Trading Compromises: Interaction of Powers in the Philippine Presidential System
- 63 Downloads
From a comparative perspective, the presidential legislative power in the Philippines is at the middle level, in both constitutional and partisan powers (Shugart and Carey 1992; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). This middle-level strength raises some problems for researchers. Generally, it is more difficult to explain why it is neither weak nor strong than why it is weak or strong. It is also difficult to examine empirically. In conventional arguments in the studies on Philippine politics, however, there have been two contrasting views on presidential power. One claims that the Philippine president is strong. This group focuses on constitutional powers, and the administrative control over the bureaucracy (de Dios 1999, 2002). Another emphasizes the influence of a dominant social class in the Congress. This group claims that presidential legislative initiatives that undermine social interests usually fail, due to the resistance of the Congress (see, for example, Abueva 2002).
KeywordsEnactment Rate Party System Debt Service Budget Process Divided Government
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Abueva, J. V. (2002) ‘Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentary Government by 2010’, in J. V. Abueva, R. M. Teves, G. C. Sosmeña, Jr., C. R. Carlos and M. O. Mastura (eds), Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines with a Parliamentaty Government: A Reader (Marikina City: Center for Social Policy and Governance Kalayaan College).Google Scholar
- de Dios, E. S. (1999) ‘Executive-Legislative Relations in the Philippines: Continuity and Change’, in C. Barlow (ed.), Institutions and Economic Change in Southeast Asia: The Context of Development from the 1960s to the 1990s (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).Google Scholar
- de Dios, E. S. (2002) ‘Nationalism and the Strong State in the 1935 Philippine Constitution’, The Philippine Review of Economics, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1–19.Google Scholar
- de Dios, E. S. and H. S. Esfahani (2001) ‘Centralization, Political Turnover, and Investment in the Philippines’, in J. E. Campos (ed.), Corruption: The Boom and Bust of East Asia (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University).Google Scholar
- Eaton, K. (2002) Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in 1990s (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press).Google Scholar
- Gutierrez, E. (1998) ‘The Public Purse’, in S. S. Coronel (ed.) Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines (Pasig City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism).Google Scholar
- Haggard, S. and M. D. McCubbins (eds) (2001) Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
- Kasuya, Y. (2008) Presidential Bandwagon: Parties and Party Systems in the Philippines (Tokyo: Keio University Press).Google Scholar
- Kawanaka, T. (2002) Power in a Philippine City (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies).Google Scholar
- Kawanaka, T. (2008) Who Eats the Most? Quantitative Analysis of the Pork Barrel Distributions in the Philippines, October, IDE Discussion Paper No. 126.Google Scholar
- Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar