Notes

Introduction

1. Spoken Turkish has, compared to spoken Arabic, more vowels and fewer consonants, so that when the language was written with the Arabic script, as many as four Turkish vowel sounds were represented by a single letter (the latter-day o, u, ö, and ü all represented by the Arabic *waw*); meanwhile, spoken Turkish pronounced as many as four of the letters of the Arabic alphabet (all distinct in spoken Arabic) identically. The umlauts on some Turkish vowels are a feature familiar to German.
2. Turkey was not the first Muslim community to take up the Latin script; Albanian, Bosnian, and Caucasian and Central Asian languages like Azeri, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh were all already being written in the Latin script before 1928.
3. See, for example, Tapper (1991), Mardin (1989), White (2002), Yavuz (2003), Çınar (2005), and Tuğal (2009).
4. See Findley (1980; 1989).
5. Müge Göçek recalls that writing on the continuities from the Ottoman to the republican period has been risky for academics during most of the history of the republic, and the few works that did this mostly did so implicitly (personal communication). The seminal work of Şerif Mardin is extremely important in this regard. See the preface to the reissue of his *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (2000). The edited volume by Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997) is one of the few works structured around a desire to place contemporary Turkey in the context of late Ottoman developments.
6. See Bowen (1993). The line of enquiry here is akin to the mode of critical history Nikolas Rose lays out, taking his inspiration from Foucault: Critical history investigates "the conditions under which that which we take for truth has been established. Critical history disturbs and fragments, it reveals the fragility of that which seems solid, the contingency of that which seemed necessary . . . It enables us to think against the present, in the sense of exploring its horizons and its conditions of possibility" (1998, 41).
7. The work of Marx and Weber has obviously been most influential on this point. In anthropology, for work inspired by the former, see, for example, Wolf (1982); influential analyses situating more recent transformations within the context of capitalism include Harvey (1989) and Jameson (1991). Weber's legacy has been more suffused throughout several bodies of literature in the social sciences; several prominent students of Ottoman and Turkish society have been influenced by Weber, including Findley (1980, 1989) and Mardin (1969).
8. In this connection, Weber (2004) discussed what he called "disenchantment." This did not mean for him that moderns had better knowledge (through science) of their own environments than "primitives" did; indeed, Weber muses that such primitives probably had much better knowledge of their own surroundings than moderns. (How many of us actually know the details of nuclear fission, or how an automobile works?) Rather, for Weber, disenchantment is the attitude that if one wanted to, one could easily find out

such things, by reading the rights books, asking the right expert, or eventually doing the right experiment. It is this attitude that Weber sees as characteristic of a modern outlook.

9. A useful overview of modernity is given in Connolly (1989).
10. See Mitchell (2000) and Abu-Lughod (1989).
11. The same argument can be made for institutionally recognizable anthropological narratives.
12. See the excellent essay on late Ottoman and republican Muslims' conceptions and experiences of history and temporality by İsmail Kara, "Tarih ve hurafe" in İ. Kara (2003).
13. Works I have found particularly useful include Abou-El-Haj (2005), Murphey (1999), Zürcher (2004), Keyder (1987), Kasaba (1988), Goffman (2002), and Aksan (2007).
14. It is at this point that the contrasts between the present study and Tuğal's recent one on Islamism become clear. Tuğal acknowledges that "there are certainly traditions of liberal and modernist religion in the Muslim world . . . [but]," he argues, "it is not continuity with these traditions that has empowered moderate Islam in countries such as Turkey. It is rather the mobilization of broad sectors under the banner of radicalizing Islam, the subsequent defeat of radicalism, and the radicals' strategic (yet internalized) change of track after the defeat" (2009, 3). I agree that we ought not interpret recent transformations in Turkey as steps toward the ultimate liberalization of Islam in general. However, I emphasize the resources for thinking and living that Muslims in Turkey find in Islamic traditions as they have been lived since the late Ottoman Empire. The compellingness of the value of an attempt on the part of observant Muslims in Turkey to be at home in a strongly centralized, authoritarian, modernizing state and then in democratic political culture, and the sincerity of these attempts, cannot be understood purely on ground external to Islamic traditions and subjectivities (e.g., as "strategic" if "internalized"). I do not deny a role for the "defeat" of "radical Islamism" in the vibrancy of moderate Islam, its leaders, and its followers in Turkey; however, I argue that without the lived continuity in Islamic religiosities and the grounds internal to traditions of Islamic reasoning and living extant in Turkey, this moderate Islam would not have been so popular and widely perceived as legitimate. Only careful attention to Islamic traditions of discourse and practice positions one to appreciate this. The chapters that follow are an extended argument in this direction.
15. This point needs to be qualified by acknowledging that Europe is itself in important respects postcolonial. Timothy Mitchell has recently recalled that the conditions of possibility for the emergence of modern forms are found in colonialism and the access to resources and new experiences it entailed (2000, xvi). World-systems theorists have made similar points; see Abu-Lughod (1989).
16. The state of the art in Turkish historiography has converged on this point and has come to emphasize the continuities from particularly the second constitutional period starting in 1908 into the early republic; see Zürcher (2004). This perspective has been elided meticulously by the vast majority of works on Islamist historiography in Turkey, according to which much of Republican history is indeed a story of alienation (Silverstein 2005). See the revisionist work by İ. Kara (2001). Michael Meeker's (2002) magisterial work on the eastern Black Sea region also emphasizes continuities from the empire to republic, though it is not centrally concerned with Islam but rather the intersection of kinship, political authority, and state institutions.
17. One may note, for instance, that while Kant's classic essay "What is Enlightenment?" initially decries settling for the answers others come up with rather than thinking for oneself in general, he ends up focusing repeatedly on religion as his main example of this (Kant 2007).
18. Iconic of this line of thought is Bernard Lewis's (2002) bestselling book *What Went Wrong*?

19. Thus many who pride themselves on their secularist religious relativism (i.e., that they see nothing wrong with Islam per se) nonetheless claim that what is problematic is that Islam somehow inhibits secularism. In other words, part of the "problem" with Muslims is not so much that their religion is Islam but that they are unacceptably (excessively) religious.
20. Talal Asad has made this point in several works; see Asad (1993; 2003). See also Smith (1991), an early forerunner of much of the recent work historicizing the category of religion.
21. See Asad (2003), Casanova (1994), Benhabib (2002), and Habermas (1989).
22. See also Silverstein (2003).
23. This is a conclusion arrived at—often to their own surprise—by a growing number among the newer generation of Islamist historians in Turkey. See the introduction to and seminal collection of primary sources in İ. Kara (1997).
24. Asad, "The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East" in Asad (1993, 200–236); Mahmood (2005); Hirschkind (2006).
25. This does not detract from the importance and insights of recent work like Charles Hirschkind, Asad, and Saba Mahmood who diagnose a "counter" quality to Islamic traditions vis-à-vis the political norms of the nation-state, but it does suggest caution lest we too hastily generalize their insights to other geographies and histories from the ones they study.
26. See Chakrabarty (2000) on epistemological issues attending historical and cultural difference.
27. See the important collection of essays on Islam in Turkey in Tapper (1991).
28. For a discussion of plural temporalities and liberalism see Connolly (2005, 54–67).
29. On statist, secularist "Republicans" (Kemalists) and their nostalgia in Turkey, see Özyürek (2006).
30. The work of İsmail Kara has been especially influential and subtle.
31. The thrust of the collection was the large degree to which much that goes under the sign of "timeless tradition" is actually of fairly recent vintage or is a recent application and use of older materials. This is especially easy to show in the case of various nationalisms and their constructions of tradition, history, and culture. Turkey is no exception.
32. See also Messick (1993) on the functioning of Islamic discursive traditions.
33. It appears that while Foucault was greatly inspired in his later work on ancient Greece and techniques of the self by the work of his colleague Pierre Hadot, Hadot has some misgivings about the readings Foucault did of both Hadot's work and that of the Stoics (though Hadot is overall generally approving of Foucault's work with classical materials, see Hadot 1995). We are not concerned with the details of Foucault's take on the Stoics here, but merely his general appreciation of ethics as norm-governed work on oneself.
34. See also the argument in Bowen (1993).
35. Sheikh Baha ad-Din "Naqshband" died in 1389. However, as Algar (1990, 3) notes, "In the view of its practitioners, *tasawwuf* [Sufism] is coeval with Islam itself, in reality if not in name, for its essential doctrines and practices are derived from the twin sources of all that is Islamic—God's Book and the *Sunna* of His Messenger. It is, therefore, only approximately correct to regard a legitimate order as originating at a given point in history under the auspices of its eponym."
36. Sufis acknowledge the "schools" of techniques to be several, reflected in the various emphases of the many different Sufi orders with different legitimate lineages. Analogies abound, likening the different orders, for instance, to the many spokes of a wheel all uniting at a single hub, the many paths to the one true God. The various orders tend to be respectful toward one another, and it has been common for practitioners to be affiliated with more than one order at a time (though this appears to be less common today). The extent to which heterodox practices or beliefs—which have garnered much attention in

the West—have been prevalent among Sufis over the centuries is a point of some dispute among scholars.

37. On Sufism in the Ottoman Empire and legacies in the republic, see the essays in Lifchez (1992). The term "mysticism" as a translation for *tasawwuf*, while a useful shorthand, is technically problematic, as there is no theological "mystery" in Islam analogous to that in Christianity. The etymology of the term "Sufi" is obscure but probably related to the Arabic term "*suf*," or wool, a reference to the simple, rough-hewn cloth early Sufis were often seen to wear as a sign of their humility before God and rejection of worldly prestige. Useful overviews of Sufism are given in Knysh (2000), Schimmel (1975), and Trimingham (1998). *Ulema* are often portrayed as being relatively hostile toward Sufism.
38. See Gilsenan's (1973) study of a Sufi order in Cairo for an account of religiosity and sociality in a context in which Sufis were stigmatized but not proscribed; see also Ewing (1997) on the identification of Sufis in Pakistan with the nonmodern.
39. On the relationship between Turkey's Islamist movement and party politics since the 1970s, see Çakır (1990). See also Kafadar's (1992) discussion of the recent resurgence of interest in and practice of Sufism in Turkey.
40. See Chakrabarty (2000) on the heterogeneity of contemporary temporalities around the world.
41. While Leftist activists were rounded up, often tortured, imprisoned, and even murdered, many right-wing activists ended up being taken quietly into the services of the state security agencies as quasi-legal agents, saboteurs, provocateurs, and even assassins working against labor movements and those critical of capitalism and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; starting in the late 1980s they were used against Kurdish activists. By the early 1990s, many commentators in Turkey lamented the "criminality of the state," which was exacerbated by the growing Kurdish separatist insurgency. One of the means the security services used to put down the insurgency was the employment of former right-wing activists and thugs—many convicted criminals and murderers—to use organized crime rings to fund and arm the state's fight and its support for (mostly Kurdish) irregulars assisting it. I was in Turkey when such direct links between the state and organized crime came to light in the mainstream press in the early 2000s. Former state officials replied that they would be willing to discuss the issue but only if the Turkish public really wanted to know what was done to defend the state against separatist terrorism and save the country. Most journalists lost their enthusiasm for the topic, and the issue was quietly dropped.
42. While 98 percent of the population of Turkey identifies itself as "Muslim," the term "Muslim businessmen" refers to observant Muslims for whom their Muslim identity is prominent. See Keyder (2004).
43. Conspiracy theories abound among secular-minded Turks as to how this capital got into the hands of these pious Muslims. Turkish branch offices of Arab (mainly Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Libyan) finance houses offering "profit without interest" became a part of the financial landscape in the mid-1980s and seem to have indeed been a significant source of capital. But most of the economic power of the Muslim bourgeoisie derives from trade, manufacturing, and state patronage (especially under Özal) of such sectors as construction and infrastructure. Speculation about the finances of various Islamist groups never abates in Turkey and is often the first comment a secular-minded Turk will make about them. See Tuğal 2009.
44. See Özyürek (2006) for a subtle and thoughtful ethnography of these Kemalists. Many of these "conservative Turkish republicans," as Tanıl Bora (2006) terms them, have gone so far as to embrace antidemocratic, authoritarian ideas, considering them a means to "save the country" from the uncertainties associated with democratic pluralization.

45. On the denial of coevalness in the anthropological construction of its objects, see Fabian (1983).
46. So, again, foreign researchers like myself are thus either being duped and taking seriously as a "local phenomenon" what has been a U.S.-hatched plot—or at the very least a U.S.-initiated process—all along, or we are ourselves part of the plot, playing our part in legitimizing Islamist movements. The aim of these plots tends to be portrayed as "weakening" Turkey in order to divide it up into pieces. For that matter, the "plot" is also taken to include such phenomena as human and civil rights. The so-called National Left sees the rise in discourses of multiculturalism; women's equality; and ethnic, religious, and gender minorities as all part of the nefarious plot against Turkey. The topic of political liberalization as conspiracy is a large one that is beginning to be addressed by Turkish researchers. See Bora (2006).
47. While not concerned with this particular order, studies of Turkish Sufi women do exist. See Raudvere (2003).
48. See Nietzsche (1998) and Foucault (2003c) on genealogy as a mode of enquiry.

CHAPTER 1

1. A recent survey found that 98.4 percent of people in Turkey respond to the question "Are you connected to a religion?" (*bir dine bağlı mısınız?*) with "Yes, I am a Muslim" (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006, 38). The survey was based on interviews with 1,846 people over age 18 in 23 different administrative regions (*il*) between March and May 2006.
2. The perspective developed here contrasts in important respects with the common historiography of Ottoman reform. Berkes (1998) and Lewis (1968), while meticulously documenting these reforms and reformers, insert it all into a teleology moving toward the allegedly inevitable and logical emergence of a secular nation-state. More recent work has shown that this was patently not the intent of Ottoman reformers until the final years of the empire when nationalism was rampant.
3. On the formalization of calculation and norms in what Weber called characteristically modern social forms, see the chapters titled "Bureaucracy" and "The Meaning of Discipline" in Weber (1978); see also Foucault (2003e) on the relationship between modalities of power and the subjects formed in and through them.
4. See the important work by Abu-Manneh (1994), which situates the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms within Islamic reasoning and rationales. Abu-Manneh argues that the Naqshbandi order was influential in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Tanzimat reform movement, as the personal tutors of the reformist Sultan Abdülmecid were Naqshbandis, indeed of the very suborder under discussion here. There is, in other words, arguably a long history of reasoning for modernization and reform on the part of Sufis in the Ottoman context, as in other parts of the Muslim world. See also Zarcone (1993).
5. On internal Ottoman debates about reform see Lewis (1993), Findley (1980), and Aksan (2007).
6. Much of the work of Şerif Mardin has been devoted, albeit for several decades implicitly, to the same points. See the recent collection of his essays (Mardin 2006).
7. Mustafa Kemal (d. 1938) was leader of the nationalist forces establishing the republic in 1923 out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. He became the country's first president.
8. See Meeker (2002).
9. One might be tempted to see the zeal of Müteferrika's "reformist spirit" as a direct result of his being a convert; however, while not minimizing the importance of his background (e.g., his upbringing in Hungarian Protestant circles, his apparent knowledge—in

addition to Ottoman Turkish—of French, Italian, German, Hungarian, and Latin, etc.), it is also the case that a very large portion of the empire's ruling class were similarly converts from the Balkans.

10. Kut gives the date as mid-February 1732 and notes that the tract was printed in 500 copies (1996, 51). On Müteferrika's printing activities, see the catalog of the exhibit *Yazmadan basmaya: Müteferrika, mühendishane, üsküdar*.
11. On reform under Selim III, see Shaw (1971).
12. See Foucault (1979); on the career of these techniques in Ottoman Egypt, see Mitchell (1991).
13. In emphasizing this point, the aim is not to celebrate prestige deriving from successful resistance or to argue for the local origin of these modern forms in the Ottoman context. Rather, as will become evident shortly, the move is in the opposite direction; upon their emergence in northwest Europe, these specifically modern forms and practices were received as foreign and often hostile by the populations (urban working classes, peasantries, rebellious peripheries, etc.) who would be subject to them.
14. For an analytic of modern social forms and practices, see Weber (1978). On the role of the emergence of the human sciences in the minute application and effectiveness of these modern modes of power and in close proximity to practitioners of *raison d'état*, see Foucault (1979).
15. On the Tanzimat and Ottoman reform, see Findley (1980).
16. The text of the Gülhane edict is given in English in Mustafa Reşid Paşa (2006).
17. The Turkish text read, "The objects of our favors are without exception the people of Islam and the other peoples [*millets*] among the subjects of our imperial sultanate," while in the French version the Ottomans distributed at the time, Muslims were not specifically mentioned (Zürcher 2004, 341).
18. These delegations were interested in visiting precisely those military schools, hospitals, and factories Foucault (1979) has described.
19. Cited in Lewis (1968, 82).
20. See Todorova (1997) for a discussion of the issue of the reification of a region into the Balkans and its representations in the West and in the region itself.
21. It will be recalled in this connection that Mustafa Kemal attended the military high school in Manastır (Bitola) in (now former Yugoslav) Macedonia, along with such figures as Ali Fethi Okyar and Kâzım Özalp, who later played prominent roles in the republic. See Mango (1999), and on continuities in personnel from the Ottoman military to the republic, see Zürcher (1984).
22. Karpat estimates that between 40 and 50 percent of the population of today's Turkey is of Balkan, Caucasian, or Crimean ancestry. If one considers that intermarriage of the immigrants with local Kurds was less common, one is left with a very high percentage of Turks of non-Kurdish origin having ancestry in these regions. It should be obvious that the point here is not to determine origins but rather to estimate what impact the experiences of these populations during the collapse of the empire, loss of territory, and migration might have had on discourse and practice in the early republic (Karpat 2000, xvi).
23. Zürcher (2004) also provides a useful brief discussion of what is known, what is not known, and what is probable regarding the fate of Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Nationalism is, of course, the main factor, including the experiences of the preceding years of nationalist rebellions in the Balkans.
24. See Butler (1997) for a discussion of these modes of subjection.

25. For example, administrative techniques and strategies of military formation had been incorporated from the Persians and Byzantines by the expanding Muslim polity as it came into contact with them; the profound Muslim engagement with Aristotelian traditions of philosophy is likewise well known.
26. The term "Islamist" in Turkish (*İslâmcı*) appears to date to 1913, when it was first used by Ziya Gökalp. The term is generally used to refer to, on the one hand, Muslim thinkers and writers who do not have a clerical education in a *medrese*, and on the other, to attempts to politicize Islam in a very precise, technical sense. The term "Islamist" in the context of its emergence refers to those who are working—on grounds that have already largely separated out the spheres of the religious and the political—to make Islam part of the political solutions to society's most pressing problems. See the introductory essay in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 1) and İ. Kara (2001).
27. See, most prominently, Lewis (1968) and Berkes (1998).
28. In arguing for, documenting, and disseminating this view among—and indeed in training a new generation of—historians and scholars, the work of İsmail Kara has been seminal. See, for example, İ. Kara (2005b, İ. Kara (1997, vol. 1), and İ. Kara (2001).
29. The Committee of Union and Progress is an extremely important feature of Ottoman history during its final decades. See Zürcher 2004. This organization built on earlier Young Ottoman circles. See Mardin (2000).
30. See, for example, Kara's long introduction to his anthology of Islamist writings in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 1).
31. It should not be forgotten that the term "intellectual" was relatively new in Western Europe, gaining popularity in France in the last years of the nineteenth century, and specifically referring to those literati who came to the public defense of Alfred Dreyfus.
32. On Kara and his work, see Silverstein (2005).
33. For the ulema-CUP alliance and ulema opposition, I draw on İ. Kara (2005b).
34. For Hanafis (which was the predominant *madhab* in the empire) something that is *wajib* is a duty, though not as obligatory as something that is *fard*. Thus the text could be translated as "all efforts to prevent this outcome are incumbent upon Muslims as a duty."
35. Şura is mentioned twice in the Quran as worthy of praise: in 42:38 and in 3:159.
36. On early generations of Ottoman reformers see the classic study by Mardin (2000).
37. Ottoman text transcribed in Yazır (1997); English translation in İ. Kara (2005b, 186).
38. An interesting overview of Egyptian attitudes toward the republican reforms is given in Hattemer (1999).
39. In the later empire, the office of the Şeyhülislam (known as the Meşihat) had three main duties: giving learned opinion on matters of Islam, directing the system of *medrese* schools and mosques, and managing the Sufi lodges. By the end of World War I, the Meşihat was doing the sultan's bidding (himself bowing to pressure from the victorious Allies) in issuing fatwas denouncing the nationalists fighting to eject Allied armies from Anatolia. In response to this, in 1920 in Ankara, a Ministry of the Shari'a and Pious Foundations was established. In March 1924, the law on the unification of education ("*tevhid-i tedrisat*") was passed, bringing all educational institutions under the auspices of the ministry of education. Also in March 1924, the Ministry of the Shari'a and Pious Foundations was changed into the Presidency of Religion. It duties were now limited to the administration of mosques and their personnel (imams and muezzins), and fatwa issuance, which was gradually translated into "informing citizens on religious matters." This remains the sphere of activity for the Presidency for Religious Affairs.
40. See the information in the next chapter on Sheikh Safvet efendi.

41. As far as I can ascertain, this text has not appeared in English anywhere before.
42. Relatively little is known and has been written about Seyyid Bey. See, however, the master's thesis by Erdem (1993), Yalçın (1936), and Guida (2008).
43. Later in his discussion, Seyyid Bey states that there are differences among the four Sunni *madhab*s regarding the requisite qualities for a legitimate caliph. The main difference is that while Shafi'is, Malikis, and Hanbalis require that a caliph be at the level of *mujtahid* (one authorized to interpret sources through *ijtihad*) in his knowledge of Islam, Hanefis are somewhat more flexible, Seyyid Bey says, in that they only require that he be an *alim* (scholar; 1997).
44. Qur'an sura *al-Shura* 42:38. See the photo in İ. Kara (1998, 45).

CHAPTER 2

1. A phrase I heard on numerous occasions. On early laments among Sufis of the degenerated condition of Sufism as internal critiques see the interesting article by M. Kara (1991).
2. Members tended to think of the United States as a religiously conservative, or at least observant, place, with the state minimally interfering in one's practice of one's religion.
3. On Sufism in neighboring Syria in recent years see Pinto (2004).
4. On the social, political, economic, and architectural aspects of the *tekke* and *zaviye* in the later empire, see the essays in Lifchez (1992).
5. In 1882 and 1890, there were 260 and 305 *tekke*s respectively in Istanbul, of which 52 and 65 were Naqshbandi (Karpat 2001, 107). Kreiser estimates that between 60 and 85 percent of these were continuously occupied (1992, 49).
6. In tandem with these transformations, in the mid-nineteenth century, the nature of taxation in the empire also changed from being assessed to neighborhoods and communities (with the distribution usually calculated by neighborhood imams) to being due from individuals through a process administered by the newly established *muhtar*s. See Behar (2003, 79–80).
7. The rise of the Naqshbandis to preeminence is related to several phenomena, including the proscription of the Bektashi order in 1826, whereupon Bektashi property was given over to the Naqshbandis, as well as the success of a Naqshbandi sheikh, Mevlana Khalid, in placing his disciples and deputies in positions of influence.
8. A great deal of work has been done on the history, ideas and practices of the Naqshbandiyya. See, in particular, Algar (1976; 1990); the essays in Gaborieau, Popovic, and Zacone (1990); Hourani (1981); Abu-Manneh (1982); LeGall (2005); and Knysh (2000, 218–34). On Naqshbandis in republican Turkey, see also Mardin (1991).
9. On this lodge and the Fatma Sultan mosque to which it was attached, as well as some of the social activities of attendees and affiliates, see Eyice (1987).
10. In April 1828, Sultan Mauhmud II had the leading Khalidi Naqshband sheikhs of the Ottoman capital rounded up, taken by rowboat to the suburb of Kartal, and from there, sent into exile in Sivas (Gündüz 1984, 151).
11. It is some index of the spirit of the times, so difficult to even conjure up today, that Mehmet Ali Aynî dedicated his 1923 volume *Why I Love the Great Sheikh* (Ibn Arabî) to "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha." Aynî was a Naqshbandi.
12. See the texts of such debates from this period in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 2). On debates about schools in this period, see Fortna (2002).
13. On these new schools, their role in reform programs and relation to alternative regimes of knowledge (especially Islamic ones), and their relative prestige, see Fortna (2002).
14. On Ottoman *medrese* programs, organization, and reforms, see Atay (1983).

15. Although suppression of the Bektashis was quite severe, with many Babas executed and exiled and *tekke*s confiscated and given over to Naqshbandis, the real targets in 1826 were the Janissaries. By the 1850s, Bektashis were again associating and holding their ceremonies in a public secret fashion; by 1870, books of Bektashi poetry and doctrine were being published. However, the Bektashis never regained their licit status, and their *tekke*s were never officially allowed to reopen (Birge 1994, 74–86).
16. İ. Kara cites a decree from 1793 that represents, in a sense, a precursor to the 1812 decree (2003, 326–27). However, this did not concern the orders' finances and was mainly concerned with maintaining standards of knowledge and ethical conduct among sheikhs.
17. There were exceptions to this general rule, as in cases where a sheikh's appointment to a certain lodge would entail his simultaneously being a preacher (*va'iz*) in a related mosque. In such cases, the appointment was approved by the ulema. See Kafadar (1989, 139–40).
18. Başbakanlık Arşivi, Cevdet Evkaf, No. 11874, cited in Gündüz (1984, 193–94). See also M. Kara (2002, 30).
19. See Barnes (1986, 92–101; 1992, 42).
20. See the classic study by F. de Jong (1978).
21. For a more detailed account of these specifically modern forms and the attendant subjects formed in and through them see, Foucault (1979).
22. See Gündüz (1984, 205) and M. Kara (1980, 301–18). The original *nizamnâme* (charter) dating from the founding of the assembly has not been found. See also the discussion of the Meclis in Zarcone (1993, 139–43).
23. For the text of the 1917 reorganization (*Meclis-i meşayih nizamnamesi*) published in *Takvim-i vekayı*, see M. Kara (1980, 389–93).
24. İlmiye Salnamesi, 1334/1915–1916, 596.
25. In rural areas, Councils of Sheikhs (*encümen-i meşayih*) were established to carry out this function, composed of the region's mufti (who chaired it) and two sheikhs (Aydın 1998, 98); see also M. Kara (2001, 15).
26. From the 1840s onward, the role of the imam in neighborhood social life was structurally transformed with the creation of the administration position of the *muhtar* to attend to matters of neighborhood-level security and representation to and communication with wider authorities and administrative bodies. These duties had hitherto been performed by local imams (Behar 2003, 78–83).
27. Cited in Aydın (1998).
28. Ibid., 99.
29. See, for example, Lewis (1968, 409).
30. See İ. Kara (2001, 66–81) and Tunaya (1962, 94–96).
31. İ. Kara (2001, 71). Interestingly, Gümüshanevi wrote that he was Naqshbandi by *tarikat*, Shadhili (another Sufi order) by disposition (Gündüz 1984), while İsmail Hakki İzmirli is known to have been in possession of an *icazetname* (certificate) from the Shadhili order (M. Kara 1985, 991). These facts are certainly due to the standing of this particular *tarikat*, widespread in North Africa but almost entirely without adherents in Anatolia and the Balkans, during the later part of the reign of Abdülhamid and his cultivation of it, most likely as part of his efforts to strengthen ties to the Arab provinces.
32. For general accounts of the relations between the orders and Abdülhamid, see Zarcone (1993) and Deringil (1998).
33. Lewis describes the Naqshbandis as characterized by "aggressive fanaticism" (1968, 406).
34. An account of life in Esad efendi's Naqshbandi *tekke* in Istanbul during two weeks in the months before the proscription of the orders and closing of their lodges in 1925 is given by the Danish esotericist Carl Vett in his *Dervish Diary* (1953).
35. *Tasavvuf* 8 (1911), 3.

36. See Brummett (2000). An account of the trials and tribulations of newspaper publishing in the later empire, and an especially lively account of the proliferation of papers in the wake of 1908, is found in Tokgöz (1993).
37. A very brief overview of the journals and their publishers is given in Kreiser (1985).
38. See Mitchell (1991, 128–60) and Foucault (2003g, 377–91).
39. See Tanpınar (2001, 249–52) and Türköne (1991, 43–45).
40. See Findley (1982) for a treatment of the emergence of a notion of ideology as emblematic of the new form of politics. For a discussion of the new field of *siyaset* in the Arab provinces see Mitchell (1991, 100–104).
41. *Tasavvuf* 1 (1911), 5–7.
42. The inclusion of the term "*ittihadiye*" is no doubt an indication of support for the new atmosphere brought by the Committee of Union and Progress. Zarcone suggests two possible reasons for the failure of the United Sufis Association, namely, its relatively severe attacks on the practice of *evladiyet* and its lack of a powerful patron (particularly among the ulema; 1993, 149).
43. Cited in M. Kara (1980, 284).
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 285.
46. There was considerable controversy surrounding the failure of the United Sufis Association and the founding of the Sufis Association, with bitterness expressed in the pages of the journal *Muhibban*, close to the figures central in organizing the United Sufis Association. See the discussion in Zarcone (1993, 144–54).
47. A fascinating and controversial individual, Musa Kâzım efendi was a member of the CUP, a Naqshbandi, and in all probability a Mason, in addition to being sheikh ul-Islam four times between 1910 and 1917. He was a very articulate and sophisticated intellectual and author of numerous books and treatises on Islam and the problems of the modern world. See İ. Kara's introductory remarks and the texts by him in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 1).
48. See also Ülker and Bahadır (2003).
49. İsmail Hakkı would go on to play a prominent role in the reorganization and reform of the education system in the early republic. See the discussion in Jäschke (1972) and the entry on him in Ülken (1979, 275–78). A selection of his writings is in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 2).
50. *Tasavvuf* 8 (1911), 3. Several Naqshbandi communities in contemporary Turkey continue the organization of seminars and symposia at which the results of scholarly research on Islamic topics are presented.
51. Ibid.
52. Aynî is another fascinating scholar and bureaucrat of the late Ottoman environment who was active well into the republican period. Born near Monastır (Bitola) in former Yugoslav Macedonia, he went to the *rüşdiye* school in Sana'a, Yemen, when his father was transferred there, then finished in the Gülhane Askeriye and Mülkiye schools in the capital. He then taught in schools in Edirne, Aleppo, and Diyarbakır, among other places, and went into the Ottoman administration, working in posts including Kosova, Kastamonu, Taiz (Yemen), Basra, Lathakiyye, and Albania. He then worked in several capacities in the new republican administration. See the texts by Aynî in İ. Kara (1997, vol. 2) and Kara's comments on him.
53. Cited in M. Kara (1985, 986).
54. Ibid.
55. On debates about Sufis and their autocritiques, see İ. Kara (2005a) and M. Kara (1991).
56. Cited in M. Kara (1985, 985).
57. See the chapter titled "Bureaucracy" in Weber (1978).

58. For the texts of the surveys and responses, see Albayrak (1996).
59. This cooperation between the nationalist forces and the Sufi orders is generally interpreted as being based on the fact that Turkish nationalism was relatively new to the majority of Turkish-speaking Muslims in Anatolia, especially among the illiterate masses, and that there could consequently be difficulties in mobilizing the population in its name. Portraying the struggle with the invading powers as a jihad, however, in the name of expelling infidel invaders, was more compelling, as was the authority of Sufi sheikhs. In other words, there is little evidence that the nationalists had much personal admiration for the Sufi orders but rather tended to use them instrumentally, much as Sultan Abdülhamid had done in the closing decades of the empire. See Zürcher (1984; 2004), M. Kara (1980), and İ. Kara (2001).
60. On debates about the status of the orders and of Islamic institutions and personnel associated with them, during what ended up being the closing years of the empire through the war of independence and into the republic, see Jäschke (1972) and İ. Kara (1997, vol. 2).
61. For a transcript of the deliberations in the Grand National Assembly, see İ. Kara (2008, 279–89).
62. For the text of law 677, see M. Kara (2002, 151). For the debates on the orders' proscription see M. Kara (2002, 144–161) and M. Kara (1980, 328–33).
63. First- and secondhand, publicly and privately expressed accounts of sheikhs' reactions to the closure of the *tekke*s are given in İ. Kara (2008, 239–63).
64. Cited in M. Kara (2001, 16).
65. See, for example, the memoirs of Mehmet Şemseddin efendi in M. Kara (2001), and see the comments by Abdülaziz efendi in İ. Kara (1991, 20).
66. I heard this expression several times, leading me to suspect that it is something of a formula used among Sufis to express how, contrary to what many may think, the formal closing of the lodges was not in fact that much of a shock to Sufis themselves. It is also the case, however, that among Naqshbandis, the relative lack of importance of specialized lodges to their practices has been documented for centuries. See Le Gall (2005).
67. The recent work of Mustafa Kara and his students has been important in this regard, as has the work of İsmail Kara.
68. For a summary of these views and source materials, see M. Kara (2002).
69. Cited in M. Kara (2001, 16).
70. An interesting account of this period and how it was experienced by sympathizers of the orders is given in Zarcone (1993).
71. See the extremely important collection of writings by prominent Islamist intellectuals from this period in the two volumes of İ. Kara (1997).
72. Cited in M. Kara (2001, 16–17).
73. See Weber's (1978) discussion of rationalization in the bureaucratization of administration, very useful in interpreting Ottoman reform, including that of the Sufi orders.

CHAPTER 3

1. See later in this chapter on these Sufis' work in the Süleymaniye garden.
2. *Keramet* are to be rigorously distinguished from *mücize*; while these latter are solely acts of a prophet, *keramet* pertain to acts of "friends of God" or *veli*s, such as Sufi sheikhs.
3. I did not pursue systematic research on the topic, but it seems that their discouragement on this issue may be a residue of the processes discussed in the previous chapter, whereby Sufis in the closing decades of the Ottoman Empire were the object of scathing and widely accepted denunciations for their obscurantism and hocus-pocus charlatanism.

4. For a discussion of the *Futuhat*, including *karamat* and habits, see Chittick (1989). See also Uludağ's entry on *keramet*, where he writes, "The greatest charismatic gift [*keramet*] is getting someone to abandon bad dispositions, and embrace good ones" (1995, 307).
5. On Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and the Nurcus, see Mardin (1989), Yavuz (2005), and Yavuz and Esposito (2003).
6. Hadot uses "spiritual exercises" to translate the Greek "ascesis," exercises in the art of living. Hadot suggests that Ignatius of Loyola in fact made the same translation in the sixteenth century, putting the term to Christian purposes.
7. On this topic see Charles Taylor's (2002) *Varieties of Religion Today*, in which he revisits James' classic *Varieties of Religious Experience*, noting that one of the reasons it is still so remarkably readable today over one hundred years after its publication is that James was expressing a modern, secular, and somewhat romantic sensibility (one that sees the authentic essence of "religion" in a personal relationship to the transcendent, by-passing authority) that became predominant among most English-speaking academics in the twentieth century.
8. See, for example, the series of booklets *Tasavvufî Ahlâk* by Mehmed Zahid Kotku.
9. Several fine histories of the Khalidi suborder are available; see especially the essays in Gaborieau, Popovic, and Zarcone (1990); Algar (1990); and Hourani (1981).
10. Zeyrek was also the site of the first Naqshbandi center in the Ottoman capital, when 'Abd Allah Ilahi of Simav established one there in the fifteenth century.
11. Accounts of republican era *sohbet*s prior to those of Mehmed Zahid Kotku are few. In addition to the references cited here see Gürdoğan (1996, 34–36) and M. Kara (2002, 262).
12. Coşan was born in 1938 in Çanakkale and raised in Istanbul in an observant family of Naqshbandis. He graduated from the faculty of Arabic and Persian literature at Istanbul University, moving to Ankara University's faculty of theology in 1960, where he completed his doctorate in 1965, became docent in 1973, professor in 1982, and retired in 1987. He married Kotku's daughter and succeeded him upon his passing in 1980. Coşan's two daughters studied in Turkey, while his son studied business in the United States. See Çakır (1990) and Yavuz (1999).
13. Mention of Özal here is a reference to his university training as an engineer. While some in Turkey are convinced that Özal was a Sufi initiate, I never heard this from anyone in this order, and I know of no evidence that he was. He is, however, generally considered by many in this order to have had a certain sympathy for Sufism, reflected in the fact that he arranged for his mother to be buried in the Süleymaniye cemetery where Mehmed Zahid Kotku and several earlier sheikhs of the order are buried.
14. Interestingly, Schimmel (1975, 366) writes of a Naqshbandi-affiliated journal called *Sohbet Dergisi*, published in Istanbul in 1952 and 1953.
15. See the discussion of neoliberal reform in later chapters, as well as Foucault (2008) on neoliberalism and enterprise as an ethos.
16. See the discussions among secular Turks during this period in Navaro-Yashin (2002).
17. In January 2001, retired general and former secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Erol Özkasnak, referred to February 28 as a "postmodern coup" (2001). See also the useful discussion of the period in Raudvere (2003).
18. It is difficult to overstate how much the overriding concern of these Sufis is to align with the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, that is, orthodoxy. Those I worked with would find the "rejection of the Sunni pattern" Trix documented (1993, 105) among the Bektashis she worked with to be a grave straying from the fold of Islam and error. While I do not wish to cast suspicion or doubt upon Bektashi devotions, my work with Naqshbandis is, in part, attempting to effect a minor corrective to Western emphases on

heterodoxy among Sufis, while the evidence regarding how widespread such heterodoxy has been among those considering themselves to be Sufis is unclear.

19. Translation from the Turkish by Hamid Algar, cited in Algar (1976).
20. For the *silsile* (initiatic chain of descent) of this order's sheikhs see appendix B to Özal (1999).
21. See the discussion in Chapter 4.
22. Followers of the teachings of Said Nursi (1876–1960), a revivalist and modernizer of Islamic traditions (Mardin 1989).
23. See Schimmel (1975) for a discussion of *nefs* (*nafs*).
24. Arabic calligraphy of this phrase can be seen inlaid in wooden wall hangings in rooms and offices of the order, and it was put on lapel pins, posters, and brochures. An example appears on the cover to this book.
25. "That's what we've heard" has the effect here of negating any pretense to authoritative knowledge on the speaker's part. In other words, while he is giving an account of the teachings of the order, he is not intending to put himself in the place of someone at a high station, let alone a sheikh. This was commonly the stance from which disciples would speak of the ethical programs of the order.
26. The Quran frequently uses the term *zikr* to refer to revelation, as a "reminder" of God, and the prophetic function has often been commented as one of reminding, to which the appropriate human response is to remember and take heed (Izutsu 2002). The *zikr* was commonly one hundred "Estaghfur al-Azim," one hundred Kelime-i Tawhid, one hundred Lafza-i Jelal ("Allah"), one hundred Salavat-i Sherife, followed by one hundred times Sura al-Ikhlas, and sometimes one hundred Sura al-Inshira. See Algar's (1976) discussion of Naqshbandi *zikr* and its relative "sobriety" in comparison with its function in other orders (e.g., its role their inducement of certain types of "ecstatic" states).
27. These techniques are all the same for women and men. As those I worked with and interviewed were all men, for smoothness of exposition I hereafter use the masculine pronoun.
28. The term used here is *tutucu*, which is generally translated as "conservative." While this sense of the term is meant here as well, the verb *tutmak* (from which *tutucu* is derived) also refers—in addition to "holding" something—to being a partisan of something, someone, or a group, such as a sports team. Thus the term here combines the meanings of conservative and zealot.
29. The literature on the initiatory process in Sufism is enormous; a useful overview is provided in Schimmel (1975).
30. A mufti is a scholar who has the authority to give his opinion (*fetva*) on matters brought to him. In the Ottoman Empire, alongside their religious functions, muftis had many administrative duties. In Turkey they are the representatives of the Presidency for Religious Affairs, presiding over the imams in a given county of the country. This is, in other words, a very high-level official for someone in Ahmet's situation to present himself to.
31. (9:5); emphasis added.
32. For an exhaustive treatment of *fitne*, see the discussion in Pandolfo (1997).
33. Sohbet at İskender Pasha mosque, June 13, 1999.
34. For a generally sympathetic account, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003).
35. When I met her, she wore a monochrome overcoat over her clothes and covered her hair with a colorful silk scarf.

Chapter 4

1. It appears that the *sohbet*s began to be held on Sunday during Kotku's tenure as sheikh, instead of Friday like they had under the previous sheikh Abdülaziz Bekine.
2. The Iskender Pasha mosque is a relatively small but historic stone structure constructed in 1506. Its role in the devotional, social, and even political life of Turkey since the late 1960s is out of all proportion to its modest physical stature, however.
3. For a study of women's experience of Sufism in Turkey, see Raudvere (2003).
4. On reading hadith as a devotional practice among Naqsbandis, see Algar (1990, 33). Until very recently, the hadiths were read from Ahmed Ziyaüddin Gümüşhanevi's concordance, *Ramuz el-Ehadith*, compiled from the six authoritative collections and originally published in 1858 with many Latin-script transliterated versions published since the 1970s. The *Ramuz* became a kind of handbook for the Gümüşhanevi branches of the Naqshbandi order in Anatolia and the Balkans and is known to have been the basis of *sohbet* lessons in the main Gümüşhanevi Naqshbandi lodge in Istanbul up until the closure of the lodges in 1925. However, as of summer 2006 and reportedly at the suggestion of Coşan's son Nureddin (discussed in Chapter 6), some of the *cemaat* has taken the significant step of abandoning *Ramuz* in favor of the six "*sahih*" collections that "all Muslims agree upon" (as I was told by a senior member), who admitted that a very few of the hadith in the *Ramuz* were disputed as "weak."
5. The precise formulation varies depending on those present and the leader of the *zikr* but was commonly the same as that noted in the previous chapter.
6. The sense of *terbiye* as synonymous with (and a translation of) the French and English "education" was an innovation of the nineteenth century (Mitchell 1991, 87–89). In the later decades of the nineteenth century, Redhouse (1996) recorded several senses of the word in the Turkish-speaking parts of the empire; these are in order: rearing, nursing, training or educating, culture, good manners, good breeding; a correction, chastising, admonition; regulating or improving by the use of chemical or other agents, including seasoning for food; bringing up or training; and correcting or punishing. Sufis use *terbiye* in the older sense of "breeding" and "cultivating" through correction (as in tying a growing plant to influence its formation). The term is now synonymous with education and training in the Arab world, but in Turkey it is falling out of use with regard to education and tends to be associated with parents' upbringing of children.
7. Among Naqshbandis specifically, the practice of *sohbet* has been emphasized since at least the time of 'Ubaidullah Ahrar (d. 1490) and Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1625) and was also by the major sheikh in the chain of initiation of the order I studied, Mevlana Khalid ("al-Baghdadî" d. 1827; Abu-Manneh 1990).
8. In Trix's (1993) study of the performative aspects of attunement between Baba and devotee, there is no evidence of the Baba guiding her toward the restructuring of her desires, hopes, fears, and sentiments generally along the lines of the exemplary traditions of Prophet Muhammad.
9. This was the only discussion (and implicit at that) of Salafi tendencies I heard during my fieldwork.
10. A. Ziyauddin Gümüşhanevi (d. 1893) is a luminary in the *cemaat*'s *silsile* and a major Islamic scholarly personality of the Ottoman nineteenth century. See Algar (1990).
11. Shi'a Muslims consider that it was, in fact, Ali who was favored by the prophet, and that the first three caliphs before him, including Abu Bakr, were usurpers. A chain of initiation passing through Abu Bakr rather than 'Ali thus represents a heightened Sunni identity.
12. This was more often the case in Urfa, possibly due to the relatively greater familiarity of the city's population with Arabic.

13. Some exceptions to this are documented. Algar (1971) relates that, as of the early 1970s, Naqshbandis in Bosnia were often combining silent and voiced formulations of *zikr*.
14. On the content and modality characteristic of contemporary debates among some prominent scholars of Islam in Turkey, see Silverstein (2005).
15. Aristotle's term was hexis. Habitus was a term Mauss (1979) used.
16. Hirschkind (2001) and Asad (1993) also note that not treating habitus as part of a conscious attempt to form certain kinds of selves dissolves its quality as a resource for the ongoing elaboration of tradition and, possibly, for resisting Western hegemony. This latter point is not one I echo in this chapter, for reasons that will be made clear in the conclusion.
17. Irvine (1989, 255).
18. For a critical account of logocentrism in Western thought see Derrida (1976, chaps. 1 and 2). See also the discussion in Messick (1993). Meeker argues that "for much of the provincial population [in Turkey], official nationalism stood to Islamic social culture as 'printed' to 'oral'" (1994, 33). On written texts as particular kinds of cultural technologies see Basso (1989).
19. The notion of presence that subtends Sufi practice here contrasts with that which Derrida (1973) has identified as characteristic of Western metaphysics, whereby meaning and knowledge have been idealized as the presence of a pure origin to an identical meaning. It is rather a metaphysic of "influence" that is at work here, and to the extent that there is a theory of knowledge operative, it is one that assumes the pragmatics of context as central to the formation of dispositions to perception. It is less a question of signification (which nonetheless is a field in play here, recalling that these *sohbet*s are structured around the lecture of hadith) than of ethical practice.
20. All quotations are from Plato (1995).
21. Among the more important studies on this issue see Eickelman (1978), Graham (1987), and Messick (1993), as well as the "Quranic Dialogics" in Fischer and Abedi (1990).
22. A similar point, though not in reference to Islam, is made by Basso (1989).
23. Logocentrism has been identified and critiqued by Jacques Derrida as that metaphysic that assigns "the origin of truth in general to the logos: the history of truth, of the truth of truth, has always been . . . the debasement of writing, and its repression outside 'full' speech" (1973, 3).
24. Sirhindi wrote in his *Maktubat*, "Saya-i Rahbar bih ast az dhikr-i Haqq" (The Shadow of the Guide is Better than the *zikr* of God), referring to the importance of being in the presence of a sheikh. On the influence of Sirhindi on Naqshbandis in the Ottoman world, see Algar (1976, 143).
25. Based on his fieldwork in the Black Sea region in 1970, Meeker draws a contrast between what he defines as a local, oral culture of "intimacy, loyalty, interpersonal transparency and affection" on the one hand and secular nationalism on the other (1994, 37–38).
26. The nature and role of love in Islam is an exceedingly large topic. For a useful treatment on love in Sufism, see Schimmel (1975).
27. *Sohbet* at İskender Pasha mosque, June 13, 1999.
28. A similar point was made by Abu-Lughod (1999, 236–38). See also Scott (1991).
29. See Scott (1991) and Rosaldo (1982).
30. Arendt (1968) analyzed this particular modality of power as part of a diagnosis of its decline among "moderns."
31. This is in marked contrast to the conception of the citizen in the deliberative public sphere and its constitution around rational, critical argument in which the status of participants is not supposed to matter. See Habermas (1989).
32. See Keane (1997) on recontextualization in religious language.

33. There is a current in recent liberal political theory that seeks to affirm, recover, and revive work within the liberal tradition on virtue and the cultivation of specific qualities of character considered to subtend a politics of natural freedom and equality. See Berkowitz (1999).
34. Meeker's work on face-to-face Islamic sociality contrasted with official nationalism documents interesting tensions, as he argues that establishment Republican People's Party functionaries upheld secular norms in public while maintaining an Islamic based ethic of sociality in informal situations, a bifurcation of public versus private he argues had nonetheless already been eroded by the early 1970s, leading by the 1990s to "the representation of local and oral Muslims in a new Islamist media culture" (1994, 38). Some of the structural tensions inherent in this move are discussed in the next chapter.
35. Incorporation as a foundation (*vakıf*) is one of the most important (indeed, one of the only) forms of civil association in Turkey. Government policy toward foundations, therefore, is extremely important to the tone of civil associational life in the country. There being of course no Sufi orders per se in Turkey, to the extent that a group of people wishes to congregate at a locale with an official status and permission to do so, they will do this as an association (*dernek*) or a foundation.
36. For historical perspective on these changes in prestige, see Chapters 1 and 2.
37. See the essays in Calhoun (1992) for an overview of the nature of the public sphere as a feature of a specific political culture.

CHAPTER 5

1. The name reflects the common practice of station names ending in "ra," short for "radio." In this case, the station would be known as "ak radio," or "white/pure radio." The station has existed since before the AK Party, and many saw significance in the fact that the party's acronym was the same as the radio station's name.
2. While it cannot be taken to directly measure the number who object to radio on such grounds, or even who reject it, a recent survey found that 9.7 percent of people in Turkey think that radio is harmful to religion and morals (*din ve ahlak*; 7.8 percent of women interviewed and 11.7 percent of men). Similarly, 7.8 percent of people interviewed agreed with the statement "Radio degrades our culture and traditions" ("*kültür, örf ve âdetlerimiz*"; 5.9 percent of women; 9.7 percent of men; (RTÜK 2007, 125–29).
3. At the time of my fieldwork, I was told that roughly half of the employees and volunteers at the station were directly involved with the Sufi order; most of the rest had a general but pronounced Muslim orientation and identity.
4. *Hizmet* can be more meritorious of God's reward (*sevab*, from the Arabic *thawab*) than *nafilah* prayers, the voluntary one, two, or four *rak'at*s performed before and after canonical worship (Bukhari 1971, 140–41).
5. This team was headed by Esad hoja (himself a professor retired from the Ankara theology faculty) and included teachers and academicians. One of the station managers said to me, "If we have any hesitations [on a matter of policy], we ask them, 'We have such and such a situation, what are the standards on this? What are the criteria? Is something *haram* [forbidden]? If so, due to what?' We get the criteria from them, and act accordingly. So we can't just do things according to our own knowledge."
6. I was repeatedly told that several of these sympathizers establishing receivers had been women. At the time of my research, the Islamist-leaning media company Channel 7 had rented one video feed and around five audio feeds on a satellite, using the video and one audio and subleasing the other audio channels, one of which this station rented.

7. That women constituted the primary audience during the daytime is also suggested by the homemaking nature of several of the programs during these hours. In addition, on several occasions I saw the mail as it was being sorted after arriving at the studios, and many of the envelopes were written in a hand typically associated with adolescent girls, often with flowers and similar designs drawn on them. Several men I interviewed in Anatolian cities told me that their local repeater, allowing AKRA to be received in their area, had been set up through the initiative of women. I was unable to follow up on either the role of women in establishing local receivers or on their listening habits and the influence this had on their practices. This is an important topic and merits systematic work.
8. While rating statistics for radio stations have been kept regularly in recent years, I have been unable to find statistics from the relevant earlier years that would corroborate this claim.
9. What the survey means by "religious programming" is not stated in the survey itself. This study, carried out by the research department of the Turkish Supreme Council for Radio and Television (RTÜK) between January and February 2007, includes interviews from all seven of Turkey's major regions; however, the regions appear to be disproportionately represented. For instance, the Marmara region represents 40 percent of interviews; the Aegean (which includes Izmir), 11.4 percent; and Central Anatolia (including Ankara), 20 percent. Also 85.5 percent of respondents live in cities, and 53.5 percent were men (RTÜK 2007, 29–30). Twenty-five percent of all respondents said they listen to "religious programs," 11 percent listen "sometimes," while 64 percent never listen to them; 24.5 percent said they listen to "religious music," 10.5 percent listen sometimes, while 65 percent "never" listen to religious music. For both religious programming and religious music, the most widely reported station was TRT, the national Turkish Radio and Television—an odd choice, since there is practically no programming on TRT radio's three channels with religious content, nor is there much musical content that would be associated with Sufism, which is the music most commonly referred to as "Islamic" in the country (RTÜK 2007, 137–41) It is quite possible that in years before the Adalet ve Kalkınma Party (AKP) came to power, most of those listening to such religious programming would have listened to private channels instead of TRT, which is a state channel; with the AKP in power (and thus exerting influence over TRT) perhaps some of these listeners switched to TRT. It is still puzzling that most respondents cited TRT as the station they listened to for religious content, given that there is little over an hour a week of either "religion and morals" or "Sufi music" programming on its four channels.
10. In fact, during the course of my fieldwork, the group's television channel failed and closed, followed by the newspaper, a severe blow to the morale of the group.
11. Interestingly, "Sağduyu" has recently appeared as the name of a political party in Turkey. One of the founding members is Nureddin Coşan. An announcement on their website before the 2007 elections stated that while the party had supported the AKP, they would not be doing so this time, due to what they saw as the AKP's failure to live up to its promises regarding "liberties."
12. Most respondents to an AKRA online survey said they listen in the evenings between 6:30 and midnight (51 percent), while 33 percent listen between 10:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. AKRA website accessed November 2007.
13. This appears to have been especially the case after the radio station's website was established and started to archive *sohbet*s for access anytime; 49 percent of 5,966 online respondents said they listen to AKRA at home, 18 percent in the car, 27 percent at work, and 5 percent elsewhere (AKRA FM website, accessed November 2007).
14. *Sohbet* broadcasts appear to continue to be important to listeners of the station; 38 percent of respondents to the online survey said they mostly listened to *sohbet*s, which would

make them the most-listened-to programs. This was followed by music (35 percent) and then news (11 percent; AKRA website).

15. It appears that at the time of this writing, the number of people who regularly tune into AKRA on the radio is relatively small, even among the 25 percent of radio listeners who is listening to religious programs and religious music. Again, it is possible that there has been a shift on the part of such listeners from private stations such as AKRA to TRT under the current government, but there seems to be little basis for this as there is practically no religious programming on TRT at all, and there is very little "religious" music (TRT broadcast schedule on http://www.trt.gov.tr accessed 11/07).
16. I note in passing that this discussion of technology echoes in some respects Heidegger's discussion in his classic essay "The Question Concerning Technology," where he emphasizes that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (1977, 4), thereby displacing the discussion to issues of historical and social forms associated with various relationships to techne, or "craft." In our discussion that follows, parallels can be drawn between his focus and mine on the relationship between particular forms and ways of life and kinds of technologies of mediation; I do not, however, wish to take a stand regarding what Heidegger puts as the "liberating" or "dangerous" aspects of techne as bringing forth versus techne as placing before.
17. Ibn Sina (d. 1037) was a polymath from Khorasan in Central Asia especially known for his contributions to medical knowledge; he is known as Avicenna in the West.
18. It appears that despite the general prohibition, some ten works in Arabic (including a book of Psalms of David) were printed in Aleppo, that is, in Ottoman lands, in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Erginbaş (2005, 15).
19. For a translation of the text of the decree see Atiyeh (1995, 283). A transliteration of the original into Latin script, as well as select pages of the printed originals, can be found in *Yazmadan basmaya: Müteferrika, mühendishane, üsküdar* (34–35).
20. The first printed work in Arabic appears to have been produced in Rome in 1514, a book of hours for Melkite Christians; four years later, in 1518 a section of the Quran was printed. The first work printed in Turkish was the bilingual text of capitulations ceded to France by the Ottoman Empire, printed in Paris in 1615 (Kuneralp 1992, 2).
21. For an English translation of the petition, see the Appendix to Atiyeh (1995, 286–92). For a Latin script transcription of this petition and the sultan's *firman*, see *Yazmadan basmaya* (30–33).
22. Interestingly, and entirely in character for the empire at that time, Ibrahim had been born into a Hungarian-speaking Christian family in present-day Romania and entered Ottoman lands during Magyar prince Tököly's rebellion against the Habsburgs (incited by Ottoman forces retreating from Vienna), as the Austrians regained control of the Kolozsvár region.
23. There is some doubt about Müteferrika's authorship of the Risale (Erginbaş 2005). The Risale is usually described as an apology for his newly embraced faith; however, its content is mainly a polemic against papism and the trinity, which has led Berkes to conclude that he had, in all probability, previously been a Unitarian and thus subject to considerable persecution at the hands of the Catholic Austrians. The sheikh of the Sufi order discussed here, Esad Coşan, wrote a short book on the Risale, in which he is aware of the critiques Berkes has brought to bear on the reading of the Risale as Islamic apologetics, but nonetheless sees in the work a sincere account of Müteferrika's rationale for embracing Islam, namely that Christians and Jews had been careless with the dogmas (*akide*) revealed to them and had, over time, falsified their scriptures (Coşan 1993, 37–38; Berkes 1998, 36–50).
24. Firman of Ahmet III, 1139 AH/1727 CE, in Atiyeh (1995, 285).

25. The proofreaders named in the *firman* are the *kadıs* (judges) of Istanbul, Selanik, and Galata, along with the sheikh of the Kasımpaşa Mevlevihane (Mevlevi dervish lodge; Atiyeh 1995, 285).
26. On the supervisory role of the ulema in early Muslim printing, see Mahdi (1995).
27. Anderson only alludes to this in passing, when he mentions that "before the age of print, Rome easily won every war against heresy in Western Europe *because it always had better lines of communication than its challengers*." Lines of communication imply important infrastructure and not just literacy (1991, 39; emphasis added).
28. The very different impact of print in places like the Philippines and Yemen are two cases that have been especially well documented; see Rafael (1993) and Messick (1993).
29. In 1974, Keith Basso wrote an essay, "The Ethnography of Writing," in which he suggests that we need to be attentive to "what kinds of information are considered appropriate for transmission through written channels, and how, if at all . . . this information differ[s] from that which is passed through alternative channels such as speech" (1989, 431). See also Derrida (1976).
30. In this context, Basso's (1989) point about writing being merely one mode, or "channel" of communication, among others is well put.
31. See the discussion in previous chapters.
32. For an analogous argument see Woolard and Schieffelin's (1994) critique of speech-act theory's claims to universal validity, specifically regarding the centrality of intention.
33. Cited in Woolard and Schieffelin (1994, 57).
34. A precedent to these relatively recent changes in communication technologies in relation to Islamic discourse and practice is the emergence of printing among Muslims in the central Ottoman lands in the early eighteenth century and then the proliferation of journals and newspapers—including publications by Sufis, such as *Tasavvuf*, *Ceride-i Sûfiye*, and *Muhibban*—in the 1910s.
35. Professor Mardin expressed to me his surprise that his comments—made in passing during an otherwise not particularly sophisticated interview with a mass-circulation daily—became so debated and created so much anger in some circles (personal communication, November 2007).
36. See the discussion of these different epistemes in Messick (1993) and Mitchell (1991, 128–60). Thus the various manuals of everyday ethics, compiling teachings of scholars from the early centuries of Islam, and even those summarizing the teachings of Sufi sheikhs from over the centuries are to be analyzed in the contexts in which they were meant to be *used*, not merely in terms of content.
37. See the important collection of essays on Islam in Turkey in Tapper (1991).
38. For a discussion of plural temporalities and liberalism, see Connolly (2005, 54–67).
39. Debates in France surrounding the Swiss Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan similarly involved archsecularist denunciations of his "religious" reasons for strongly embracing democracy, multiculturalism, tolerance, and an ethic of citizenship among Muslims in Europe. According to their norms (and those of many nonreligious people in the so-called West), one is apparently supposed to both act according to liberal private-public norms *and* have nonreligious reasons for doing so. On statist, secularist "republicans" (Kemalists) and their nostalgia for the days of their clear hegemony in Turkey, see Özyürek (2006).
40. Recent work has shown the centrality of specific technologies to the emergence of a particular kind of exercise of reason and power and their link to the fact that criteria for participation were thoroughly gendered and class based (propertied men being the players initially). See Ryan (1992) and Eley (1992); see also Mazzarella's (2004) discussion of media and mediation.
41. See Arendt's chapter titled "What is Authority?" in Arendt (1968).

CHAPTER 6

1. Esad hoja was accompanied to his grave by some ten thousand mourners. Among the politicians attending the funeral were Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, at the time of writing Adalet ve Kalkınma Party (AKP) chairman and prime minister, and president of the republic, respectively. "Sevgi Seli," *Yeni* Şafak, February 10, 2001; "Yerini Oğluna Bıraktı," *Radikal*, February 10, 2001. Erdoğan also published a condolence message in the *Yeni Şafak* newspaper.
2. A "politician known to be close to Sufi circles," quoted in Oğhan 2001. See our discussion of the problem of cradle sheikhs in Chapter 2.
3. In September of 2002, the Sağduyu (Commonsense) Party was formed with the prominent participation of Nureddin Coşan (recall that the newspaper affiliated with the order had also been called *Sağduyu*). The public profile of this party was very low in Turkey, with few even knowing of its existence. They apparently supported the AKP in the November 2002 elections ; however, Nureddin made a public statement (placed on the Sağduyu Party website, http://www.sagduyu.org/) that in the July 2007 elections, they would not be supporting the AKP, due to what they saw as the AKP's failure to address issues of freedom and rights (most probably the head scarf issue).
4. On the AK P era in Turkish politics, see Yavuz (2006), Keyder (2004; 2006), and Tuğal (2007).
5. Beginning in 2008, the country was shaken by a deepening investigation into a shadowy group allegedly known as Erkenekon, apparently formed by hard-line Kemalists among active-duty and retired military personnel and people close to them in academia, the media, "civil society" associations, and business circles. They are accused of plotting one or more coups and of using the media and academia to turn public opinion against the AKP and to orchestrate street protests against the AKP administration. Particularly shocking to some is that it is special counterterrorism police units that are leading the investigation, marking the most prominent group calling itself "patriots" as terrorism suspects, as Leftist and Kurdish groups have been.
6. This and following quotes from Erdoğan's speech at the inauguration are taken from Aksoy 2001.
7. See the discussion in Foucault (2008).
8. To give an example, most such scholars would agree with other, not particularly "religious" people in the country that the reason why Istanbul still carries that name and not Constantinople, while the main language spoken in the city now is not Bulgarian or Greek, is the military.
9. We have seen examples of this kind of work in earlier chapters, such as the fact that the vast majority of the *ulema* and Sufi sheikhs in the major Ottoman cities enthusiastically supported the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) coup against Abdülhamid and are on record saying and writing so; or that when the Sufi orders were abolished in 1925, many sheikhs wrote their memoirs, and a great many expressed sympathy with the decision on grounds either that Sufism's degeneration was extensive or that it was a luxury that Muslims could not afford given their general educational, infrastructural, economic, and military situation.
10. See Keyder (1987; 1997) on the significance of the relative absence of a bourgeoisie in the formative decades of republican Turkey.
11. Interestingly, among the delegates pressing Turkey for such a concession was the Japanese Baron Hayashi, who outlined the recent history of his country whereby such a transition regime had been established "with success" (Lausanne Conference 1923, 492–93).

12. An independent Greece had existed since 1831, but the northern part of the eventual Greek country only became independent of the empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.
13. Again, we recall that Karpat (2000, xvi) estimates that between 40 and 50 per cent of the population of today's Turkey is of Balkan, Caucasian, or Crimean ancestry.
14. Arms and financing for Kosovar Albanians were certainly being organized quietly by the Albanian diaspora around the world, including in Istanbul (where I met an Albanian American allegedly doing just that). But the Turkish authorities had committed themselves to coordinating their responses through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and such material support was done discretely in Turkey. Emotional ties to Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans run high in Turkey, however, and the Turkish authorities flew in several thousand Kosovar Albanian families to temporarily shelter them in camps set up by the military near Kırklareli, in Thrace.
15. It is also through foundations that religious minorities such as Armenian and Greek Christians and Jews are to provide for the administration of their communities' facilities, such as houses of worship, schools, lands, and archives. Again, the importance of regulations on foundations can hardly be overstated, and indeed the liberalization of such regulations is a part of the reforms being undertaken by authorities in line with European Union–accession protocols.
16. On foundations and associations in the corporate life of Naqshbandis in Turkey, see Yavuz (2003, 133–50); on observant, non-Sufi communities in Turkey, see White (2002, 178–211).
17. These are prominent industrialists and businessmen in Turkey, who established Koç, Sabancı, and Yeditepe Universities, respectively.
18. Many of the center's researchers have also spent time abroad in language courses in the Arab world, or English-speaking world, or both, and as visiting fellows in centers in North America, Western Europe, or Malaysia.
19. These universities, all of which had between one and five submissions, were the following: Dokuz Eylül (Izmir), Erciyes (Kayseri), Selçuk (Konya), Süleyman Demirel (Isparta), Cumhuriyet (Sivas), Harran (Urfa), and Uludağ (Bursa).

EPILOGUE

1. Some of these circles went so far as to openly support a coup, such as the former head of the Kadıköy branch of the Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Kemalist Thought Association), Birol Başaran, who said in speaking to a so-called seminar on law and politics in February of 2008, "I think days are coming when the law's boundaries will be stepped out of [*hukuk dışına çıkılacağı*]. In certain situations the law can be suspended. [Some are saying] 'Let's call in the army, they should do a coup, and so on.' [It is said that] now is not the time. Why isn't it the time? After watching for five years the AKP's treason [*vatan hainliği*] and their betrayal [lit. "selling"] of the country, if we take the country into our own hands at this moment we'll also get a grip on the crisis. This is the problem. The Turkish military should be on stand-by, they know what to do" (quoted in "Kim kimdir?" *Radikal*, July 2, 2008). Başaran is also a member of the CHP and sought to lead the party, though he received only a handful of votes in the party's 2001 delegation. As this book went to press, there were signs of significant changes within the CHP, involving among other things its distancing itself from views expressed here by Başaran.
2. The (then) chief of the general staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, said in a speech, "There is a topic about which no one should have any doubts—and we in the military are

emphasizing this once again—and that is that there are things that we support and that we cannot abandon. These are the Republic of Turkey's unitary state structure, its nation-state structure, its secular state structure, and that the established organization of the armed forces not be damaged through political, emotional or prejudiced attitudes. However, we are seeing that now just such an atmosphere is emerging as well as tendencies to prune away the state while exalting the individual. Now, of course the individual is important. But how democratic and reasonable is it to erode the state while promoting the individual?" ("Yaşar Büyükanıt: Konuşmak için taslağı bekliyoruz." *Radikal*, October 2, 2007).

3. Many people in Turkey have heard this anecdote, and I found several vague references to it having been either a headline in *Cumhuriyet* in 1933 or a radio announcement at around the same time. However, I have been unable to verify either of these.
4. The Turkish state, like most others, has been very reluctant to simply massively incorporate such people into active citizenship, for example, by legalizing the status of squatters, for fear of destabilizing the whole property regime; at the same time, the state must display a degree of responsiveness to the needs of its titular citizens, for to do otherwise risks political instability. Their situation usually becomes a issue in party politics, as parties try to curry favor with such populations by promising to issue titles and deeds to the properties they inhabit, to extend municipal services like utilities and transportation to their hitherto marginal neighborhoods, and so on.
5. An interesting discussion of cynicism as a modality of the political in Turkey is in Navaro-Yashin (2002). Most prominent among the cynics are many supporters of the CHP, who see liberalism as merely a mechanism for the penetration of capitalism and the dismantling of the Turkish state through treachery and collaboration on the part of lackeys within Turkey. I must set aside discussion of the so-called National Left phenomenon in Turkey, which, on these topics, is often indistinguishable from the Right.
6. Indeed, this may be part of the reason why anthropologists have given scant attention to the country; with so much reform and modernization, Turkey had simply ceased to be exotic enough. (It is also true that for many decades, access of foreigners to conduct research in rural areas and "villages"—the locus of anthropological objects par excellence for decades—was restricted by the state.)
7. First published in *The New Republic* 41 (January 7, 1925): 162–63, reprinted in Dewey (1984b: 189–93).
8. See Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006).
9. What has become of the political Left in Turkey since the 1990s is itself a large, important topic deserving of attention. For our purposes, it will suffice to say that many political commentators in Turkey note that after 2002, they saw very little difference between the discourses of the self-proclaimed Left (like the CHP) and the nationalists (MHP) and declared that for all intents and purposes the Left has ceased to exist. The nationalist hysteria and conspiracy theories coming from the so-called Left in Turkey (especially those structured around the notion of the "National left" [*ulusal sol*]) can appear utterly foreign and bizarre to those more familiar with Leftist politics in Western Europe.
10. I reiterate here that I am not arguing that every instance of articulation of Islamic and liberal norms and practices around the world is such an internal unfolding of Islamic traditions. That this is the case in Turkey is because of the status of political modernity in the country (see earlier chapters of this book). Nor am I suggesting that processes in Turkey could or should be "models" for other Muslim societies (a suggestion the current government in Turkey also politely refuses, incidentally), since the grounds from which reasoning is undertaken, as well as the historicity of regimes of knowledge and power intersecting at such grounds, will differ.

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