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The Emergence of a Development Agency, 1944–1981

  • Heather Marquette
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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

In 1997, the World Bank announced a commitment to combating corruption within its own projects and within its client countries. The first has always been a concern of the Bank since its inception. The second marked a complete departure from past Bank activity, where the Bank had dealt with some of the world’s most notoriously corrupt dictators and political regimes, often in the face of heavy criticism from many of its shareholders. This current focus on corruption at the World Bank must thus be seen both within the context of an overall international movement and as the result of certain historical events. It is important to examine the changing philosophy of development at the Bank, with the Bank both informing and being informed by changes in development theory, and also the significance of changes in Bank leadership.

Keywords

International Monetary Fund Development Agency External Debt Bank Lending Most Favour Nation 
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Notes

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Copyright information

© Heather Marquette 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heather Marquette
    • 1
  1. 1.International Development DepartmentUniversity of BirminghamUK

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