the country’s sovereign territory. There are places in the Niger Delta and the north-eastern state of Borno in which Abuja’s writ does not run. Second, the Federal Government does not provide all of its citizens with the security, basic health care, primary education and other public goods that it should. It is failing to protect and promote the flourishing of all Nigerians.


Police Officer Armed Force Ordinary People Niger Delta Security Force 
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Copyright information

© J.N.C. Hill 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. N. C. Hill
    • 1
  1. 1.King’s College LondonUK

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