• Heather Marquette
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


In 1997, the World Bank announced its intention to provide a ‘systematic framework for addressing corruption as a development issue in the assistance it provides to countries and in its operation work more generally’.1 This included:
  • Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects.

  • Helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce corruption.

  • Taking corruption more explicitly into account in country assistance strategies, country lending considerations, the policy dialogue, analytical work, and the choice and design of projects.

  • Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption.2

Although the Bank acknowledged that some of these areas were new territory and would require new staff, new areas of expertise, new procedures and new lending instruments, it claimed that it had long been concerned with corruption. Indeed, a recent report asserts that the Bank has been ‘in the business’ of combating corruption, ‘since its very inception.’3


Civil Society Good Governance Authoritarian Regime Bank Lending Legal Reform 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Heather Marquette 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heather Marquette
    • 1
  1. 1.International Development DepartmentUniversity of BirminghamUK

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