A Framework for Analysing Presidential-Legislative Relations in Asia

  • Yuko Kasuya


This chapter provides a broad-brush picture of the relationship between presidents and assemblies in Asia. As discussed in the Introduction, in countries with a popularly elected chief-executive (or president), the way the president deals with the legislature has a crucial impact on the governance of that country. This chapter is concerned with the ‘strength’ of Asian presidents vis-à-vis the assembly, with strength defined as the degree to which the president can realize her policy agenda for the nation.


Veto Player Presidential Decree Seat Share Party Discipline Comparative Political Study 
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© Yuko Kasuya 2013

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  • Yuko Kasuya

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