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The Significance of Comparative Advantage in Donor Work on Corruption

  • Heather Marquette
Chapter
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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

Johannes Linn, the Bank’s VP for the ECA region, recently posed four questions regarding the risk of overload for the Bank due to its work on governance:
  • First, by trying to address the roots of poor governance, the Bank may overload the reform agenda and overstretch both its own limited capacities and those of its counterparts.

  • Second, even the most committed reformers might shy away from undertaking a huge mass of comprehensive and simultaneous reforms, including fiscal relations, civil service, pensions, education and health, banking sector, regulatory institutions and so on.

  • Third, overloading the reform agenda can undermine the credibility of genuinely reform-minded governments. Can they be blamed for the slow progress of institutional development that took decades to achieve in other countries?

  • Fourth, can the Bank really transfer the highest standards of knowledge in so many areas, simultaneously in many countries?1

He recommends greater selectivity, more flexibility in defining conditionality and dividing work among bilateral partners based on comparative advantage. In addition to work being done in partnership with the World Bank, several donors are involved in anti-corruption work of their own. Given the scope and aim of this book, it is neither possible, nor necessary, to study other donors in the same depth as I have done for the World Bank.

Keywords

Civil Society Comparative Advantage Good Governance Money Laundering Recipient Country 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

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Copyright information

© Heather Marquette 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heather Marquette
    • 1
  1. 1.International Development DepartmentUniversity of BirminghamUK

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