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The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Programme

  • Heather Marquette
Chapter
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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

Previous chapters have built a theoretical and historical context for the Bank’s anti-corruption programme. The complexity of the Bank’s approach also means that one has to have a full understanding of how the Bank works in order to evaluate its anti-corruption programme: its lending programmes and products, its evaluation processes, interactions between regions and sectors and its external relations. However, the size of the project undertaken means I must restrict myself to the Bank’s key four-pronged strategy. As Operations Evaluation Department (OED) points out, ‘the menu of potential actions to curtail corruption is very large so a framework is needed that provides guidance on ordering potential actions’.1 I have used the Bank’s own strategy to guide my evaluation and recommendations, following the logic of Bade Onimode, editor of the 1989 text IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt, who stated, ‘To evaluate the World Bank’s programmes, we should … use their own figures, their own language, to see whether what they set out to do has been done.’2

Keywords

Civil Society Oversight Committee Bank Staff Financial Action Task Force Public Sector Reform 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Heather Marquette 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heather Marquette
    • 1
  1. 1.International Development DepartmentUniversity of BirminghamUK

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