Conclusion: Lessons from the Study of Asian Presidentialism

  • Yuko Kasuya


Throughout this volume, we have explored the strength of Asian presidents vis-à-vis their respective national legislatures. In doing so, we first provided a broad-brush picture of the degree of strength among presidents in the countries under study (Chapter 2). Strength, which refers to a president’s ability to enact her policy agenda, was measured by a two-dimensional framework, one dimension focusing on the president’s constitutional authority over legislation, and the other addressing her influence through political parties. Succeeding country-study chapters (Chapters 3 to 8) provided details and nuances of presidential strength in Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. In particular, each chapter analysed whether the assessment given in Chapter 2 is relevant, and if not, why not. In this concluding chapter, I discuss issues raised by previous chapters in view of the existing theories on presidential-legislative relations. The aim here is to clarify the characteristics of Asian presidential/semi-presidential regimes, and to address theoretical issues that require future research.


Common Framework Veto Player Electoral Rule Parliamentary Election Seat Share 
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© Yuko Kasuya 2013

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  • Yuko Kasuya

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