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The Legitimacy of International Norms

  • Isao Miyaoka
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Part of the St Antony’s Series book series

Abstract

A good understanding of collective norm legitimization requires a careful study of norm legitimacy. This chapter presents a theoretical framework to analyze the legitimacy of international norms, mainly drawing on constructivist approaches in international relations and social psychology. First, I review three major theories of international norms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism and then reconsider the concept of legitimacy. Second, I outline three forms of social influence (normative, informational, and referent informational influence) to gain an insight into mechanisms through which social interaction such as collective legitimization affects legitimacy and thus state behavior. Third, I discuss three sources of legitimacy: the formal consent to emergent norms expressed by states; ideational consistency between emerging norms and existing legal rules, moral principles, and scientific views; and intergroup relationship between norm promoters and target state actors. I also summarize the crude propositions offered by my theoretical framework. Finally, I briefly discuss methodological issues such as data sources and case selection.

Keywords

International Society Social Influence International Norm Liberal Democratic Party Normative Influence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Isao Miyaoka 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isao Miyaoka
    • 1
  1. 1.Osaka University of Foreign StudiesJapan

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