

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. Trans. David J. Parent (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
2. John Richardson, "Introduction" in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 18.
3. Ken Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth," in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 40–58.
4. Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Brian Leiter, "Perspectivism in Genealogy of Morals," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals*, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
5. Maudemarie Clark, for example, has argued that we *must* take a revive and rescue position with regard to Nietzsche's truths if we are "interested in maintaining Nietzsche's stature as an important philosopher." Maudemarie Clark, "Nietzsche's Doctrines of the Will to Power," in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001), 140.
6. John Richardson, "Introduction," 5.
7. For different versions of this view, see Ofelia Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) and Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).
8. Wendy Brown, "Democracy Against Itself: Nietzsche's Challenge," in *Politics Out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 121–37; William Connolly, *Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy* (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1995); Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993). A slightly different case for a Nietzschean democracy is made by Dana Villa's critique of this foregoing literature and his connection of Nietzsche with Arendt in "Democratizing the Agon: Nietzsche, Arendt, and the Agonistic Tendency in Recent Political Theory," in *Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Alan Schrift (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).
9. See, for example, Babette Babich, "Nietzsche and the Condition of Postmodern Thought: Post-Nietzschean Postmodernism," in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990); Jacques Derrida, *Éperons/Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Sara Kofman, "Baubó: Theological Perversion and Fetishism," in *Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics*, ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); David Farrell Krell, *Postponements: Woman, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Kathi Weeks, *Constituting Feminist Subjects* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). For a persuasive argument demonstrating Nietzsche's relationship to post-structuralism in general and deconstruction in particular, see Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

10. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990) and *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
11. Daniel W. Conway, "Das Weib an sich: The Slave Revolt in Epistemology," in *Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory*, ed. Paul Patton (New York: Routledge, 1993).
12. Wendy Brown, "Postmodern Exposures, Feminist Hesitations," in *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Rebecca Stringer, "A Nietzschean Breed': Feminism, Victimology, *Ressentiment*," in *Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Alan Schrift (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).
13. Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, eds., *Why We Are Not Nietzscheans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Ofelia Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism*; Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*.
14. Ofelia Schutte, "Nietzsche's Psychology of Gender Difference," In *Modern Engendering: Critical Feminist Readings in Modern Western Philosophy*, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994) and *Beyond Nihilism*; Linda Singer, "Nietzschean Mythologies: The Inversion of Value and the War Against Women," in *Feminist Interpretations of Nietzsche*, ed. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
15. Devoted translator Walter Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche as an existentialist lover of Socrates managed to introduce Nietzsche into the highly specialized world of academic, English-language philosophy, but at the expense of declaring him to be fundamentally "anti-political." See Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1974). Many still argue that Nietzsche is either apolitical or antipolitical; see, for example, Leslie Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*; William Connolly, *Identity/Difference and Political Theory and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Despite this, it is now grudgingly accepted amongst most professional philosophers in the United States that Nietzsche can be read as a political philosopher or, at the very least, that he has views about politics. For two very different accounts of the issues at stake in claiming Nietzsche as a political thinker, see Daniel W. Conway's *Nietzsche and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1997) and Bruce Detwiler's *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*.
16. *GS* §377.
17. *BGE* §257.
18. Wendy Brown, "Politics Without Banisters: Genealogical Politics in Nietzsche and Foucault," in *Politics Out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 91–120.
19. See, for this argument, Butler, *Gender Trouble*; Butler, *Bodies That Matter*; Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Michel Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
20. Henry Staten is admirably attentive to this constitutive contradiction, documenting its multiple moments in Nietzsche's texts through a practice of reading he calls "psychodialectic," a method that is "as attentive to the logical economy of the text as . . . the libidinal economy with which it interacts." Henry Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 8. Yet Staten's careful and insightful study overlooks the *political* aspirations that constitute the objects of Nietzsche's libidinal economy, and the necessarily

- political uses and meanings of Nietzsche's use of rhetoric. This book seeks to build on Staten's work by rectifying this omission.
21. Some construe Nietzsche's emphasis on contradiction as an agonistic struggle between equal yet opposite parties, a struggle that is necessary for the betterment of the contenders and results in the victory of the stronger or more excellent party (see, for example, Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*, 61–64). While the foregrounding of struggle in this reading is correct, I nevertheless do not think that for Nietzsche the outcome of any particular struggle is necessarily explainable in terms of merit, excellence, or desert. Triumph is not so simple or transparent; struggles are not so intentionally determined or consciously known; and the contending parties are not always so clearly distinguishable from one another. Indeed, it may often be the case that a victor—be it a drive or a morality or a political party—triumphs because of an accident, a piece of forgetfulness, a misplaced desire, or even a lack of awareness of its participation in the struggle altogether. It is also the case that drives or moralities or parties can be difficult to distinguish from one another, sometimes merging and then separating again or coalescing at unexpected points and reshaping one another. So while there may be a kind of agonism at work in Nietzsche's philosophy, the contests themselves are not nearly so distinct and their triumphant outcomes are not nearly so meaningful.
  22. For example, Martha Nussbaum's criteria for determining whether or not a theory is political are whether or not (or the degree to which) it addresses the specific normative concerns of a multicultural, welfare- or wealth-redistributive liberal state. Martha Nussbaum, "Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 5, no. 1 (1997), 1–12. Although Brian Leiter does not construe political theory so narrowly, he is clear that Nietzsche has "has no political philosophy" because he has no "theory of the state and its legitimacy." Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 296.
  23. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 1997); cf. *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Indeed, it may well be the case that our presumption of the state as being the primary or only site and origin of power is itself a function of a larger and more diffuse functioning of power relations that Foucault has named *governmentality*.
  24. It is in this spirit that Foucault declares it is necessary "to cut off the head of the king" in political theory and begin to think about power as operative in ways other than that of the solely prohibitive, sovereign law; Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 88–89, and "*Society Must Be Defended*": *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997).
  25. As Mark Warren rightly notes, Nietzsche "shows how subjects are possible as historical achievements. He shows us how capacities of the self evolved together with domination, and how they might be reconceived to go beyond their origins." Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1988), 2.
  26. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 3.
  27. As Foucault argues, "Philosophers or even, more generally, intellectuals justify and mark out their identity by trying to establish an almost uncrossable line between the domain of knowledge, seen as that of truth and freedom, and the domain of the exercise of power. What struck me, in observing the human sciences, was the development of all these branches of knowledge can in no way be dissociated from the exercise of power . . . generally speaking, the fact that societies can become the object of scientific observation, that human behavior became, from a certain point on, a problem to be analyzed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, with mechanisms of power." He continues: "Truth is no doubt a form of power. And in saying that, I am only taking up one of the fundamental

- problems of Western philosophy when it poses these questions: Why, in fact, are we attached to the truth? Why the truth rather than lies? Why the truth rather than myth? Why the truth rather than illusion? And I think that, instead of trying to find out what truth, as opposed to error, is, it might be more interesting to take up the problem posed by Nietzsche: how is it that, in our societies, 'the truth' has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its thrall?" Michel Foucault, "On Power," trans. Alan Sheridan, in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture—Interviews and Other 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 106–7.
28. This means that I do not see Nietzsche as a political thinker because he devotes himself to the political goal of the enhancement of the type man, which Bruce Detwiler, for example, argues is Nietzsche's primary political project in *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) or because he asks the fundamental question of politics, "What ought man to become?" as Daniel W. Conway argues in *Nietzsche and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1997). The first reading strikes me as inconsistent with Nietzsche's revolutionary tendencies (to be discussed in a moment) insofar as it is accompanied by the claim that only a few of those men will be enhanced—i.e., this reading of Nietzsche's political project is one of aristocratic radicalism, whereas I see Nietzsche's politics as fundamentally revolutionary and thus mass-based. The second reading of Nietzsche as a political thinker strikes me as potentially reliant upon a historical construal of either the nature of human beings or the nature of power.
  29. I owe this point—and the interpretive approach underlying it—to Daniel W. Conway's marvelous and methodologically groundbreaking study of Nietzsche, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
  30. In this, I in part follow Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur (*Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature* [New York: Routledge, 1993]), who have made a forceful and persuasive case for overlooking all of Nietzsche's unpublished writings. See also R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965) and Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1974).
  31. Maudemarie Clark (*Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*), Bruce Detwiler (*Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*), Tracy Strong (*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* [Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000]), and Mark Warren (*Nietzsche and Political Thought*) all take this approach.
  32. Brian Leiter, "Perspectivism in *Genealogy of Morals*"; Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions*; John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
  33. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 10.
  34. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*. 4 vols. Trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991).
  35. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
  36. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 10.
  37. Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, 26.
  38. Richardson, "Introduction," 12.
  39. Even Heidegger notes the difficulty of attributing importance to the order of aphorisms in *The Will to Power*, one that "does not stem from Nietzsche himself, is arbitrary and inessential," and that Heidegger admits produces a similar "arbitrariness, within certain limits" in his own interpretation of Nietzsche (Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1, 24).

## CHAPTER 1

1. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 368d–369a.
2. Plato, *Republic*, 462d.
3. Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992) Book II, Lemma 7, Scholium.
4. Even Locke dabbles in this body politic imagery, arguing that “when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a *community*, they have thereby made that *community* one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the *majority*: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the *consent of the majority*: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, *one community*, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should.” John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government” in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), §96.
5. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 112.
6. Plato, *Republic*, 462a-c.
7. This assumption also implies a desire for politics itself to run as smoothly and unconsciously as bodily processes. Socrates’ proposal that the *polis* function as a body thus suggests a longing that politics undertake its most important functions as effortlessly and unthinkingly as your body breathes, swallows, and regulates your temperature while you read this book, admirably focusing on “more important” things. Cf. Rousseau’s claim in the *Social Contract* that if the General Will were truly general and completely unified, there would be little to no dialogue—much less discord—at the seemingly endless meetings of the Assembly: “As long as several men together consider themselves to be a single body, they have only a single will, which relates to their common preservation and the general welfare. Then all the mechanisms of the state are vigorous and simple; its maxims are clear and luminous; it has no tangled, contradictory interests; the common good is clearly apparent everywhere, and requires only good sense in order to be perceived . . . A state governed in this way needs very few laws; and to the degree that it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones, this necessity is universally seen. The first to propose them merely says what everyone has already felt; and there is no question of intrigues nor of eloquence to pass into law of what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure the others will do likewise.” *On the Social Contract*, Book VI, chapter 1, ed. Roger Masters, trans. Judith Masters (New York: St. Martin’s, 1978), 108.
8. *BGE* §19.
9. See, for example, Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Leslie Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
10. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Athlone Press, 1983), 40.
11. *BGE* §117.
12. *BGE* §19.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *BGE* §12. As we will see, although Nietzsche’s view is very much opposed to the Platonic/Christian model of the soul, it resembles, in many respects, the account offered by Aristotle in *De Anima*, defining *psychē* as the principle of living things. Indeed, in its usage by Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles, and Aesop, *psychē* means “breath,” “esp. as in the sign of life”; it is only the Platonic usage that refers to *psychē* as “the soul or spirit of man,” as

- that which is “opposed to *sōma*.” Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 903.
15. ZI:4 “On the Despisers of the Body.”
  16. In Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. James Strachey, trans. Joan Riviere (W. W. Norton: New York and London, 1960), 26.
  17. *GM* III:16.
  18. *BGE* §12.
  19. *Ibid.*
  20. *EH* “Z” §4. In *BGE*, section 54, Nietzsche argues that all modern philosophy has been attempting the same thing: “Since Descartes—actually more despite him than because of his precedent—all the philosophers seek to assassinate the old soul concept,” making modern philosophy essentially “*anti-Christian*,” if not, unfortunately, “*anti-religious*.” Nietzsche, for his part, is more definitive: “What is it that my whole body really expects of music? For there is no soul” (*GS* §368).
  21. *BGE* §23.
  22. *GM* II:12.
  23. I therefore disagree with Elizabeth Grosz’s claim that “Nietzsche does not have a coherent theory of the body as such.” Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 121. Conway’s conceptualization of the soul as the “invisible body” that informs and is informed by the visible one admirably makes clear Nietzsche’s refusal of any soul/body dualism (Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 23–30), yet the emphasis on vision as the primary psychological sense unwittingly reinstates this dualism by reifying the “visible” body as a perceptible, material container for Nietzsche’s invisible and “sumptuary” soul. The distinction between the body (*morphē*) and the drives that construct it (will to power) cannot be so easily made for Nietzsche. As Joanne Faulkner argues, “Nietzsche uses the body as a metaphor for the intellect, and intellect for the body, such that the reader is left chasing him through the labyrinth of his thought, which refuses to stop on either side of the spirit-body divide.” Joanne Faulkner, “The Body as Text in the Writings of Nietzsche and Freud,” *Minerva* 7 [2003], 112. Further, as we will see in the next chapter, the crucial diagnostic sense for assessment of this discernible conglomeration of drives is not vision but *smell*.
  24. *GS* §120.
  25. *EH* “Books” §4.
  26. *BGE* §214.
  27. *BGE* §212.
  28. *TI* “Anti-Nature” §3. In this aphorism, Nietzsche warns that “one remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace.”
  29. *GS* §322.
  30. For example, Graham Parkes insists on the necessity of a provisional “tyranny” (*Composing the Soul*, 351–58) and Leslie Thiele argues that Nietzsche believes a “tensioned order” is necessary, to which end “leadership is found indispensable.” Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, 63.
  31. *GS* §290. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 185, 192–93; cf. Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, 63.
  32. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 7.
  33. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 191.
  34. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 190.
  35. Moreover, what is at stake in insisting that Nietzsche really does value order more than disorder? Is it meant to ensure that his view of the soul cannot sanction “just anything”? Thiele, Parkes, and even Nehamas, at times, all seem to suggest that it is sufficient for psychological health simply for one’s soul to be *ordered*, with the *particular* ordering of secondary (or non-) importance. Yet there is also a lurking anxiety at the heart of these studies

- about the possibility that Nietzsche may *not* recommend an ordering of the soul, much less any particular kind of psychic discipline whatsoever. Although Nehamas is the only one of these three to (indirectly) take on this issue, arguing that we need not *like* Nietzsche or Nietzschean figures in order to appreciate their greatness (*Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 192ff.), in his more recent reflections on this issue, Nehamas “confesses” that he has not faced this question directly and ultimately casts his lot with Kant on this ethical question, concluding that Nietzsche must be rejected insofar as he “refuses to reject the evil hero unconditionally.” Alexander Nehamas, “Nietzsche and ‘Hitler,’” in *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy*, ed. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 91, 105.
36. Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 181.
  37. *Ibid.*, 83.
  38. *Ibid.*, 181, emphasis added.
  39. An ideal is still an ideal, and therefore regulative. See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990) and *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
  40. Thiele ultimately comes to this conclusion as well, arguing that “health and order of the soul are always an overcoming of illness and disorder.” Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, 91. Health is therefore the *process* of overcoming sickness, a condition from which sickness is never definitively absent.
  41. *GM* III:9. Nietzsche credits his own illness as being responsible for all of his distinctive and distinctively admirable characteristics: “A long, all too long, series of years signifies recovery for me; unfortunately it also signifies relapse, decay, the periodicity of a kind of *décadence* . . . Even that filigree art of grasping and comprehending in general, those fingers for *nuances*, that psychology of ‘looking around the corner,’ and whatever else is characteristic of me, was learned only then, is the true present of those days in which everything in me became subtler—observation itself as well as organs of observation” (*EH* “Wise” §1).
  42. *GM* II:16. See Daniel W. Conway, “The Birth of the Soul: Toward a Psychology of Decadence,” in *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*, ed. Jacob Golomb, Weaver Santaniello, and Ronald Lehrer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) for a discussion of the development of the soul as the body’s contraction of illness.
  43. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Book II, Lemma 2.
  44. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 45.
  45. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 38.
  46. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 62.
  47. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 62.
  48. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 70.
  49. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 70.
  50. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 70.
  51. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 70.
  52. *GM* III:7.
  53. *BGE* §23.
  54. *BGE* §3.
  55. *BGE* §289.
  56. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 44.
  57. *GM* II:12.
  58. As Paul Patton aptly notes, “Whereas Hobbes’s dynamic is one of preservation or increase in the capacities of a given body, or preservation *through* increase of the body’s capacities, Nietzsche’s dynamic includes activity which might lead to its destruction or to its transformation into a different kind of body, as well as activity directed at the maintenance or increase of the power of the body in question. For Nietzsche, the power of a given body is a function of the activity of which that body is capable and not simply the powers

- of others which it can command.” Paul Patton, “Nietzsche and Hobbes,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 33, no. 3 (2001), 106. It is for this reason that Nandita Biswas Mellamphy concludes that Hobbesian power is essentially *reactive*, unlike the *activity* of will to power. Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, “Corporealizing Thought: Retranslating the Eternal Return Back Into Politics,” in *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought*, ed. Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 709–10.
59. Not only is this viewpoint problematic for all of the above-mentioned reasons, it is also based upon a presumption that Nietzsche refuses again and again: equality. The importance of inequality for Nietzsche’s understanding of life will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
  60. *BGE* §13.
  61. *BGE* §186.
  62. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 4 vols., trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). Arthur Danto’s important study claims: “It is hardly avoidable that we think of Will-to-Power in almost exactly the terms in which men once thought of substance, as that which underlies everything else and was the most fundamental of all . . . It is a metaphysical or, better, an ontological concept, for ‘Will-to-Power is Nietzsche’s answer to the question ‘What is there?’” Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 215. More recently, John Richardson has argued that will to power is metaphysical insofar as it constitutes a systematic truth about essence. See John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
  63. Bernd Magnus agrees, noting that “without the *Nachlass* it is virtually impossible to read eternal recurrence and will to power as first-order descriptions of the way the world is in itself.” Bernd Magnus, “The Use and Abuse of *The Will to Power*,” in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 233. Laurence Lampert cites Heidegger’s reliance on the unpublished notes as a prominent reason for his resolute interpretation of will to power as a metaphysical principle (Laurence Lampert, “Heidegger’s Nietzsche Interpretation,” *Man and World* 7, no. 4 [1974]), and Danto’s claim that will to power is an ontological concept depends on his multiple citations from the *Nachlass*. An exception to this generalization is Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, who cites generously from the unpublished writings and yet nevertheless concludes that “Nietzsche’s philosophy excludes as irrelevant to actual events the question of the ground of being in the sense of traditional metaphysics.” Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*, trans. David J. Parent (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 60.
  64. As will become clear, I therefore strongly disagree with Lampert’s assertion that Nietzsche’s published writings “do contain references to the metaphysical aspects of will to power” (Lampert, “Heidegger’s Nietzsche Interpretation,” 360). The aphorisms he cites as proof—*BGE* §§22, 36, and 259—will be discussed in detail.
  65. Heidegger nowhere, to my knowledge, takes such concerns into account in his reading of Nietzsche. John Richardson openly rejects this methodology, seeing no difficulty in reading Nietzsche’s philosophy as one “more like that we already practice,” which allows us to hear him “using language with the same straightforward intent as thinkers before him have done” (Richardson, *Nietzsche’s System*, 6); cf. Brian Leiter’s choice to present Nietzsche as “aspir[ing] to speak clear, precise, ‘analytical’ philosophical English” (Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York: Routledge [2002], xii). Richardson’s claim of course presumes that previous thinkers *have* used language with “straightforward intent,” and raises the question of why, then, Nietzsche seems so clearly to refuse this mode of presentation. One is also left wondering what is to be gained by refusing to reckon with such an obvious and distinctive feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy in our interpretation of it. Leiter insists that his methodological choice does not mean that he thinks Nietzsche is “really a ‘closet’ analytic philosopher.” Rather, Leiter claims that if Nietzsche is “to *speak to us*,” he must do within



- the terms of analytic philosophy as it developed in the twentieth century. Those terms are far superior to any other sort, he says, and interpreting Nietzsche in any other way would be “irresponsible.” While Leiter is correct to note that if Nietzsche is to speak to us we must be able to understand his language, this is very different from claiming either that Nietzsche speaks the language of analytic philosophy or that it is the only language “we” ourselves speak.
66. See, for example, Nancy Love, *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 206, 5n. It is only recently that this aphorism has begun to be read with care by Nietzsche interpreters. Maudemarie Clark emphasizes the hypothetical and tentative status of the proposed thesis that the world is will to power in this section, concluding that it cannot legitimately be attributed to Nietzsche at all (Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990]). Daniel W. Conway urges us to read this section in the experimental tone in which it is couched, as one more indication of the overall experimental status of Nietzsche’s use of will to power (Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997]). Müller-Lauter comes to the opposite conclusion but only by taking a careful reading of section 36 seriously (Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions*).
  67. Despite the reams of scholarship on Nietzsche’s inimitable style, I have yet to encounter more than a single discussion of Nietzsche’s use of quotation marks, nor any acknowledgment of their function as a distancing mechanism or sarcasm. Eric Blondel argues that Nietzsche’s quotation marks highlight two distinctions: the first, between moral language and his own (therefore indicating that moral language is “improper, if not vulgar, slang, obscene, or incorrect”), and, second, to suggest the gap between language in general (which, like moral language, is always already metaphysical) and his own. See Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Seán Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 148–56. Blondel at least agrees that these “inverted commas” function as a means of indicating that the words being used are *not* those in some sense intended, desired, or employed literally by Nietzsche himself: “Inverted commas indicate that appearances are deceptive” (174).
  68. In *BGE*, section 56, Nietzsche tells us that he has not only thought pessimism “through to its depths,” but also sought to “liberate it from the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and simplicity in which it has finally presented itself to our century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.”
  69. *BGE* §36.
  70. *DP* §4.
  71. *GM* I:13.
  72. *TI* “Errors” §3.
  73. I therefore quite agree with Clark’s conclusion that the statement in *BGE*, section 36, that the world is will to power cannot stand because as an argument it “depends on the causality of the will, something [Nietzsche] nowhere accepts.” Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, 217. On denial of causality *per se*, see *GS* §112; *BGE* §16, §21, §360; *A* §39; on denial of the causality of the will, see *TI* “Philosophy” §5, “Errors” §3; *GS* §127; *BGE* §19, *A* §15.
  74. *BGE* §230, in “Our Virtues.”
  75. *BGE* §14.
  76. *GM* III:12.
  77. *GS* §374.
  78. *GS* §373. Nietzsche sees this mechanicism in modern philosophy, too, particularly among British thinkers, and castigates Hobbes specifically for this methodology in *BGE* §252.
  79. *GS* §373. Nietzsche’s setting up of the contrast between science’s interpretation of the world and his own is also an obvious sales pitch, a means of showcasing will to power as both shocking yet compelling, frightening yet overfull of explanatory power, questionable

- yet characterized by the power and charm of reversal which oppositional refutations so often display.
80. *D* §507.
  81. Not only is “will to power” put in quotes, but so, too, is “the world” at the end of *BGE*, section 22. Blondel calls this Nietzsche’s “double game of saying and unsaying” (Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture*, 152), noting in reference to section 1067 of *The Will to Power*: “So here again, Nietzsche forbids us to speak of ‘world’ in general, but writes: ‘Do you know what “the world” is for me?’”
  82. *D* P§5.
  83. *BGE* §§13, 259.
  84. *GS* §349. Section 349 occurs in Book V of the *Gay Science*, which was written the same year as *BGE* and appended to the previously completed Books I through IV.
  85. *GM* II:12.
  86. II:12 “On Self-Overcoming.”
  87. *CW*, *Epilogue*.
  88. *GS* §349.
  89. *Z* II:12 “On Self-Overcoming.”
  90. *Ibid.*
  91. *A* §17.
  92. *TI* “Errors” §2.
  93. Some commentators have argued that will to power nevertheless remains a teleological drive, if for no other reason than because it seems necessitated by the “to” (*zu*) of “will to power” (*Wille zur Macht*). See Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32 and John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), chap. 1. Yet is grammar the key interpretive point here? If will “to” power is a drive “toward” expenditure, but that expenditure is neither a predeterminable end state nor a static condition; if, in fact, the *Macht* toward which *Wille zur Macht* drives can never be known or predicted, then what becomes of *telos*? Indeed, what remains of *zu*? Is this instead an example of how “being” is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause” rather than the effect of language? “Indeed, nothing has yet possessed a more naïve power of persuasion than the error concerning being . . . After all, every word we say and every sentence speak in its favor” (*TI* “Philosophy” §5). Becoming can thus have no advocate by definition; this does not mean, however, that Nietzsche’s own use of *Wille zur Macht* makes him the unsuspecting spokesperson for being.
  94. *GS* P§4.
  95. *GS* §382; cf. *EH* “*Z*” §2.
  96. For an important discussion of active and reactive in Nietzsche, see Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.
  97. *TI* “Skirmishes” §14.
  98. *Z* Prologue §4.
  99. *TI* “Skirmishes” §44.
  100. *TI* “Skirmishes” §37.
  101. *D* P§4; cf. *TI* preface: “Excess of strength alone is the proof of strength.”
  102. *BGE* §188.
  103. *Z* Prologue §7.
  104. *TI* “Skirmishes” §44.
  105. *BGE* §259.
  106. *GS* §111.
  107. *GM* II:1.
  108. *GM* II:11.
  109. *BGE* §229.
  110. This is the case despite Deleuze’s famous argument to the contrary (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, chap. 1). It is one thing to deny Nietzsche’s essentialism, another to deny his

- inegalitarianism—the first is justifiable, but the second is not. While I think Nietzsche is committed to the existence of hierarchy—without it, after all, life is impossible—nevertheless this does not mean that the hierarchy is fixed, inscribed immutably into the constitution of bodies, enduring over time, or immune to transformation. Indeed, the unceasing flux of growth and decay that Nietzsche argues characterizes life makes clear just how fleeting any particular hierarchy is. But this does not undermine his insistence that hierarchy *exists* and *is necessary*.
111. In this claim, Nietzsche is in good company—this critique of liberal equality is by now a familiar one. See, for example, Wendy Brown, “Liberalism’s Family Values,” in *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,” in *Critical Race Feminism: A Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. Adrienne K. Wing (New York: New York University Press, 1993); bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (Boston: South End Press, 1984); Catharine MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978); Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Shane Phelan, *Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and Dilemmas of Citizenship* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Patricia Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
  112. Z II:12 “On Self-Overcoming.”
  113. GS §118.

## CHAPTER 2

1. Daniel Ahern, *Nietzsche as Cultural Physician* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
2. GM III:11.
3. GM III:28.
4. For a compelling study of Nietzsche’s philosophy that takes the centrality of *décadence* and Nietzsche’s self-professed obsession with it as its starting point, see Daniel W. Conway’s rich and insightful *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Nietzsche’s obsession with *décadence* is by no means idiosyncratic—many late nineteenth-century European writers, fearful of the multiple social, political, and economic upheavals occurring on the continent and beyond attributed these changes to the decay of morality, the family, and traditional structures of authority. The prognosis for such disintegration was nothing less than the millenarian demise of European culture as a whole. See Edward J. Chamberlin and Sander Gilman, eds., *Degeneration: The Dark Side of Progress* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985); Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Elaine Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle* (New York: Viking, 1990).
5. TT “Socrates” §2, “Anti-Nature” §5. I return to this claim in Chapter 6.
6. GM III:1, 28.
7. HL §5.
8. HL §10.
9. Ibid.

10. *SE* §2.
11. *BGE* §208.
12. *BGE* §212.
13. *BGE* §208.
14. *BGE* §223.
15. *BGE* §200.
16. *BGE* §242.
17. *A* §1.
18. *GM* III:28.
19. *GM* III:19.
20. *Z* Prologue §5.
21. *TI* “Skirmishes” §37.
22. *TI* “Skirmishes” §37. These passages (and occasional others in *Beyond Good and Evil*) lend credence to the notion that Nietzsche’s critique of modern man is not simply an attack on weakness, but also a (reminiscently Rousseauian) critique of a particular *stratum* of the weak—the *bourgeoisie*. Thus the reader sometimes encounters Nietzsche’s critiques of the vulgarity of theater-going crowds (and not just at Bayreuth), his contempt for the newspaper reading masses and his sometimes romanticization of the working class (as, for example, in *BGE* §58). Moore notes this as a moment wherein Nietzsche’s critique of *décadence* subverts the dominant condemnations of degeneration prominent in his day: instead of cultural degeneration inducing a rising tidal wave of crime, sexual indulgence, and drug/alcohol abuse, Nietzsche instead deploys a notion of “healthy criminality” (modeled on Napoleon and Cesare Borgia), with which he contrasts with the “decadent criminality” of the Christian, bourgeois type. Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 143.
23. *BGE* §242.
24. *BGE* §258.
25. *GS* §23.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *BGE* §262.
28. *GS* §377.
29. Or at least through *Twilight of the Idols*; see *TI* “Anti-Nature” §2, “Errors” §2, and “Germans” §6.
30. *A* §6. Unlike his disavowal of conservatism, in this case what Nietzsche says about himself (at the *end* of his career, perhaps in retrospective reflection) is wholly true: “Nothing has preoccupied me more profoundly than the problem of *décadence*—I had reasons” (*CWP*). Richard Gilman notes that Nietzsche is the philosopher who made decadence his central and critical problem. Richard Gilman, *Decadence: The Strange Life of an Epithet* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975). Gregory Moore notes that “few thinkers, either before or since, have contemplated this problem as deeply or as consistently as [Nietzsche], or have placed it at the very centre of their philosophical inquiry” (Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 219). See also Charles Bernheimer, *Decadent Subjects: The Idea of Decadence in Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Culture of the Fin de Siècle in Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
31. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, chap. 2.
32. It may also be one more token of Nietzsche’s deep admiration for all things French: “I believe only in French culture and consider everything else in Europe today that calls itself ‘culture’ a misunderstanding—not to speak of German culture” (*EH* “Clever” §3). Conway suspects Nietzsche appropriated the term from Paul Bourget, a French psychologist whom Nietzsche particularly admired. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, 57.
33. *A* §17.
34. As Derrida notes, “The degenerate is not a lesser vitality; it is a life principle hostile to life.” Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other*, ed. Christie McDonald, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 27. Bernheimer does not mark this transition

- from disinterest to despair in Nietzsche's understanding of decay (in part because Bernheimer relies too much on the unpublished notes), yet he recognizes the nuance in Nietzsche's account, noting that "decadence has a necessary and beneficial place in the economy of life. It is not a problem in itself—it becomes problematic only if it threatens to exceed its limits and infect the organism as a whole" (Bernheimer, *Decadent Subjects*, 30). Yet he contends that Nietzsche has "no clear idea" of what he means by *décadence* (*ibid.*, 29), because everything from modernity, subjectivity, truth, morality, Wagner, and "woman" seem to be instances of it. But this "bewilder[ing], confus[ing], even exasperat[ing]" list (*ibid.*, 48) does not undermine the possibility of specifying what Nietzsche means by *décadence*—it is rather a testimonial of just how widespread he believes the disease to be. Indeed, Nietzsche's assimilation of so many different events to mere epiphenomena of the underlying problem of *décadence* is part and parcel of his revolutionary posture, a deployment of revolutionary rhetoric that seeks to induce crisis through a single, comprehensive interpretation and critique of everything existing (a topic to be explored more fully in the next chapter).
35. Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy*.
  36. Comprehensively documented by Moore in *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*.
  37. André Comte-Sponville, for example, insists that "Nietzsche's thinking is racist in its essence through its conjunction (under cover of heredity) of elitism with biologism." André Comte-Sponville, "The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete: 'Art in the Service of an Illusion,'" in *Why We Are Not Nietzscheans*, eds. Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 33.
  38. Although Robert Solomon admits that Nietzsche's "enthusiasm for genetics and racial stereotyping" is "overly abused," he nevertheless sees a "quasi-biological deterministic thesis" lurking in Nietzsche's tests, a thesis that "suggests that weakness and strength as such are singular, concrete characteristics—as fixed and unambiguous as eye color, and as all-encompassing as the defining characteristics of a biological species." Robert Solomon, "One Hundred Years of *Ressentiment*," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 121.
  39. As Moore notes, "Even [Nietzsche's] openly racist interpreters often complained that he had no clearly defined concept of 'race.'" Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 157.
  40. *GM* III:17.
  41. §208. Moore argues that this is Nietzsche's primary tactic, whereby *Rasse* is "often used interchangeably or in close connection with the word *Stand*," denoting something like "estate, class, caste," or "any group which shares a common ancestry (such as a clan or dynasty)" (Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 125.) Cf. Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 111. In contemporary terms, then, this would make Nietzsche's race/class designation something more akin to an ethnic group than a "race."
  42. *BGE* §205.
  43. *BGE* §252.
  44. *BGE* §251.
  45. *GS* §357.
  46. *BGE* §62.
  47. *BGE* §48.
  48. McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 52.
  49. Nietzsche explicitly disavows Spencer in his only published elaboration of genealogical method in *GM* II:13 (I discuss this aphorism more fully in Chapter 3).
  50. *TI* "Skirmishes" §14.
  51. *BGE* §262. For Germany's colonial endeavors and their role in shaping Germans' self-conceptions with regard to race and class, see Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire*,

- 1884–1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001) and Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).
52. For example, Max Nordau's *Degeneration* (London: Heinemann, 1913). As Mike Hawkins argues, because Darwin himself neither applied his theory of natural selection to human beings in *The Origin of Species* nor specified the necessary "direction" of evolutionary change, social Darwinism became an instrument for documenting both social progress and decline. Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 34. Hawkins also points out the extraordinary "flexibility" of Darwinism with regard to its "unit of selection," wherein evolution and natural selection may "act upon" an individual organism or, as became popular in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, the "species, tribe, nation, race" (33).
  53. Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 116.
  54. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, 18, 31–35. Indeed, Brian Leiter claims that Nietzsche's critique of modern mediocrity misplaces its cause in morality as opposed to, say, the leveling effects of the free market. Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics," in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 248. Cf. Mark Warren's claim that Nietzsche's political proclamations must be overlooked or ignored as the "naïve" ruminations of someone blind to the increasing industrialization and modernizing changes occurring in the Europe of his day. Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).
  55. Neil MacMaster, *Racism in Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 92.
  56. *BT* P§5.
  57. *EH* "Destiny" §4.
  58. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*.
  59. *BT* P§5.
  60. *EH* "D" §2.
  61. *GM* III:1.
  62. *CW* 2nd postscript.
  63. *BGE* §62.
  64. *CW* 2nd postscript.
  65. *TI* "Skirmishes" §43.
  66. MacMaster, *Racism in Europe*, 6; Tzvetan Todorov, "Race and Racism," trans. Catherine Porter, in *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*, ed. Les Back and John Solomos (New York: Routledge, 2000), 65–67.
  67. *BGE* §268.
  68. *GM* I:12.
  69. *BGE* §257.
  70. Cf. Fanon: "It is the settler who has brought the native into existence." Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963). See also Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978).
  71. No doubt he is also emphasizing the bloodiness of these events, but, on this count, Nietzsche is more than fair and this emphasis renders him neither responsible for such violence nor its advocate. As Henry Staten has argued regarding Nietzsche's discussions of slavery, it is important to be attentive not merely to Nietzsche's claims but also his *tone*, which reveals neither an unproblematic advocacy nor the unquestioning condemnation that contemporary readers might want. Rather, Nietzsche speaks in tones of "horrified fascination," understanding that "there is something terrible mixed with the beauty of nature." Henry Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 83. As Staten says, this is the fundamental "economic dilemma with which Nietzsche struggled to the very end—the problem of how to stomach history as he imagines it, as the totality of affect of suffering humanity, how to keep from vomiting it back up when he tries to swallow it" (86).

72. *GS* §23.
73. *BGE* §262.
74. *BGE* §242.
75. *BGE* §200.
76. *GS* §377; cf. *BGE* §256.
77. Both here and in *HH* §475; *GS* §§357, 377; *BGE* I, §§241, 243, 254.
78. *BGE* §251.
79. *GS* §377; *BGE* §208, §251.
80. *GS* §362; *BGE* §199; *GM* I:16, *EH* “*CW*” §2.
81. *BGE* §§208, 241, 254.
82. Peter Bergmann, *Nietzsche: “The Last Antipolitical German”* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 162.
83. *GS* §377.
84. *BGE* §256.
85. Moore seems to favor the line of causality offered in Figure 2.2 (Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 156–59) but I am not convinced there is much textual evidence to support it. Much depends on the plausibility of his reading of Nietzsche’s anti-Semitic anti-Christianism as an attempt to smear *anti-Semites* by tarring them with their own brush (see Note 88).
86. See, for example, *D* §206; *BGE* §264, §272; *TI* “Improvers” §3, §4; *A* §46.
87. See, for example, *GM* I:5, I:12; *TI* “Improvers” §4. Moore argues that Nietzsche’s use of “Aryan” as a label of superiority is an ironic appropriation of the racialist discourse that defined contemporary arguments about race and religion and which he uses to ridicule the Christians, anti-Semites, and German nationalists involved in such debates. It is these people, not Jews or “inferior races,” who are Nietzsche’s real targets (Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 158). While Moore is right to note that Nietzsche uses “Aryan” to refer to “non-white” groups like the Japanese or Semitic groups like the Arabs (*GM* I:11) such that his “mythical ‘blond beast’ serves as an emblem for the ‘predatory type’ in all cultures” (157), the fact that “other” groups can be described as “Aryan” does not dislodge the category from its status as signifier of what is highest or best. Nor does Nietzsche offer his genealogy of morality simply in refutation of late nineteenth-century debates about the Jews and German health. Rather, it is also a diagnosis of the fundamental decline of the modern age and a warning regarding its impending nihilism—he is speaking, in other words, not simply to his own contemporaries but also to a broader, historical audience. While Nietzsche relinquishes the belief in racialist categories and mocks the eugenicist ambitions of his Wagnerian contemporaries, he nevertheless retains racist disregard for Jews and other “blacks.” Moreover, although racism and racialism frequently overlap, they are nevertheless distinct phenomena such that one can be a racist, as, in my view, Nietzsche is, without also being a racialist, as, in my view, Nietzsche is not (but many social Darwinists and German nationalists of his day clearly were). On the distinction between racism and racialism, see Todorov, “Race and Racism,” 65–67. As we will see in Chapter 4, it is not race but *gender* (understood not merely as a surrogate or place-holder for race/racial health) that reveals Nietzsche’s deepest investments in the causality of European *décadence*.
88. Walter Kaufmann offers a cursory defense of Nietzsche on this count, arguing that Nietzsche’s multiple criticisms of anti-Semites (including Wagner) mean he cannot himself be anti-Semitic. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1974), 298–304. Moore claims Nietzsche deliberately transposes many of the vicious stereotypes about Jews onto Christians, thereby fortifying his own self-stylization as the Antichrist(ian) and leaving any possible verdict on his anti-Semitism, at best, ambiguous (Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 153–55). But, obviously, Nietzsche can revile both Jews and anti-Semites at the same time, and the notion that he is slandering Christians with anti-Semitic Jewish stereotypes suggests as much (Comte-Sponville, “The

- Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete," 32). In the nineteenth century, Jews were generally considered to be "black" or "swarthy," thereby combining imperial or "anti-black" racism with the already widespread continental anti-Semitism. See Sander Gilman, *The Jewish Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991) and MacMaster, *Racism in Europe*. And, in *TI* "Improvers," section 4, Nietzsche calls Christianity "sprung from Jewish roots and comprehensible only as a growth on this soil," the "anti-Aryan religion *par excellence*." For discussions of Nietzsche's relationship with both Judaism and anti-Semitism, see Jacob Golomb, ed., *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1997) and Weaver Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
89. *GM* I:12.
  90. *Z* I:21 "On Free Death"; cf. I:9 "On the Preachers of Death"; *D* §206.
  91. For example, *A* §2, *BGE* §258, *GM* II:12.
  92. It is important not to read a retrospective teleology of fascism into Nietzsche's texts, since any ideology—from Christianity to Marxism to social Darwinism to democratic freedom—can be appropriated for destructive political purposes by despicable rulers and regimes. This is an argument against those regimes, not the ideologies by which they justify their actions. Ideologies do not cause political behavior any more than they intrinsically justify it, and powerful regimes can obviously use any ideology they want to legitimate their otherwise loathsome behavior. For further commentary on these issues, see Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890–1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Jacob Golomb and Robert Wistrich, eds., *Nietzsche: Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
  93. This is not to say that Nietzsche no longer uses the *word* race (*Rasse*), which surfaces often enough in both *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Antichrist(ian)*. But it is to say that the kind of speculation about what constitutes a race (racialization), the various qualities and characteristics of particular races and nations that made up the Europe of his day (racialized nationalism), and the concern regarding both "race-mixing" (*Vermischung*) and the unification of Europe, which we find primarily in *Beyond Good and Evil* and scattered throughout the *Genealogy*, simply do not recur in the 1888 writings.
  94. *GM* III:25.
  95. *TI* "Skirmishes" §48.
  96. *TI* "Socrates" §11.
  97. *TI* "Errors" §2.
  98. *TI* "Skirmishes" §35.
  99. *CW* §5.
  100. *GM* II:17.
  101. *GM* II:16. All of the rest of the citations in this paragraph are taken from *GM* II:16; cf. *GS* §354.
  102. *GM* II:1. Cf. *HL* §1: "Thus the animal lives *unhistorically*: for it is contained in the present, like a number without any awkward fraction left over; it does not know how to dissimulate, it conceals nothing and at every instant appears wholly as what it is; it can therefore never be anything but honest. Man, on the other hand, braces himself against the great and ever greater pressure of what is past: it pushes him down or bends him sideways, it encumbers his steps as a dark, invisible burden which he can sometimes appear to disown and which in traffic with his fellow men he is only to glad to disown, so as to excite their envy."
  103. *GM* III:13.
  104. *GM* II:1. Cf. *HL* §1: "In the case of the smallest or of the greatest happiness, however, it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness: the ability to forget or, expressed in more scholarly fashion, the capacity to feel *unhistorically* during its duration." This is quite different from Bernard Yack's claim that, for Nietzsche, modern culture "degrades and dehumanizes us" (*The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992],



- 320). “Dehumanization” is not really a word that makes sense with regard to Nietzsche—for him, the human is *essentially* “dehumanized” insofar as what it means to be human is simply to be a sick and deranged animal (and for this sentence even to make sense one has to rely on the very humanist usage of the word “human” that Nietzsche rejects). The “realization of humanity in the world” is thus quite far from anything for which Nietzsche longs; no doubt it would be too gruesome and horrifying a prospect ever to affirm.
105. *GM* I:8.
  106. *GM* II:4.
  107. *Ibid.*
  108. *GM* II:14.
  109. *GM* II:20.
  110. *GM* II:14.
  111. While it is plausible to argue that Nietzsche sees *any* deviation from our animal past as the first step on the road toward *décadence*, I do not construe Nietzsche in this way because it engages in a kind of retrospective teleology that is otherwise incompatible with his genealogical method. Although the transition from consciousness to bad conscience, from sickness to sin, may seem both immediate and virtually imperceptible, Nietzsche nevertheless offers an analytic distinction between the two in the second essay of the *Genealogy*, and sometimes even a temporal one, as in his discussion of the ascetic priest in the third essay, under whom “the invalid has been transformed into ‘the sinner’” (III:20). Moreover, although the transition from consciousness to bad conscience may look, in hindsight, both effortless and inevitable, the bad conscience was neither the necessary consequence of the historicization of consciousness, nor was it an intended or predictable result of that historicization, which Nietzsche claims constituted mankind’s “entire *prehistoric* labor” on itself (*GM* II:2). As Nietzsche himself reminds us, “The ‘evolution’ of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus by no means its *progressus* toward a goal, even less a logical *progressus* by the shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force—but a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions” (*GM* II:12).
  112. *GM* I:13. Cf. Foucault: “With the Christian pastorate we see the birth of an absolutely new form of power. Also . . . we see the emergence of what could be called absolutely specific modes of individualization . . . What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves the history of the subject.” Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 183–84.
  113. *GM* II:14.
  114. Again, to cite Foucault: “I think this typical constitution of the modern Western subject makes the pastorate one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies.” Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 185.
  115. *A* §51.
  116. *GM* III:28.
  117. *A* §58.
  118. *GM* I:12.
  119. *A* §44.
  120. *GM* I:14.
  121. *CW* §5.
  122. *BGE* §30.
  123. *GM* III:14.
  124. *EH* “Destiny” §1.
  125. *TI* “Philosophy” §3. Freud, too, places great importance on smelling, hypothesizing that the human assumption of an erect posture was *the* calamitous step on the road to

- civilization and unhappiness since it led to a devaluation of the otherwise centrally important capacity of smell. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1961). Nietzsche seems to have escaped this particular sensory erosion triggered by the onset of civilization, which potentially explains why, despite being *décadent* himself, he can nevertheless diagnose it where others remain oblivious. Significantly, Nietzsche affirmatively contrasts the nose with the eye—and a technologically enhanced eye at that—claiming that the nose “is able to detect minimal differences of motion which even a spectroscope cannot detect.” For a marvelous exposition of the use of metaphors of smelling and “sniffing out” in Nietzsche’s texts, see Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Seán Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 113–24.
126. *EH* “Destiny” §1.
  127. *EH* “Wise” §8.
  128. *EH* “Wise” §1.
  129. *EH* “Clever” §10.
  130. *Ibid.*
  131. *EH* “Wise” §2.
  132. *Ibid.*
  133. *GS* P§3.
  134. *EH* “Wise” §6.
  135. *EH* “Wise” §6.
  136. *EH* “Wise” §4.
  137. *EH* “*TT*” §2.
  138. *EH* “*TT*” §1.
  139. *TI* “Anti-Nature” §4. Notice that Nietzsche has set up the problem nostalgically from the outset—he seeks to *renature* the antinatural, to, as he says in *Beyond Good and Evil*, “translate man *back* into nature” (§230, emphasis added).
  140. *EH* “Destiny” §7. Cf. *A* §47: “That we find no God—either in history of in nature or behind nature—is not what differentiates *us*, but that we experience what has been revered as God, not as ‘godlike’ but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely as an error but as a *crime against life*. We deny God as God. If one were to *prove* this God of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to believe in him. In a formula: *deus, qualem Paulus creavit, dei negatio* [God, as Paul created him, is the negation of God].”
  141. *GM* P§6.

### CHAPTER 3

1. Daniel Conway, for example, argues that Nietzsche “offers no cures, no therapies, and no hopes for a regimen of self-constitution that might make [decadent souls] whole.” Daniel Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 67. See also Daniel Conway, *Nietzsche and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
2. In this, I follow Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
3. As Arthur Danto notes, Nietzsche “sometimes urged Will-to-Power with a blind and driving urgency, which is so characteristic of him, as though he were flailing his readers with a weapon.” Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 217.
4. As Catherine Zuckert notes, “Nietzsche consistently present[s] ‘legislation,’ that is, the declaration of the highest values, as *the* proper work of the philosopher.” Catherine Zuckert, *Postmodern Platos* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 22.

5. Observing that Nietzsche's "invective appears more frequently in the later writings," Danto unwittingly merges these metaphors, noting that "it is almost as though the work of diagnosis were over, the time having now come to combat" (Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 182).
6. And in taking a "medical" approach and using philosophy as a kind of therapy, Nietzsche is by no means pathbreaking in this regard; see Martha Nussbaum's *The Therapy of Desire* for an exhaustive accounting of the ways in which Hellenistic philosophers employed precisely this therapeutic approach (*The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994]).
7. On the world-making power of revolutionary writing, manifestos in particular, see Martin Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Gardes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). In Nietzsche's particular case, Bruce Detwiler puts it well when he says: "In the best of cases the philosopher is not simply one who ascends from the cave and perceives the sun; rather he is one who out of the depths of his own creativity becomes a new sun for mankind." Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 29. Or, in Brian Leiter's words, Nietzsche's term "philosopher" functions as an "honorific for the one who creates values." Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 11.
8. This is a fact about which his Anglo-American commentators in particular complain (with regard to will to power and much else). However, rather than insisting on measuring Nietzsche by a yardstick on which he perennially comes up short, we might instead consider if this lack of (adequate) argumentation suggests that he is up to something other than the more familiar philosophical project of argument construction, which might therefore demand we at least *supplement* more traditional philosophical reading techniques with an additional or different set of interpretive strategies. This is not to say that Nietzsche does not make arguments at all, or that we can no longer assess his claims according to standards of argumentative validity or coherence or consistency, but it is to say that berating Nietzsche for failing to be a philosopher of the analytic variety may be a deficiency not in Nietzsche's texts but in our demand that he *be* an analytic philosopher. As David Owen points out, "Nietzsche is acutely attentive to issues of expression" and with regard to the *Genealogy* specifically, Owen argues that "if we are to offer a compelling account of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*, it must be one that makes sense of the rhetorical strategies that he deploys in this work." David Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality* (Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 59.
9. Others have also argued that Nietzsche performs the things he describes or criticizes in his writings, focusing on the ways in which Nietzsche's writings reveal his own weakness, *décadence*, or asceticism, thereby "proving" his diagnosis of modernity through his own manifestation of its symptoms of degeneracy. See, for example, Conway, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*; Henry Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Kelly Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* (New York: Routledge, 1995). This analysis strikes me as exactly right, and my own project is obviously indebted to this line of thinking. This chapter, however, explores the performance of the *affirmative* and revolutionary Nietzsche, taking him at his word not simply that he is a *décadent* but also supremely healthy.
10. And this is, I think, the closest thing to a philosophical "justification" for will to power that we are going to get from Nietzsche. Owen argues that if Nietzsche's project is to be effective, he needs to provide *reasons* for will to power "that are authoritative-for-us, given our existing perspective, and stand in the right kind of motivational relationship to both our existing perspective and Nietzsche's perspective" (Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, 42). Aaron Ridley goes to some lengths to demonstrate the ways in which Nietzsche does, in fact, do this work in a careful and nuanced documentation of the possible ways in which Nietzsche undertakes the critical reevaluation of values. Aaron Ridley, "Nietzsche and the Re-evaluation of Values," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 2005. But what Owen seeks

and Ridley supplies are, at best, elusive in Nietzsche, at worst, irrelevant insofar as we take his primarily rhetorical presentation of will to power seriously. For Nietzsche's "problem of authority" may in fact be what is most significant about his revolutionary project. Does the multiplicity of his rhetorical tactics—their variability in both level of sophistication and intended conscious or subconscious target—suggest Nietzsche's own unsureness as to his own authority—his questions regarding what would actually "work" on his readers (and thus constitute sufficient reasons)? Is Nietzsche in fact deliberately *showcasing* his lack of reasons, perhaps in order to highlight their inadequate explanatory power or overall unimportance? Is dislodging the relevance and necessity of reasons actually part of his very revolutionary project? And if the latter is the case, how could he *persuade* us that he is right about this? I am not saying that Nietzsche never offers reasons, but I do think he is skeptical about their overall importance and savvy regarding the impossibility of ever definitively knowing them, and that the possible lack of compelling reasons for will to power may instead be read as a performance of his more literal suggestion that reasons are important primarily because of our own weaknesses and inadequacies.

11. *BGE* §212.
12. This is how John Richardson describes the task of the philosopher in the introduction to the Nietzsche volume of the *Oxford Readings in Philosophy* series. John Richardson, "Introduction," in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14.
13. Z I:4 "On the Despisers of the Body."
14. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1974).
15. Martha Nussbaum, "Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 5, no. 1 1–12.
16. Leslie Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); William Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); cf. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 186–90; Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
17. This seems to be the view of Brian Leiter, who recognizes Nietzsche's basic project as the revaluation of values but claims this as a primarily moral or ethical project. Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*.
18. Ansell-Pearson argues that from Nietzsche's beginning reckonings with the Greeks through his "middle period" to the mature works, "Nietzsche's commitment to culture over politics is unwavering," even when it comes to his project of great politics, the revaluation of values. Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95.
19. Arthur Danto acknowledges the revolutionary character of Nietzsche's philosophy a number of times without pursuing the claim distinctly, as, for example, when he notes that adequately conceiving of the world in a Nietzschean way would require "a total revolution in logic, science, morality, and in philosophy itself." Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 35.
20. Yack sees Nietzsche as deeply invested in "total" revolution—i.e., revolutionary transformation not merely of social life or institutions but the very meaning of what it means to be human—but qualifies this transformation as "sub-political." Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution*, 10.
21. Nehamas has argued of Nietzsche that "the last thing he is is a social reformer or revolutionary" and that Nietzsche neither advocates nor foresees "a radical change in the lives of most people." Alexander Nehamas, *Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 225. Cf. Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics," in *Nietzsche: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 247.

22. *BGE* §210.
23. I therefore find it difficult to understand how Nietzsche's revolution could *not* affect most, if not all, human beings in modernity if its transformative effects would permeate the very constitution of our being. As Detwiler aptly notes, "there is strong evidence for the conclusion that the great politics of the future, which is integrally related to Nietzsche's reevaluation of all values, is also a politics of the real world. There is every reason to believe that 'all power structures of the old society' will be 'exploded' in fact and not just in thought." Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 56.
24. *EH* "Destiny" §7.
25. *EH* Destiny §8.
26. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
27. *EH* "CW" §4. Nietzsche initially conceived of the *Antichrist(ian)* as the first of four volumes of a larger work to be entitled *Revaluation of All Values*. It is clear that he saw this potential *magnum opus* not only as an incisive statement of his overall critique of and project for modernity, but also that it was crafted as a piece of revolutionary rhetoric intended to bring about the very revolution he claimed to foresee.
28. *EH* "Destiny" §8.
29. *EH* "Destiny" §1. Compare Marx's language in the *Manifesto*, which, by contrast, reads as tame, almost *conservative*, in tone after Nietzsche's impassioned invective. See Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978).

Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat (474).

The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable (483).

30. *A* §62.
31. *EH* "Destiny" §2.
32. *EH* "Untimely Ones" §2, "Destiny" §2.
33. *EH* "Destiny" §1; cf. *EH* "TI" §2.
34. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
35. *EH* "Books" §2; cf. *EH* "Destiny" §§8–9.
36. *TI* Preface.
37. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
38. Claudia Crawford goes a step further, arguing that Nietzsche's rhetoric is not simply revolutionary but *apocalyptic*; that he is not merely a radical but a *prophet*. Claudia Crawford, "Nietzsche's Psychology and Rhetoric of World Redemption: Dionysus versus the Crucified," in *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*, ed. Jacob Golomb, Weaver Santaniello, and Ronald Lehrer (New York: SUNY Press, 1999). While Crawford is right to note Nietzsche's often religiously inflected rhetoric (especially in *Ecce Homo* and *The Antichrist[ian]*), I wonder if this has more to do with the *object* of Nietzsche's critique—Christianity—than with either his own self-positioning or the intended character of his revolution. To argue that Nietzsche's writings are both prophetic and apocalyptic means claiming that Nietzsche's rhetoric of revolution is moralizing, that it believes in itself as a truth that is unimplicated in the body, transcending the flux and chaos of "this" world, meant as both universal and ahistorical. While it is indisputable that Nietzsche declares his views to be "true" (a rhetorical strategy that Conway argues displaces all others post-1886; *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*), his conflation of truth with the body (see Chapter 1) suggests Nietzsche knew that even his most fervent beliefs would decay and die off. Moreover, Nietzsche's utilization of

the rhetoric of performativity (to be discussed in the next section) is an obvious recognition of the “fallibility” of truth claims, standing his proselytizing in direct contradiction to Crawford’s evangelical interpretation. Finally, in an issue to be addressed more fully in Chapter 6, there seems to be no clear vision of salvation promised by Nietzsche’s revolutionary rhetoric. As Yack argues, the character of revolutionary longing post-Kant takes its cues *not* from its utopic vision of a redemptive future world, but rather from its overwhelming discontent and critique of present and past obstacles to the realization of our humanity. Thus, “although one may indeed call it utopian to plunge forward into a future defined only by the negation of the obstacles to satisfaction, such utopianism is inspired by hatred of present obstacles, not by an infatuation with kingdoms of the imagination.” Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution*, 27.

39. *EH* “Destiny” §8.
40. *A* §62.
41. *GM* II:22. After such nausea, the next aphorism begins with Nietzsche noting dryly, “This should dispose once and for all of the question of how the ‘holy God’ originated” (*GM* II:23).
42. *GM* II:24.
43. *GM* III:20.
44. *GM* III:22.
45. Nietzsche’s rhetoric therefore qualifies him as a revolutionary in at least three of the four senses that Hannah Arendt argues are definitive of modern revolutions: “novelty, beginning, and violence”; Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1963), 37. Her fourth criterion—“irresistibility”—raises the question of how best to interpret the frequent revolutionary claim that the revolution itself is inevitable. Do revolutionaries only document the impending crisis that will necessarily lead to the overthrow they claim to predict? Or is this “objectivity” rather one more tactic by which they seek to *produce* the very revolution for which they so long? Martin Puchner has argued that “the modern, revolutionary manifesto seeks to obtain an authority it does not yet possess,” meaning that “it is through the very speech acts of the manifesto that the context and the agent are being wrought” (Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution*, 24), putting a different spin on revolutionary inevitability. While Arendt’s reading of Marx on this issue cannot be engaged here, I find this ambiguity of rhetorical interpretation is, at best, irresolvable in the case of Nietzsche and clearly exemplified in his use of performative rhetoric, a rhetorical strategy that undercuts the possibility of ultimately distinguishing between reality and metaphor, empirical description and philosophical imposition. It also makes impossible the project of definitively falsifying his revolutionary predictions.
46. *BGE* §39. The allusion is of course to Thomas Nagle’s famous essay, “What is it like to be a bat?” *The Philosophical Review* (October 1974).
47. *EH* “*UM*” §3.
48. *BGE* §6.
49. *BGE* §9.
50. *BGE* §211.
51. *GS* §58.
52. *GS* §57.
53. *GS* §57.
54. *GM* III:7.
55. *GM* II:12.
56. *BGE* §204.
57. *GM* III:18.
58. *BGE* §259.
59. Nietzsche’s activity here is thus a precursor to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s conceptualization of politics as hegemonic articulation, a politics that rejects any “distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices” (Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,

- Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* [London: Verso, 1985], 107). It also resonates with what Judith Butler calls a politics of the performative, which consists in “misappropriating the force of speech from those prior contexts” we did not authorize, a resignification of the terms of political discourse itself that foregrounds “nonstate-centered forms of agency and resistance” (Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* [New York: Routledge, 1997], 40, 19).
60. “All our political theories and constitutions—and the ‘German *Reich*’ is by no means an exception—are consequences, necessary consequences, of decline; the unconscious effect of *décadence* has assumed mastery even over the ideals of some of the sciences” (*TI* “Skirmishes” §37).
  61. *GM* II:12.
  62. *GS* §§349, 357; *BGE* §§14, 213, 253; *TI* “Skirmishes” §14. On the relationship between Nietzsche and Darwin, see the very different accounts given by Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
  63. *GM* II:12.
  64. We might well note the importance of determining Nietzsche’s own method for understanding his philosophy, which I have argued is a performative rhetoric of will to power. This is perhaps another way Nietzsche shows us both the importance of method and the very method he is employing.
  65. *GS* §349; *BGE* §13.
  66. *BGE* §36. I discuss this aphorism at length in Chapter 1.
  67. *A* §59.
  68. *GM* III:24.
  69. *BGE* §259. See chapter 1 for a discussion of this claim.
  70. *GM* II:12.
  71. *TI* “Socrates” §6; cf. *GM* III:25.
  72. *CW* 1st postscript.
  73. *TI* “Skirmishes” §51.
  74. *CW* Second Postscript.
  75. *EH* “*CW*” §2.
  76. *BGE* §214.
  77. *EH* “Books” §1.
  78. *GS* P§1.
  79. *BGE* §27.
  80. *TI* “Maxims” §43.
  81. *A* Preface; cf. *EH* “Books” §1; *TI* “Maxims” §15.
  82. *EH* “*BGE*” §1.
  83. As Puchner notes regarding *The Communist Manifesto*, “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” is “addressed to a recipient that does not yet fully exist . . . it needs to create, performatively, the proletariat as a self-conscious agent” (Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution*, 31). We might argue the same thing about the concluding sentence of the *Antichrist(ian)*: “Revaluation of all values!” Both Conway and Oliver offer similar analyses of Nietzsche’s debt to future disciples. Oliver relies on Derrida for her analysis, acknowledging that the “credit” of Nietzsche’s words will only be fully “redeemed” by his future readers (Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche*, 157–58). Conway sees this strategy as an indication of Nietzsche’s exhaustion and decrepitude, his inability to solve the problem of *décadence* himself, claiming that Nietzsche’s resort to broader-based strategies of disciple cultivation reveals his awareness that his purely esotericist strategies have failed. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, chap. 5.
  84. *EH* “*BGE*” §1.
  85. *EH* P§1.
  86. *BGE* §6.

87. Ibid.
88. *EH* "D" §2.
89. See, for example, Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 41, 182–83.
90. To be clear, this is by no means an exclusive or exhaustive interpretation of *Ecce Homo*, a dense and deeply complex book. Moreover, Nietzsche's individual discussions of his texts in this book are enigmatic and do not simply (or even at all, in some cases) constitute a summing up of each work's "main points." Nevertheless, we certainly cannot discount the possibility that Nietzsche is ridiculing our obtuseness as readers through his use of exceedingly clear language, larger-than-life self-descriptions, and pedantic, step-by-step guidance through the story of his life. While it is clearly a particular story crafted to produce particular effects in his readers, this is not mutually exclusive with the possibility that Nietzsche in fact *believes* large parts of it and intends us to believe them as well, along with his grandiose self-descriptions that he no doubt does believe and does not primarily intend to be self-mocking. While Nietzsche's self-assessments may be arrogant and occasionally mistaken in their details (for example, Nietzsche is certainly clever but not necessarily because of his dietetic recommendations), nevertheless, it is difficult to quarrel with many of his larger assertions, two of which are most important for my own project: his masterful writing and his role as the inaugurator of crisis in the modern West.
91. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. *EH* "Destiny" §2.
95. *EH* "Destiny" §8.
96. *EH* P§1.
97. *A* §50.
98. *A* §62. Again, as Puchner observes regarding Marx, "the *Manifesto* speaks for the proletariat; it creates—makes in the sense of a performative *poesis*—the proletariat; and it theatrically enacts its future . . . the *Manifesto* projects itself forward, anticipating what will have happened; it is the space of unauthorized theatricality and performative *poesis*. In this sense, the *Manifesto* practices not only a form of political speech act but a form of futuristic speech act . . . Otherwise, a simple command would be enough: 'Revolution now!'—and it never is." Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution*, 31–32.
99. *EH* "Books" §1; cf. *GS* P§1.
100. Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Seán Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Sara Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, trans. Duncan Large (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
101. As Joanne Faulkner observes, "[Nietzsche] does not *reduce* the mind to body, in the manner of materialism. Rather, the metaphor *equivocates* between the mind and body. According to Nietzsche, we can never depart from language in order to discover its pure bodily source. The scientific materialist assumes that the body, as an object of observation, is that inert, unseeing body of the very mind-body dualism that [Nietzsche] seeks to overcome. Rather, Nietzsche attempts to reveal the full dimensions of corporeality through a use of language that exploits the creativity of will to power instead of employing a *descriptive* language to reduce all thought to twitching flesh." Joanne Faulkner, "The Body as Text in the Writings of Nietzsche and Freud," *Minerva* 7 [2003], 115–16.
102. *EH* "Books" §1.
103. *BGE* §128.
104. For example, *BGE* §11; Nietzsche also appeals to differences in color to capture degrees of distinction, as in *BGE* §215 and *GM* P§7. Vision, of course, is the primary metaphor for the activity of *theoriā*, which implies the possibility of an impartial and complete vantage point from which one might survey and comprehend the whole and is the model of philosophical understanding in Western thought. Nietzsche's redeployment of vision as perspective, his claim that a multiplicity of perspectives constitutes "objectivity," and his



- refusal of the unthinkable eye of *theoriā* “turned in no particular direction” (*GM* III:12) indicate a notable break with the primacy of vision and the visual metaphor for knowledge in Western philosophy. Indeed, for Nietzsche, the most important philosophical senses are smell and hearing, typically the dullest of the human senses.
105. A frequent metaphor for interpretive care in Nietzsche (see, for example, *BGE* §§22, 44, 186; *EH* “Wise” §1, “Clever” §5, “CW” §4; *TI* “Germans” §7; *NCW* “Where Wagner Belongs”). Poor readings or interpretations are thus, by implication, ham-fisted—clumsy, blunt, incapable of *grasping* detail, approaching the text or world as mere resistance, nothing more.
  106. *SE* §7.
  107. *BGE* §198.
  108. *BGE* §296.
  109. *EH* “BT” §1.
  110. *EH* “D” §1.
  111. *GMP* §1.
  112. *GM* I:5.
  113. *TI* P.
  114. *EH* “Wise” §1.
  115. *EH* “Clever” §10.
  116. *CW* §5.
  117. *EH* “Books” §4.
  118. *EH* “Books” §3.
  119. *EH* “Books” §4.
  120. *EH* “Wise” §3.
  121. “*EH* “Books” §3.
  122. *A* §13.
  123. *EH* “Destiny” §1.

## CHAPTER 4

1. *BGE* §47.
2. *BGE* §208.
3. *EH* “Clever” §1.
4. *TI* “Socrates” §4.
5. *GM* I:12.
6. *GS* §59.
7. Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Seán Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 220.
8. *EH* Destiny §6; cf. *Z* II:6 “On the Rabble,” III:13 “The Convalescent” §2; *GM* III:14; *A* §38; *EH* Wise §8.
9. *EH* “Wise” §7.
10. *GM* III:25.
11. This is Walter Kaufmann’s tack, who may be partially forgiven insofar as this interpretive strategy served the larger goal of gaining Nietzsche admission into the English-speaking world as a legitimate philosopher (a realm in which “explicit” misogyny at least nominally disqualifies one for membership); see Kaufmann’s footnotes to *GS* §§71, 72, 75; *BGE* §§232, 238, and his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1974), wherein his only word on the subject is to dismiss Nietzsche’s views on women as just as “philosophically irrelevant” as his ad hominem attacks on philosophers and other contemporaries (84). Of course, Nietzsche’s ad hominem attacks may in fact be *essential* to understanding his problem with other philosophers, especially if Nietzsche is to be taken seriously that all philosophy is autobiography (which renders any criticism of any

- philosopher *necessarily* ad hominem attack). While Kaufmann's view of the irrelevance of Nietzsche's remarks on women is no longer influential in Nietzsche scholarship, which increasingly tends not to disregard these remarks, nevertheless, his approach remains a default standard of "objectivity" in philosophy classrooms and at professional gatherings where scholars are eager to discuss the "real" issues in Nietzsche without being distracted by side issues or "political" detours.
12. Meaning, therefore, that femininity or womanhood is a disease. On this issue, see Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English's classic *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women* (New York: Anchor Books, 1978), 101–33. More on this in the section of this chapter entitled "Truth as *Femme Fatale*."
  13. This is in direct contrast to his use and discussion of the category "race," which I tried to show in Chapter 2 is characterized much more by flexibility and antiessentialism than by rigid racialized categorizations or dogmatic insistence on the separation and ranking of different races. Nietzsche's discussion of gender simply lacks this flexibility and is decidedly essentialist in its categorization of sexual difference. As we will see, however, Nietzsche's discussion of gender does not lack its own racialized investments.
  14. *BGE* §276.
  15. Nancy Leys Stepan, "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science," in *Anatomy of Racism*, ed. David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 40.
  16. With few exceptions (not all of them feminist), an unspoken consensus has emerged in Nietzsche scholarship since Kaufmann that Nietzsche's views on women and gender are either to remain undiscussed or else be defended, excused, or complicated out of existence (those exceptions include Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001]; Kelly Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* [New York: Routledge, 1995]; Frances Nesbitt Oppel, *Nietzsche on Gender: Beyond Man and Woman* [Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005]; Ofelia Schutte, *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984]). While this shift toward either disavowal or disinterest constitutes a perhaps necessary corrective to Kaufmann's myopic dogmatism on the issue, the result has been that a central claim of Nietzsche's philosophy has been either ignored or rationalized away for precisely the same reason that Kaufmann tried to hide it altogether: it is simply too difficult to take Nietzsche's misogyny seriously as a central, animating principle of his thought. Hence the multitude of explanations, whether defensive or deferential, for Nietzsche's obviously misogynist pronouncements regarding sex and gender. To take only a handful of examples from an already substantial literature: Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins find that Nietzsche's reputation as a misogynist is an unfortunate rumor, the fame and inaccuracy of which is second only to the widespread belief that "Nietzsche was crazy" (Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, *What Nietzsche Really Said* [New York: Schocken Books, 2000]), while Higgins herself argues that *The Gay Science* "presents an entrée into gender theory that is genuinely exciting," claiming Nietzsche as a "pioneer in gender theory" (Kathleen Higgins, "Gender in *The Gay Science*," in *Feminist Interpretations of Plato*, ed. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998]). John Richardson has attempted to recruit Nietzsche for the ranks of care feminism, arguing that his claim to be the first psychologist of the Eternal-Feminine means he saw himself as possessing traditionally feminine qualities like empathy and psychological insightfulness, the basis for his assertion that he "knows" women so well (John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 192). While analytic philosophers fall more often on the side of defending Nietzsche, continental interpreters have reliably found Nietzsche's remarks about women less groundbreaking than evasive; thus, David Farrell Krell determines that Nietzsche's full examination of the "convergence of sensuality and death in the figure of woman" is perpetually deferred (David Krell, *Postponements: Woman, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986]), while

- Babette Babich declares that “throughout all of Nietzsche’s texts, women, truth, and even philosophers are concinnously double played, or, at the very least, double voiced,” implying that whatever Nietzsche says about women he indirectly declares of himself, and *vice versa* (Babette Babich, “Nietzsche and the Condition of Postmodern Thought: Post-Nietzschean Postmodernism,” in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb [Albany: SUNY Press, 1990], 261). Jacques Derrida has of course argued that “there is no such thing as a woman, as a truth in itself of woman in itself. That much, at least, Nietzsche has said” (*Éperons/Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978], 102–3) (an interpretive certainty Oliver rightly notes is inconsistent with Derrida’s overall claim that *all* of Nietzsche’s text may be “monstrously” indeterminate, of the same (in)essential character as his scribbled notebook remark, “I have forgotten my umbrella” [*Womanizing Nietzsche*]). Sara Kofman, following Derrida, reiterates that there is no woman-as-such in Nietzsche, stating that there are rather “types” of women, all of whom are historical constructs (Sara Kofman, “The Psychologist of the Eternal Feminine,” *Yale French Studies* 1995 [87]), and attempts to save Nietzsche from the charge of misogyny by staking a claim for the ultimate “ambivalence” of his “many heterogeneous texts on woman” (Sara Kofman, “Baubö: Theological Perversion and Fetishism,” in *Nietzsche’s New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics*, ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy Strong [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988]). In this regard, Oppel’s recent book is a breath of fresh air, offering an innovative defense of Nietzsche’s views of both women and gender from an avowedly feminist perspective that forsakes neither interpretive care nor the necessary confrontation with Nietzsche’s most unsavory remarks (Oppel, *Nietzsche on Gender: Beyond Man and Woman*). For my part, I find Nietzsche’s remarks on women and gender to be neither ambiguous nor defensible, but nevertheless basic to his thought and his overall project—as basic as the body, health, and will to power.
17. Martha Nussbaum claims Nietzsche’s views regarding women and gender can be forgotten because Nietzsche—unlike, say, Rousseau—lacks a fully developed argument regarding women and gender, and that his scattered and fragmentary remarks amount to nothing more than “the silly posturings of an inexperienced vain adolescent male.” Martha Nussbaum, “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 5, no. 1, [1997] 5. While the latter may be true, the former surely is not, and the latter may in fact be quite important if Nietzsche is engaged in a project of massive autobiographical projection (which he claims all philosophy necessarily is).
  18. Leslie Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 89–90. In a similar vein, Alan Schrift has carefully pointed out the ways in which Nietzsche disavows the reality of oppositional values and refuses the stark and graceless divisions of binary opposites, seeing Nietzsche as a crucial precursor to Derridean deconstruction (Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* [New York: Routledge, 1995]). Oppel argues that Nietzsche’s views on gender offer an opening into the deconstruction of gender binarism itself (Oppel, *Nietzsche On Gender*).
  19. *BGE* §44.
  20. *EH* “*CW*” §4.
  21. *CW* Epilogue.
  22. *BGE* §2.
  23. *TI* “Socrates” §2.
  24. Schrift, *Nietzsche’s French Legacy*. Schrift’s interpretation of Nietzsche as anticipating the movement of Derridean deconstruction is utterly persuasive.
  25. I:16.
  26. III:25.
  27. *EH* “*BT*” §2.
  28. *EH* “Destiny” §9.

29. *GS* §118.
30. *GS* §26.
31. *GM* I:10; emphasis added. This aside makes good sense, for there is no way in which *any* deed could be *purely* active, undetermined by any force or consideration other than itself. Such an acknowledgement suggests (that Nietzsche knows) the ultimate uselessness of “active” as a description of deeds or forms of life at all. Although Rüdiger Bittner has argued that Nietzsche fetishizes a notion of creativity that only God can be said to possess—that is, creation of the utterly and entirely new *ex nihilo*—it seems that here, at least, Nietzsche explicitly acknowledges its impossibility. Rüdiger Bittner, “Masters Without Substance,” in *Nietzsche’s Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche’s Prelude to Philosophy’s Future*, ed. Richard Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
32. *BGE* §260; cf. *GM* I:16.
33. *BGE* §21.
34. As Lynne Tirrell notes, “Nietzsche is willing to explore this sort of possibility, this ‘dangerous “maybe”’ [i.e., that opposites are of the same essence] when it applies to the more standard philosophical oppositions such as good/evil, mind/body, truth/falsity, conscious/unconscious thought, but when it comes to man/woman, Nietzsche has more difficulty towing his own philosophical line.” Lynne Tirrell, “Sexual Dualism and Women’s Self-Creation: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Nietzsche for Feminists,” in *Nietzsche and the Feminine*, ed. Peter Burgard (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 162. Oppel claims that Tirrell overlooks the obviously “hyperbolic and illogical” character of Nietzsche’s misogynist remarks, which perform this deconstruction of binary opposition in their very rhetorical excess and philosophical error. Oppel, *Nietzsche on Gender*, 189. This resembles her overall claim throughout that the views of women Nietzsche typically espouses are so fallacious, hackneyed, and/or outrageous that they cannot seriously be meant as his actual views, but are instead meant to draw attention to the very illogical, clichéd, and overblown character of misogynist gender stereotypes current in Nietzsche’s day. Yet Oppel lacks an analysis of Nietzsche’s rhetorical philosophical strategies *overall*, which seem very much to include both hyperbole *and* fallacy as a matter of course, regardless of his subject matter. If this is so, then Nietzsche’s remarks on gender are neither unique in this regard nor automatically discountable because of it. Moreover, it seems too easy to assume that because a remark is either rhetorical or illogical, Nietzsche means it only in jest, a methodological approach that seems more accurately to reflect *our* historically located prejudices regarding the requirements of “true” philosophical argument and the appropriateness or credibility of certain political claims.
35. *TI* “Skirmishes” §45.
36. *TI* “Skirmishes” §37.
37. *Z* IV:13[3] “On the Higher Man.”
38. *TI* “Anti-Nature” §1; cf. *A* §45. Christianity is unlike Islam, then, which Nietzsche calls a religion of “men” (*Männer*) and “male instincts” (*Männer-Instinkten*) (*A* §§59–60)[0].
39. *BGE* §202, emphasis added.
40. *GS* §377.
41. *BGE* §209. Cf. *GS* §362, “*Our faith that Europe will become more virile [Vermännlichung],*” wherein Nietzsche praises Napoleon for allowing “man” to once again “become master over the businessman and the philistine—and perhaps even over ‘woman’ who has been pampered by Christianity and the enthusiastic spirit of the eighteenth century, and even more by ‘modern ideas.’”
42. *GM* I:13.
43. *GM* III:14.
44. *GM* III:19.
45. *GM* III:19; cf. *D* P§4.
46. *TI* “Skirmishes” §37.

47. *BGE* §206. The first of these is the sexual function, the second is the procreative, albeit in Nietzsche's specific understanding of procreation. More on the first later on; the second is discussed in the following chapter.
48. *TI* "Skirmishes" §3.
49. *TI* "Skirmishes" §6.
50. Nietzsche in fact claims that Sand and other nineteenth-century European women writers are "the best involuntary *counterarguments* against emancipation and feminine vainglory [or self-mastery; *weibliche Selbstherrlichkeit*]" (*BGE* §233).
51. *GM* III:21.
52. Kaufmann translates each of these words as "abortive," which, given Nietzsche's meaning, is not far off. For Nietzsche could be saying either that the poorly turned out woman is the one with no children—that her lack of maternity (whether through infertility or choice) is her "abortive"-ness—or, he could be saying that a childless woman is a failed woman, that she herself is incomplete, an abortion, a botched job.
53. See, for example, Ann McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
54. *GS* §362.
55. See Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985).
56. That these bourgeois norms were inevitably formed through constant negotiation with the project of empire has been persuasively demonstrated by McClintock (*Imperial Leather*); Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); and Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). The consideration of how Nietzsche in particular has specifically engaged "the East" as a foil and counterpart to Europe and European decay, however, remains unexplored thus far in either Nietzsche studies or post-colonial studies.
57. *BGE* §202.
58. Nietzsche tends to be unambiguous on this point, using *Mann* and *Männer* to specify the gendered nature of his claims; moreover, he is explicit that these men are European. The ambiguity of the German *Menschen*—which can be translated as either "men" or "human beings"—does not complicate this claim but rather exemplifies it. A feature of many languages, the interchangeability of the male designation with the gender-neutral or "inclusive" designation does not mean that women are included as human beings in a term like "humanity," but rather that to be human is to be a man and *vice versa* (this slide between "man" and "human" is on display in a number of Nietzsche's aphorisms; for example, in the discussion of "the higher men" [*die höheren Menschen*] in *Zarathustra*; cf. *TI* "Skirmishes" §§37, 45). This complication of maleness and humanity is an identification from which women always constitute a deviation and a special problem, and who therefore require special linguistic indicators like adjective endings, articles, and gender specific plurals to mark their presence. That women are invisible unless otherwise specified suggests that the unmarked is never really neutral but rather the masculine in universalist disguise.
59. *BGE* §293.
60. *GS* §377. Hysteria, which literally means "womb" and names a condition in which a mental disturbance manifests itself physically (that is, an illness that is "all in your head"), was the late nineteenth-century diagnosis of pathological femininity. See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 104; Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor*, 129; Elaine Showalter, *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). A clear (if deeply ineffective) expression of upper-class white women's resistance to patriarchal control and

- subordination, it was alleged to have been caused by the woman's own unruly womb, metonymously wandering around her body and refusing to stay in its "proper place." Ehrenreich and English, *For Her Own Good*; Showalter, *Hystories*.
61. *Z* III:5(2) "On the Virtue that Makes Small."
  62. *BGE* §239. The metonymic slide between "man" and "human being" is clearly on display in this aphorism, with Nietzsche using *Menschen* in a context in which he clearly means the more specific *Männer*.
  63. *EH* "Books" §5.
  64. *BGE* §239.
  65. *Z* I:18 "On Little Old and Young Women."
  66. *Z* III:12(23) "On Old and New Tablets."
  67. *EH* "Books" §5.
  68. *BGE* §239. Notice in this passage that the word Kaufmann translates as "master" is the word *Herr*, which is automatically gendered male or masculine, having been modernized into the address "Mister."
  69. *Ibid.*
  70. As indicated already (see Chapter 2), Nietzsche has a remarkably solipsistic view of Europe's health and development—he does not see it as part of a larger international, hemispheric, or global context. Thus, it is no surprise that the kind of "feminism" he is most worried about is the kind that was taking root in Europe and which is now often referred to in the West as feminism's "first wave," characterized primarily by the movement for white/European women's suffrage, a movement that actively excluded indigenous, colonized, native, slave, and other women of color in its movement for political enfranchisement. See Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945*; Louise Michele Newman, *White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
  71. *BGE* §239.
  72. *EH* "Books" §5.
  73. *Ibid.*
  74. *BGE* §239.
  75. As Elaine Showalter has shown, this reconfiguration of gender roles was widely considered to be a dramatic cultural crisis throughout both Europe and the United States. Elaine Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle* (New York: Viking Press, 1990). As McClintock (*The Education of Desire*), Stoler (*Imperial Leather*), and Wildenthal (*German Women for Empire*) make clear, these concerns are inextricably related to the interests of European Empire.
  76. *BGE* §210.
  77. *BGE* §75.
  78. *GM* III:14.
  79. *BGE* §293.
  80. *Z* II:3 "On the Pitying," III:1 "The Wanderer," III:12(29) "On Old and New Tablets"; *BGE* §§210, 212, 227; *TI* "The Hammer Speaks."
  81. *BGE* §147.
  82. IV:5(2) "The Magician." David Krell notes that the Magician is actually the first appearance of what is later to become Ariadne in "The Plaint of Ariadne," one of Nietzsche's *Dionysian Dithyrambs*. Krell, *Postponements*, 15.
  83. *BGE* §238.
  84. "Especially significant for the analogical science of human difference and similarity were the systematic study and measurement of the human skull. The importance of the skull to students of human difference lay in the fact that it housed the brain, differences in whose shape and size were presumed to correlate with equally presumed differences in intelligence and social behavior. It was measurements of the skull, brain weights, and brain convolutions that gave apparent precision to the analogies between anthropoid apes, lower

racés, women, criminal types, lower classes, and the child" (Nancy Leys Stepan, "Race and Gender," 43). I am grateful to Franz Ulm for pointing out this usage of *Flachköpfigkeit* to me.

85. Z I:18 "On Little Old and Young Women."

86. *BGE* §239.

87. *GS* §363.

88. *GS* §363. Similarly, Nietzsche proposes that we might index (racial?) differences among men based on their different views of "having and possessing" a woman (*BGE* §194).

89. "Has my definition of love been heard? It is the only one worthy of a philosopher. Love—in its means, war; at bottom, the deadly hatred of the sexes" (*EH* "Books" §5); cf. also *CW* §2: "But love as *fatum*, as fatality, cynical, innocent, cruel—and precisely this is a piece of nature. That love which is war in its means, and at bottom the deadly hatred of the sexes!—I know no case where the tragic joke that constitutes the essence of love is expressed so strictly, translated with equal terror into a formula, as in Don Jose's last cry, which concludes the work:

*Yes, I have killed her,  
I—my adored Carmen!*

Such a conception of love (the only one worthy of a philosopher) is rare: it raises a work of art above thousands."

90. *BGE* §239.

91. *EH* "Books" §3.

92. *BGE* §144.

93. Presumably this would hold for "lower" races as well, whose attempt at education would constitute a kind of instinctual violation of nature.

94. Z I:18 "On Little Old and Young Women." Nietzsche thus transposes the familiar conceptualization of the respective "inner" and "outer" of female and male genitalia, appropriating the "labyrinth" for men and calling them "deep," while women are superficial, surface, or shallow. As we will see in the next chapter, this is part and parcel of Nietzsche's appropriation of femininity for the higher capacities of male creators.

95. *BGE* §145; cf. *GS* §66.

96. *GS* §362.

97. It is thus no surprise that this aspect of Nietzsche's views on women has received so much scholarly attention—it is his least concrete "commentary" on women, the one most divorced from the political realities of gender, on which Nietzsche's philosophy is (by his own reckoning) necessarily based (therefore making it the most "philosophical"? It certainly thereby becomes the most fruitful resource for defenses of Nietzsche's "ambivalence" regarding women). It is also undeniable that this idealist exercise is the *sexiest* part of Nietzsche's views on gender, not only because this version of "woman" is seductive but also because women's bodies are here used as a means, the sexed-up vehicle by which Nietzsche's critique of modernity and modern forms of life is communicated. As commentators, then, it is worth interrogating our own fixation on (and reification of?) this most un-Nietzschean aspect of Nietzsche's thought. What is *our* investment in truth being a woman? Is it possible that Nietzsche has no politics because of our own scholarly preference for and prioritization of the immaterial and the abstract? Do we, too, share modernity's lascivious longing for "truth"?

98. That it has resonated so resoundingly with so many commentators perhaps reflects the shared anxieties, desires, and experiences of these readers, who remain, by and large, both a male and a masculinist bunch. In this sense, Derrida is right that "there is no truth as such of woman as such" in Nietzsche, but this is not because Nietzsche is an anti-essentialist. Rather, it is because Nietzsche is not really talking about "woman" at all but unintentionally explaining himself, an activity decidedly different from the post-structuralist "feminist" reading of Nietzsche as "becoming" woman or "writing with the hand of woman." Derrida, *Éperons/Spurs*; Krell, *Postponements*.

99. *BGE* §5.
100. Parts of this section of Chapter 4 have appeared in my article “Nietzsche/Pentheus: The Last Disciple of Dionysus and Queer Fear of the Feminine,” *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 2008): 90–125. I am grateful to *differences* and Duke University Press for permission to reprint these passages.
101. As Kelly Oliver notes, most discussions of “woman” in Nietzsche do not account for the fact that he has two versions of her—the maternal and the feminine (*Womanizing Nietzsche*). Oliver argues that these two versions of “woman” are mutually exclusive, that the maternal body is in some sense asexual (both because it lacks sexual desire and because it does not seem to participate in sexual activity). I follow Oliver in this analysis, although I disagree with her larger assertion that it is primarily the *maternal* that both fascinates and terrifies Nietzsche (144). Rather, it seems to me that Nietzsche is both excited and revolted by women in particular as *sexual* beings, the only way in which they escape his/men’s ultimate control.
102. Thus neither of Nietzsche’s versions of “woman” are sexually active, even if the Eternal-Feminine (unlike the maternal) is quite obviously *sexualized*.
103. *TI* “Maxims” §5.
104. *Z I*:18 “On Little Old and Young Women.”
105. *BGE* §25.
106. *BGE* P.
107. *GS* §67.
108. *GS* §60.
109. Here, Kaufmann fails to translate Nietzsche’s use of the word *Frauenzimmer*, an archaic but indisputably derogatory word for woman that has no good English equivalent but that I have here rendered “wench” (other equally archaic possibilities in English might include “dame” or “broad”; it remains to be seen if the increasingly colloquialized “bitch” might be a plausible twenty-first-century equivalent).
110. *BGE* P.
111. *Z II*:15 “On Immaculate Perception.”
112. *BGE* §220.
113. *Z I*:12 “On the Flies in the Marketplace.”
114. *BGE* P.
115. *GS* P§4. Nietzsche reprints this aphorism in the epilogue to *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, his final work, adding after the first sentence, “*Tout comprendre—c’est tout mépriser*” [“To understand all is to despise all”]. Apparently, such allusions are so distasteful he cannot even pronounce them in his own tongue, speaking first Greek, then French. For more allusions to truth as the female genitalia, see *GS* §§59, 64, 339; *BGE* §§127, 204; *TI* “Maxims” §16.
116. *GS* P§4.
117. *TI* “Errors” §3.
118. *GS* P§4.
119. *BGE* §232.
120. Sara Kofman prefers to construe this masculine distaste as demure feminine modesty, defining *décadence* as the denial of perspective, the desire to “look through the keyhole” at truth in its entirety and “outrage feminine modesty” (Kofman, “Baubo”). To make this rather conventional “defense” of Nietzsche’s view of women, however, Kofman nevertheless must accept Nietzsche’s depiction of (and very use of the term) the “Eternal-Feminine,” and his association of the female body with “horror” (her word). In a more nuanced essay, Derrida argues that woman’s modesty veils (to men) the truth that she is untruth—“Woman is but one name for that untruth of truth” (*Éperons/Spurs*, 51). She thus knows what dogmatic male philosophers do not—that possession of the truth is castration, even death (59). This still less than flattering view of women is later presented by Derrida in terms of three different positions that he argues women inhabit in Nietzsche’s texts: (1) as the “debased” and



- “despised” figure of falsehood; (2) as the “censured, debased, and despised” figure of truth; and (3) as “an affirmative power,” “beyond the double negation of the first two” positions, as “a dissimulatrix, an artist, a dionysiac” (97). Derrida stakes the credibility of this last option—the only position for women that is neither “despised” nor “debased”—entirely on a single aphorism from *The Gay Science* (§339) wherein Nietzsche discusses *life*, not truth, as a woman. This equation is tenuous not simply because life and truth are not necessarily interchangeable but also because Nietzsche subjectifies life as woman in only two places: this passage, and the specific literary and rhetorical context of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It is thus difficult to form a generalization regarding woman’s position in Nietzsche’s texts as an affirmative figure on the basis of such minimal textual support. Moreover, we must further believe that Nietzsche makes room for the possibility of women “artists” and “dionysiacs,” skepticism of which is entirely justified by Nietzsche’s adamant insistence on the immutability of sexual difference, the naturalness of gender hierarchy, and the requirement that artists and creators be “hard.” It is not enough to say, with Derrida, that there may not be *a* sexual difference or *a* woman-as-such in Nietzsche in order for there to nevertheless be sexual differences or women-as-such for Nietzsche: plurality does not an antiessentialist (much less an antimisogynist) make. It is also unsatisfying, if not a bit disappointing, to encounter these playful rereadings of Nietzsche’s texts that allegedly issue in more “feminist” interpretations but that seem almost deliberately to discount significant portions of what he actually *says* about women (leading one to wonder if political commitments have forestalled a more thorough reading of the text). On this front, compare Derrida’s female “dionysiacs” with Kofman’s tortured equation of Baubô with Dionysus as a similarly veiled and sexually indeterminate deity of fecundity and eternal return (196–99). Whence these labored apologies for Nietzsche’s view of women? For more suspicion of deconstructionist feminist readings of Nietzsche, see Oliver’s *Womanizing Nietzsche*, and also her “Who is Nietzsche’s Woman?” in *Modern Engendering: Critical Feminist Readings in Modern Western Philosophy*, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
121. BGE §232.
  122. As Showalter has demonstrated, female sexuality was often figured as veiled in the late nineteenth century, and male scrutiny of the veiled female form was a frequent metaphor for medical and scientific observation (*Sexual Anarchy*). Cf. Nietzsche: “Oh, this dreadful science! sigh [women’s] instinct and embarrassment; ‘it always gets to the *bottom* of things!’” (BGE §204). And: “Science offends the modesty of all real women. It makes them feel as if one wanted to peep under their skin—yet worse, under their dress and finery” (BGE §126). Nietzsche, of course, has nothing but contempt for such scientific “knowledge”; in this latter aphorism, we notice, even “worse” than peeping under woman’s skin (at the blood, organs, intestines, etc.) is seeing what is under her “dress and finery.”
  123. GS P§4. Of course, it is entirely possible that such intercourse can *never happen*, if the truth of woman is that she is a lie. As Nietzsche says, when one is in love with a woman it becomes clear that “they ‘give themselves,’ even when they—give themselves” [*Das sie ‘sich geben,’ selbst noch, wenn sie—sich geben*] (GS §361).
  124. BGE §232.
  125. *Ibid.*
  126. Z I:7 “On Reading and Writing.” Nietzsche places great weight on this statement, affixing it as an epigraph to essay III of the *Genealogy* and declaring that essay to be an exposition of its meaning. As Oliver has pointed out, in his transposition of this quotation, Nietzsche omits the word “brave” [*mut*]; for her interpretation of this omission, see her *Womanizing Nietzsche*, 36–37.
  127. TI “Germans” §6.
  128. *Ibid.*
  129. TI “Germans” §6. “Another counsel of prudence and self-defense is to *react as rarely as possible*, and to avoid situations and relationships that would condemn one to suspend, as it were, one’s ‘freedom’ and initiative and to become a mere reagent. *As a parable I choose*

- association with books* [emphasis added]. Scholars who at bottom do little nowadays but thumb books—philologists, at a moderate estimate, about 200 a day—ultimately lose entirely their capacity to think for themselves. When they don't thumb, they don't think. They *respond* to a stimulus (a thought they have read) whenever they think—in the end, they do nothing but react . . . The instinct of self-defense has become worn-out in them; otherwise they would resist books. The scholar—a *décadent*" (*EH* "Clever" §8).
130. As Oliver observes, Nietzsche "puts the warrior in the passive position; wisdom or woman is the lover and the warrior is the conquered beloved" (*Womanizing Nietzsche*, 22). In another passage, Zarathustra personifies happiness as a woman, saying, "Happiness runs after me. That is because I do not run after women. For happiness is a woman" (*Z* III:3; "On Involuntary Bliss").
131. An enactment of this type of dance is enacted in Zarathustra's pursuit of life in the Third Part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in "The Other Dancing Song" §2. I discuss this "courtship" at length in the next chapter.
132. *GS* §363.
133. *GS* §59.
134. *TI* "Maxims" §27. Zarathustra suggests this prospect may be worse than even the "dirt" on the surface of truth's body: "It is not when truth is dirty, but when it is shallow, that the lover of knowledge is reluctant to step into its waters" (*Z* I:13 "On Chastity").
135. *GM* III:7.
136. *GM* II:2.
137. *GM* III:8.
138. *GM* III:9.
139. *GM* III:7.
140. *Ibid.*
141. Nietzsche says that "as for that exception, Socrates—the malicious Socrates, it would seem, married *ironically*, just to demonstrate *this* proposition." Yet Socrates may be the exception that proves Nietzsche's bizarre rule that truly masculine sexual desire ought not be fulfilled, merely relished for the unconsummated longing it is. The only difference is object choice: Socrates is famous for his sexual abstinence with regard to the *men* he desired. This possibility, however, simply does not register for Nietzsche (despite his scholarly infatuation with Greek life and culture) because he is really just rather traditional in his conceptualization of sexuality in general. Despite the current fashionableness in asserting Nietzsche's (conscious or repressed) homosexuality (as exemplified by Joachim Köhler's tell-all biography *Zarathustra's Secret: The Interior Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Ronald Taylor [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002]), "intercourse" in Nietzsche's texts is only ever figured as the married, heterosexual, traditionally gendered, reproductive kind, and Nietzsche neither expresses sexual desire for men in his published texts nor takes any position whatsoever as to whether such a desire should be gratified. For more on this subject, see my "Nietzsche/Pentheus: The Last Disciple of Dionysus and Queer Fear of the Feminine," *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 2008): 90–125.
142. *EH* "Books" §5.
143. *EH* "Books" §5. See Note 52 for the interpretation of *verunglückt*.
144. *Z* II:18 "On Great Events."
145. *EH* "Books" §5.
146. As Henry Staten notes, "What Nietzsche in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* pictures as the absolute desire of the most appropriative man, his ultimate possessiveness, is also that which most threatens a man's integrity, his self-possession" (*Nietzsche's Voice*, 164). Even Krell notes the obvious confluence of women with both sex and death in Nietzsche's texts, no matter how often Nietzsche may have "postponed" this encounter (*Postponements*).
147. *GS* §69.
148. *CW* §3.

149. Z1:7 "On Reading and Writing."
150. *BGE* §131.
151. *BGE* §239.
152. *TI* "Germans" §6.
153. *GM* III:1.
154. Z1:13 "On Chastity."
155. *GS* §66.
156. *GM* III:14.
157. *BGE* §86.
158. *GS* §256.
159. *BGE* §34.
160. *GM* III:12. Of course, this is still an *observation*, rather than a *copulation*, leaving a questionable and defensive distance between man and truth.
161. As we have seen, however, the conservative or reactive Nietzsche is, in many senses, a Christian—"sexuality" is synonymous with traditionally gendered heterosexual reproductive intercourse, "morality" with chastity (and, as we will see in the next chapter, "life" with pregnancy and birth). Although Nietzsche insists that he is *not* advocating for the ascetic ideal (or at least the one that turns *against* life, anyway), I find he is not fully persuasive on this count. In modernity, what other kind of ideal could there possibly be?
162. *GM* III:20.
163. *EH* "Destiny" §7.
164. *BGE* §231.
165. Nietzsche's misogynist remarks about women in *Beyond Good and Evil* have often been excused on the basis of this preview disclaimer that they are only *his* truths, a qualification that for many has seemed reason enough to disregard them. Yet aren't *all* of Nietzsche's remarks only his truths? Isn't commentators' observation of this fact a banality and Nietzsche's acknowledgement of it a tautology, given his claim that perspective is "the basic condition of all life" (*BGE* P)? Does acknowledgment of Nietzsche's truths *as his* thereby disqualify them *as truths*? And if so, doesn't this disqualify *all* of his claims, not simply the misogynist ones?
166. *BGE* §220.
167. *GS* §88.

## CHAPTER 5

1. That Nietzsche exemplifies—and even admits—his implication in the *décadence* he diagnoses has been persuasively demonstrated by Daniel W. Conway in his *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
2. *TI* "Socrates" §11. The philosopher thus takes on the same role as the ascetic priest, who does not *cure* the underlying problem of *resentiment*, but merely alters its direction, alleviating symptoms and preserving (not enhancing or overcoming) endangered life (*GM* III:15–17). For an excellent analysis of the similarities between Nietzsche and the ascetic priest he criticizes, see Daniel Conway's "Comedians of the Ascetic Ideal: The Performance of Genealogy," in *The Politics of Irony: Essays in Self-Betrayal*, ed. Daniel Conway and John E. Seery (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
3. *GS* 370; cf. *NCW* "We Antipodes."
4. And, in fact, I think it is the solitary, masculine self-birth that is actually the most prominent and well-defined option of these three possibilities. Although the standard philosophical reading of Nietzsche would have us include both the *Übermensch* and eternal recurrence (along with will to power and sometimes *amor fati*) as his primary "positive" doctrines, as Arthur Danto observes in his insightful and largely traditional philosophical

accounting of Nietzsche's thought, both of these "doctrines" are, at best, "puzzling," and by and large merit very little attention in Nietzsche's published writings. For example, "The *Übermensch* idea, for all its notoriety, hardly appears in Nietzsche except in *Zarathustra*, and it differs from most of the characteristic views he held which are found much reiterated throughout the sprawling corpus. Even in *Zarathustra* itself, no specific characterization is really furnished." Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 196–97. As for "the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence," it "hardly appears in any of the published works. Even when it does, it is announced and presented, but there is no attempt at argument or proof. There is in the *Nachlass*, though it is difficult to know how much weight to give it" (203–4).

5. *BGE* §257.
6. *GM* I:16; cf. *A* §59.
7. *TI* "Skirmishes" §49.
8. *TI* "Skirmishes" §51.
9. *BGE* §224.
10. *CW* §7.
11. *TI* "Skirmishes" §43.
12. *TI* "Skirmishes" §37.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Conway convincingly documents the unstoppable inertia of *décadence* Nietzsche narrates in his post-Zarathustra writings, especially in the 1888 works (Conway, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*, chap. 2). However, gender and its essential importance to Nietzsche's understanding of *décadence* are not considered as the crucial explanatory causes of Nietzsche's fatalism.
15. *TI* "Skirmishes" §43.
16. *TI* "Skirmishes" §41.
17. *EH* "HH" §3.
18. *CW*, 2nd postscript.
19. *TI* "Skirmishes" §41.
20. *TI* "Errors" §2. Although Foucault's focus is on the historical emergence of sexuality and not *décadence*, his remarks on the ways in which the European obsession with *décadence* informed and produced sexuality seem apposite to Nietzsche, and add historical justification to my methodological choice of refusing to sever Nietzsche's remarks about modernity and truth from his remarks about health, race and gender. In this sense, Nietzsche's dark diagnoses and anxious prognoses regarding modernity's impoverished and sexual(ized) weaknesses are exemplary of this particular historical discursive configuration of power-knowledge: "The medicine of perversions and the programs of eugenics were the two great innovations in the technology of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century. Innovations that merged together quite well, for the theory of 'degenerescence' made it possible for them to perpetually refer back to one another; it explained how a heredity that was burdened with various maladies (it made little difference whether these were organic, functional, or psychical) ended by producing a sexual pervert . . . [i.e., the emasculated man of European modernity]; but it went on to explain how a sexual perversion resulted in the depletion of one's line of descent—rickets in children, the sterility of future generations. The series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex. And let it not be imagined that this was nothing more than a medical theory which was scientifically lacking and improperly moralistic. Its application was widespread and its implantation went deep. Psychiatry, to be sure, but also jurisprudence, legal medicine, agencies of social control, the surveillance of dangerous or endangered children, all functioned for a long time on the basis of 'degenerescence' and the heredity-perversion system. An entire social practice, which took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, furnished this technology of sex with a formidable

- power and far-reaching consequences.” Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Vol. I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 118–19.
21. *A* §38.
  22. *Z* III:8(1) “On Apostates.”
  23. *TI* “Skirmishes” §49.
  24. *TI* “Ancients” §4. This is because, Nietzsche tells us, Goethe failed to understand the Greeks. The significance of this misunderstanding, which in fact constitutes Goethe’s failure to understand the Dionysian, the “psychology of the orgiastic” that is the only guarantor of a future “where even pain still has the effect of a stimulus” (*TI* “Ancients” §5) will become clear a bit further on. As we will see, Goethe fails to achieve wholeness, to return (a return that Nietzsche tells us is really an “ascent”) to nature, because he fails to achieve a sufficient Dionysian hardness, thereby rendering him incapable of self-birth.
  25. *GM* II:24.
  26. *EH* “Z” §8.
  27. *Z* II:20 “On Redemption.” Revenge is certainly a kind of rebellion against natural or necessary constraint, but, for the most part, Nietzsche defines revenge or *ressentiment* as a protest against the limitations of the *body*—of weakness or sickness—and *not* that of time. For example:
 

“The *sick* are man’s greatest danger; *not* the evil, *not* the “beasts of prey.” Those who are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed—it is they, the *weakest*, who much undermine life among men, who call into question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, in man, in ourselves . . . It is on such soil, on swampy ground, that every weed, every poisonous plant grows, always so small, so hidden, so false, so saccharine. Here the worms of vengefulness and rancor swarm; here the air stinks of secrets and concealment; here the web of the most malicious of all conspiracies is being spun constantly—the conspiracy of the suffering against the well-constituted and victorious, here the aspect of the victorious is *hated*” (*GM* III:14).
  28. As Conway notes, “the drama of *Zarathustra* is fueled largely by the central character’s failure to acknowledge the extent of his reliance on the recognition of others.” Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, 170.
  29. *A* §1.
  30. As Graham Parkes observes, “all the characters in the book are aspects of Zarathustra’s personality.” Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 360).
  31. IV:11 “The Welcome.”
  32. *Ibid.*
  33. I:22 “On the Gift-Giving Virtue.”
  34. *Z* IV:13(6) “On the Higher Man.”
  35. *Z* IV:17(1) “The Awakening.”
  36. *Z* IV:18(3) “The Ass Festival.”
  37. *Z* II:19 “The Soothsayer.”
  38. *Z* IV:2 “The Cry of Distress.”
  39. *Z* IV:17(1) “The Awakening.”
  40. *Z* III:13(2) “The Convalescent.”
  41. *Z* IV:17(1); “The Awakening.”
  42. *Z* IV:18(1); “The Ass Festival.”
  43. *Z* IV:18(3) “The Ass Festival.”
  44. *Ibid.*
  45. *Z* IV:19(1) “The Drunken Song.”
  46. *Z* IV:19[1–2]; “The Drunken Song.” As Conway notes, “Zarathustra both assumes and denies the role of successor god.” Daniel W. Conway, “Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche: The Deconstruction of *Zarathustra*,” in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 105.

47. As Robert Gooding-Williams has pointedly observed, although *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* ends by predicting the coming of his children, it is “marked by the absence of his children.” Robert Gooding-Williams, *Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 303). Gooding-Williams suggests that this absence may mean that “Zarathustra deceives himself if he expects that he or anyone else will one day realize a Dionysian interruption of European modernity.” By contrast, Conway claims that the fourth part of *Zarathustra* evidences a kind of critical perspective that Nietzsche could no longer muster by 1888. He argues that this section is actually a kind of satyr play, a self-parody added by Nietzsche before the onset of his incipient madness. Conway, “Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche.”
48. Z IV:20 “The Sign.”
49. Kathleen Higgins rightly draws attention to this in her *Nietzsche’s Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). We might have assumed, based on the first and second parts, that Zarathustra’s work was to bring his redemptive message and teaching to humanity. In the face of the decisive failure of this project, Zarathustra turns to work on himself, facing his own nausea at existence and attempting an affirmation of life despite its preponderance of wretched failures. Now, if the conclusion of the third part is to be believed, this latter work at least is a success. And since Zarathustra clearly has no intention of returning once again to humanity, what exactly is left for Zarathustra to do?
50. GS §338.
51. Z III:6 “Upon the Mount of Olives.”
52. Z II:6 “On the Rabble.”
53. As Laurence Lampert has pointed out, the parts I-III of *Zarathustra* form a coherent whole, and there is a way in which the Fourth Part “violates the ending of part III.” Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 287.
54. Parts of this section of Chapter 5 have appeared in my article “Nietzsche/Pentheus: The Last Disciple of Dionysus and Queer Fear of the Feminine,” *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 2008): 90–125. I am grateful to *differences* and Duke University Press for permission to republish these passages.
55. III: 15(1–2) “The Other Dancing Song.”
56. Kaufmann is poetically translating *Schlangen* here—serpents—as “serpents’ ire.” Now, it may be that Nietzsche wishes to associate life with the deviousness and cunning of a snake, and thus she may indeed be full of “serpents’ ire,” but it may also literally be the case that life comes with her own entourage of serpents, and therefore that this animal does not belong exclusively to Zarathustra. While this suggests that life (or “woman”) too can take possession of the phallus, there is ambivalence even in this image, resonating as it does with devious Eve who brings about the downfall of “man” through her collaboration with the serpent in the Garden of Eden. In either case, life’s *Schlangen* are a warning, a sign of unnaturalness and danger.
57. The combination of these two images—the serpents and the hair—together conjures up a Medusa-like figure who has the ability to render impotent any man who looks at her directly. While Freud famously reads Medusa’s head of serpentine hair as standing in for the threat of castration, others have speculated that Medusa’s fearfulness resonates with the male fear of the *vagina dentata*, an anxiety that intercourse will cause castration because of the penis’s submersion in the devouring, toothy vagina. Although Nietzsche does not explain his reticence regarding the female genitalia in precisely this way, the specifically masculine anxiety he suffers in relation to the female sex organs is certainly not unfamiliar, and Zarathustra clearly regards life with a kind of wariness in this passage that suggests his anxiety regarding both her and his desire for her, each of which feels threatening to him. Conversations with Floris Biskamp about both German translation and anxious masculinity have enhanced my understanding of this passage.

58. Another rendering, not quite as pretty, but with just as much poetic license and a bit more faithfulness to tone, might be “bouncing bitch.”
59. This is Nietzsche’s version of life as a terrier—or perhaps a particularly nasty housecat. It recalls the other passages from *Beyond Good and Evil* already encountered in Chapter 4, wherein Nietzsche warns about woman being “*essentially* unpeaceful, like a cat, however well she may have trained herself to seem peacable” (BGE §131) or a “beast of prey, the tiger’s claw under the glove.” This “beautiful cat ‘woman’” elicits pity because she “appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in need of love,” yet also causes fear because she, like tragedy, “tears to pieces as it enchants” (BGE §239).
60. Z III:15(2) “The Other Dancing Song.”
61. “The magic and the most powerful effect of women is, in philosophical language, action at a distance, *actio in distans*; but this requires first of all and above all—*distance*” (GS §60).
62. “*Failures*.—Those poor women always fail who in the presence of the man they love become restless and unsure of themselves and talk too much. For what seduces men most surely is a certain secretive and phlegmatic tenderness” (BGE §74).
63. I have little patience for interpretations that seek to make excuses for this most obviously misogynist entreaty of Nietzsche’s (a misogyny I find virtually indisputable despite the fact it not spoken in “his own” voice). Laurence Lampert goes farther than mere excuse mongering in this regard, actively sentimentalizing this unnerving “courtship” of life and obscuring its sinister resonances in *Nietzsche’s Teaching*. First, Lampert unjustifiably speculates that the secret Zarathustra whispers into life’s ear (after the “chase” and whip-brandishing, to be discussed in a moment) is that “she is of all things the sweetest” and that he has no aim or desire to alter her (238–39). Yet Lampert then admits that the whip “transforms” life, causing her to become “yielding and submissive” (236) and notes that in marrying her, Zarathustra gives life a new name—“Eternity” (“As is appropriate for a bride, Life receives a new name from her husband,” 240). Each of these moments belies Lampert’s own assertion that Zarathustra has no wish to change life, that he accepts her as she is. Moreover, Lampert fails to note the remarkable *lack* of offspring from this “marriage,” thus allowing him to describe his own interpretation of this scene as an “affirmative” reading. Far worse than these inconsistencies, however, is their foundation in Lampert’s acceptance and romanticization of Zarathustra’s right to own, appropriate, and dominate “life”—whether through a name or through violence—and Lampert’s disturbing failure to note the obvious fact that a whip-bearing lover who purports to father offspring with a “yielding and submissive” partner is not simply a suitor but also a potential rapist. Indeed, what exactly does Lampert’s “affirmative” reading actually affirm? As I hope I have made clear in the preceding chapter, denying Nietzsche’s misogyny need not be the prerequisite to taking him seriously as a philosopher; speaking for myself, however, I do wish taking endorsements of women’s violent subordination seriously were the prerequisite for professional philosophizing. On this count, Frances Oppel offers by far the most credible, insightful, and feminist interpretation of this scene—and of *Zarathustra* overall—that I have thus far encountered in the literature on Nietzsche, an interpretation that is compelling in part because she *does* take the possibility of rape seriously. In the end, Oppel does not see anything like the vicious subordination I read here, and I think there is no way definitively to settle which of our readings is the “correct” one, a much more delightful and quintessentially Nietzschean interpretive dilemma. Oppel, *Nietzsche on Gender*, chap. 5.
64. Z III:12(10).
65. Z III:12(13).
66. Z III:12(15).
67. Z III:12(25).
68. Z III:12(12) “On Old and New Tablets.”
69. Z III:12(29) “On Old and New Tablets.”
70. Z III:12(30) “On Old and New Tablets.”

71. Z III:3 "On Involuntary Bliss." My conclusion here owes much to Kelly Oliver's superb work on gender and maternity in Nietzsche, in particular, her *Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
72. The significance of her hair reappears, too. No longer a fire but now a nest, its tangled foolishness (a kind of labyrinth?) poses an obstacle to his words, which they nevertheless penetrate easily, providing a singular (and admittedly oblique) moment of intimacy and consummation.
73. We recall that at the very end of the book, Zarathustra describes himself as being "ripened" [*reif*]. Perhaps his future self-birthing is his "work"?
74. EH "Z" §7.
75. GS §369.
76. Z IV:13(11) "On the Higher Man."
77. GS P§3.
78. Z II:2 "Upon the Blessed Isles." See also GS §72; Z II:1 "The Child with the Mirror," II:5 "On the Virtuous," II:15 "On Immaculate Perception"; BGE §206, §248; GM III:8. Not even Socrates, that other famous womb envier, attempted such an appropriation, content to declare himself a midwife. Kelly Oliver argues that Nietzsche's appropriating of child-birth is by no means of the "imitation is the highest form of flattery" variety but is rather symptomatic of philosophy's matrificial exclusion of the feminine. Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche*; see also Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Gillian Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
79. BGE §206.
80. Eve Sedgwick sees Nietzsche's proliferating metaphors of fecundity and procreation as offering an unconventional, "sexy thematics" of relations between *men*. Eve Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 135–36). For commentary on Sedgwick's claim, as well as an in-depth examination of Nietzsche's declaration of his Dionysian discipleship, see my "Nietzsche/Pentheus: The Last Disciple of Dionysus and Queer Fear of the Feminine."
81. BGE §295.
82. BGE §232.
83. TI "Philosophy" §6.
84. EH "Z" §8.
85. GS §370.
86. TI "Ancients" §4.
87. EH "Books" §5.
88. EH "Destiny" §7.
89. GM III:8. As Zarathustra tries to explain, "Verily, some are chaste through and through: they are gentler of heart, fonder of laughter, and laugh more than you. They laugh at chastity too and ask, 'What is chastity? Is chastity not folly? Yet this folly came to us, not we to it. We offered this guest hostel and heart: now it dwells with us—may it stay as long as it will!' Thus spoke Zarathustra" (I:13 "On Chastity").
90. TI "Skirmishes" §8.
91. Z IV:13(11) "On the Higher Man."
92. TI "Skirmishes" §10.
93. *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
94. TI "Skirmishes" §9.
95. TI "Skirmishes" §10.
96. TI "Skirmishes" §7.
97. TI "Skirmishes" §10.
98. GS P§3.
99. TI "Ancients" §5.
100. TI "Ancients" §4.
101. *Ibid.*



102. *GS* P§4.
103. *Z* I:18 “On Little Old and Young Women.” Recall that Nietzsche names Napoleon’s mother as among the most “powerful and influential women of the world” (*BGE* §239).
104. *TI* “Ancients” §5.
105. *Z* II:2 “Upon the Blessed Isles.”
106. III:16(1) “The Seven Seals.”
107. As Kelly Oliver has persuasively argued, Nietzsche’s (and Derrida’s) appropriation of the feminine does not thereby make them *into* women (much less feminists); it is rather an usurpation of the feminine by these men, who allow it to exist only when first possessed and incorporated by them. Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche*.
108. *BGE* §295.
109. *TI* “Skirmishes” §19.
110. A premiere quality of the ass is that it always says yes—the only “speaking” the ass does in *Zarathustra* is a braying that sounds eerily like “yes” [*ja*], and as the litany recites, “He [the ass/God] does not speak, except he always says Yes to the world he created: thus he praises his world. It is his cleverness that does not speak: thus he is rarely found to be wrong” and “What hidden wisdom it is that he has long ears and only says Yes and never No! Has he not created the world in his own image, namely, as stupid as possible?” (*Z* IV:17(2) “The Awakening”). One can only image the potential danger and mortal threat posed by the possibility of a woman who has similarly lost the ability to say no (cf. *GS* §43).
111. *TI* “Ancients” §4; see also *TI* “Ancients” §5.
112. *EH* “*Z*” §8.
113. This is how Irigaray reads the eternal recurrence—as an endless loop of solipsistic male orgasm. Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*.
114. *TI* “Skirmishes” §44.
115. *EH* “*Z*” §5.
116. *GM* III:4.
117. Indeed, many hold that the eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s central and most important teaching—see, for example, Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), Tracy Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000). Yet while Nietzsche declares eternal recurrence to be “the fundamental conception” of *Zarathustra* (*EH* “*Z*” §1), nowhere does he state in any published writing that eternal recurrence is his own most important idea or “teaching.” Moreover, as Conway has pointed out, “The eternal recurrence is so often hailed as sheltering his esoteric wisdom not because of any properties or elements deemed essential to this vague doctrine, but because nothing else in his corpus stands out as a likely candidate for a ‘final teaching’ befitting him” (Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, 159).
118. *EH* “*Z*” §1.
119. *GS* §341.
120. *GS* §233.
121. *Z* III:2(2) “On the Vision and the Riddle.”
122. *Z* III:13(2) “The Convalescent.”
123. The possibility that this snake, too, is a phallic symbol cannot be overlooked, making Zarathustra’s choking on the existence of modern *man* a very literal experience (I am indebted to Aliza Shapiro for this insight). Indeed, that the solution to this unbearable choking and nausea is to *bite the snake’s head off* indicates the necessity of castration or male bodily mutilation if modernity is to survive. This overcoming of negation is what Zarathustra witnesses in the shepherd’s transformation—he laughs at his own struggle and emasculation, his own crippling or lack of wholeness, affirming what otherwise threatened to kill him, displaying his superabundance and strength in the process. As we will see in the next chapter, this transformation and self-mockery is a task that Nietzsche himself could

- only recommend, not undertake (we know already that affirmation was impossible for Zarathustra).
124. *Z* III:13(2) "The Convalescent."
  125. *Z* III:5 "On the Virtue That Makes Small."
  126. *GM* I:10.
  127. *Z* Prologue §5.
  128. *Z* II:14 "On the Land of Education."
  129. *EH* "BT" §3; cf. *TI* "Ancients" §4.
  130. Similarly so in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche suggests that such a "world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is" is someone "who wants to have *what was and is* repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably *da capo*" (§56). If this is, in fact, a reference to the eternal recurrence (it is not named as such in the aphorism), it would require the repeated return of *the same*, of all that "*was and is* repeated into all eternity."
  131. *Z* III:2(2) "On the Vision and the Riddle."
  132. As already noted, these elements are themselves recurrences from Nietzsche's initial formulation in section 341 of *GS*. The significance of these two particular aspects of the setting is not entirely clear, although Nietzsche's other references to spiders (and in particular his explanation of the "tarantulas" in *Z* II:7, "On the Tarantulas") typically associate them with *ressentiment*, as creatures who catch their prey through devious entrapment (either in a sticky web or by poisoning). Similarly, the moon is often figured in *Zarathustra* as the feminine counterpart to the masculine sun, and characterized as deceptive because of her femaleness (as, for example, in II:15, "On Immaculate Perception").
  133. In either case—whether eternal recurrence is the recurrence of the identical or is rather a broad characterization of the circular character of existence—I think it is clear that eternal recurrence is not and can in no way be a "selective" principle, whereby reactive forces (Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson [New York: the Athlone Press, 1983]), death itself (Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other*, ed. Christie McDonald, trans. Peggy Kamuf [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985]), those unable to bear the weight of recurrence (Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching*), or the nihilistic aspects of one's personality (Tracy Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*) do not recur. Despite the popularity of this thesis, the eternal recurrence is not, as Kelly Oliver claims, the return of "difference" (Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche*, 106) but rather of the "identical" or "same" (cf. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998]).
  134. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 96.
  135. *EH* "BT" §3.
  136. *EH* "Z" §1.
  137. *D* §206.
  138. *GM* I:11, II:1.
  139. *GM* III:17.
  140. *Z* II:6 "On the Rabble."
  141. The obvious homophobia of this imagery suggests that, just like the appropriately masculine desire for women, Nietzsche did not think that sexual desire for *men* should be consummated, either—it is, like *all* sexual gratification, simply a vile and loathsome experience.
  142. *Z* II:2 "Upon the Blessed Isles."
  143. *BGE* §56.
  144. It is possible to read the incessant demand for the arrival of the *Übermensch* in *Zarathustra* as simply a desire for humanity to work toward the goal of self-overcoming. Alan Schrift, for example, offers a very nice exposition of the *Übermensch* as a *process* of overcoming and as such a term that is better translated as "becoming-*Übermensch*." Alan Schrift,

- “Rethinking the Subject: Or, How One Becomes-Other Than What One Is,” in *Nietzsche's Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche's Prelude to Philosophy's Future*, ed. Richard Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); cf. Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Yet while such an interpretation is wholly consistent with Nietzsche in his best, most nuanced, and healthiest moments, nevertheless, it is not clear that this was an interpretation he himself was fully able to recommend or endorse. Although Nietzsche himself warns against interpreting the *Übermensch* “as an ‘idealistic’ type of a higher kind of man, half ‘saint,’ half ‘genius’” (*EH* “Books” §1), he nevertheless also says in the same breath that the word functions as “the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to ‘modern’ men, to ‘good’ men, to Christians and other nihilists.” The problem with the former interpretations lies in the words in quotation marks—idealistic, saint, and genius—but *not* with the connotation of either “supreme achievement” or total opposition to modern men. As I hope is clear, this *Übermensch* can be the by-product of a genuinely virile artist’s act of self-birth just as much as some superheroic figure who arrives in the great noon to induce humanity’s own redemptive self-overcoming.
145. *NCW*, preface.
146. *EH* “Wise” §2.
147. *EH* “Clever” §6.
148. *NCW*, “Where I offer objections.” Reprinted from *GS* §368, where the litany reads “one is common people, audience, herd, female, pharisee, voting cattle, democrat, neighbor, fellow man.”
149. *CW* Preface.
150. *EH* “BT” §4.
151. As Foucault notes, “This class [the bourgeoisie] must be seen rather as being occupied, from the mid-eighteenth century on, with creating its own sexuality and forming a specific body based on it, a ‘class’ body with its health, hygiene, descent, and race: the autosexualization of its body, the incarnation of sex in its body, the endogamy of sex and the body” (Foucault, *History of Sexuality Vol. I: An Introduction*, 124). As Moira Gatens has argued, *any* analogue between the body politic and the individual citizen/body in modern political thought is always the particular white/European male body in “human” disguise, serving as the norm for who counts as human (Moria Gatens, *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power, and Corporeality* [New York: Routledge, 1996]). Gatens concludes that “the metaphor of the body politic is ultimately a psychotic fascination with an impossible desire for a unified, holistic, or single body which is interchangeable with every other body—a ‘dream of men’” (25–26). Such a psychotic fascination is clearly the outcome (and perhaps also the cause) of Nietzsche’s “solutions” to the castration of modern masculinity.
152. Conway’s original and persuasive proof of this claim in *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game* has obviously influenced my own reading of Nietzsche immeasurably.
153. *BGE* §47; *GS* §321; cf. *GS* §276; *Z III*:1 “The Wanderer.”
154. *Z III*:7 “On Passing By”; cf. *Z I*:17 “On the Way of the Creator.”

## CHAPTER 6

1. *GM III*:4.
2. *EH* “Books” §1.
3. *GM III*:5.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *A* §11.
6. *GS* §338.
7. *EH* “Wise” §8.
8. *EH* “Clever” §4.

9. *EH* "Z" §8.
10. *EH* "Clever" §4.
11. *EH* "Z" §6.
12. I also credited Daniel W. Conway for this insight, which he compellingly demonstrates in *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
13. I therefore do not accept the argument of Maudemarie Clark and others who claim that Nietzsche comes to believe in the existence of a kind of empirical reality that can be accessed and revealed through science in the 1888 writings (Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990]). Rather, I see this as a rhetorical strategy to induce a revolution that does not conclude with a mere privileging of the body, but also seeks ultimately to undermine that very privileging.
14. *EH* "Wise" §7.
15. Gayle Rubin names Pauline Christianity in particular as this foundation, noting that current forms of sexual moralism (in medicine, psychiatry, education, politics, etc.) need no longer be explicitly linked with Christian doctrine to nevertheless be indebted to it as their unspoken origin and legitimation. Gayle Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality," in *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, ed. Carole Vance (Boston: Routledge, 1984). Richard Dyer argues that despite the decline of Christianity as organized religion, "its ways of thinking and feeling are none the less still constitutive of both European culture and the colonies and the colonies and ex-colonies (notably the USA) that it has spawned. Many of the fundamentals of all levels of Western culture—the forms of parenting, especially motherhood, and sex, the value of suffering, guilt, the shock of post-Enlightenment materialism—come to us from Christianity, whether or not we know the Bible story or recognise the specific items of Christian iconography." Richard Dyer, *White* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 15. Dyer also usefully points out the ways in which the iconography and meaning of *whiteness* are Christian, thus making sense of Nietzsche's racialized anxieties about gender decay as described in Chapter 4.
16. The only other possible culprit Nietzsche suggests is Plato, calling Christianity "Platonism for the people" (*BGE* preface). He is inconsistent on this count, however, equivocating on the relative value and influence of Plato in a way he is absolute with regard to Christianity. On this, Nietzsche is conclusive—Christianity is the very *religion* of meaning, having "interpreted a whole mysterious machinery of salvation into suffering" (*GM* II:7).
17. As Judith Butler has argued, "to problematize the matter of bodies may entail a loss of epistemological certainty, but loss of certainty is not the same thing as political nihilism. On the contrary, such a loss may well indicate a significant and promising shift in political thinking." Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 30).
18. See, for example, Conway, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*; Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other*, ed. Christie McDonald, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); and Kelly Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
19. This is the difficulty of offering a feminist reading of Nietzsche while still remaining a scholar of Nietzsche, and goes some way toward accounting for the frustrating pattern in Nietzsche scholarship (discussed in Chapter 4, note 16) that preserves Nietzsche's status as a great philosopher at the expense of either ignoring or excusing his misogyny. There is the additional difficulty that feminist analysis is still not considered sufficiently "objective," an unspoken presumption that works to confine feminist readings of philosophy either to rationalizations of misogyny or explorations of the multivalent and endlessly shifting permutations of "woman" in Nietzsche's texts. However, simply focusing on gender (much less "woman") does not make a reading feminist. Indeed, I suspect that the fear of castration lurks here as well, reproduced under the normative guise of "good scholarship," and

- rebounding back onto feminist analysis by policing the boundaries of what constitutes its appropriate focus and critical content. It is no surprise, then, that feminist critics might be on their guard. Thus, in her essay in *Feminist Interpretations of Nietzsche*, Kathleen Higgins encourages feminists not to lose their senses of humor when encountering Nietzsche's "jokes" about women, insisting without a hint of irony that in doing so she is not rehabilitating that very stereotype. Kathleen Higgins, "Gender in *The Gay Science*," in *Feminist Interpretations of Plato*, ed. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 150. Similarly, Maudemarie Clark argues in her essay in *Feminist Interpretations* that the ultimate issue for Nietzsche is "whether women really want enlightenment about themselves, whether we can will it." Maudemarie Clark, "Nietzsche's Misogyny," in *Feminist Interpretations of Nietzsche*, ed. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 197. Thus accepting a misogynist premise in Nietzsche, Clark concludes by arguing that women should take Nietzsche at his word on this count: "feminists interested in this possibility could do worse than to look both seriously and with a sense of humor at Nietzsche's attempt to turn resentment into laughter in *Beyond Good and Evil* VII." But as Kelly Oliver rightfully points out, "Nietzsche's woman reader *must* laugh or she will feel wounded by his texts." Kelly Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 24, emphasis added. So, too, if she is to be considered a "good scholar"?
20. *GS* P§3.
  21. *GS* §339.
  22. *EH* "Wise" §1.
  23. *EH* "Wise" §2.
  24. *EH* "Wise" §3.
  25. What Nietzsche says of moralists holds equally well here for interpreters: "But even when the moralist addresses himself only to the single human being and says to him, 'You ought to be such and such!' he does not cease to make himself ridiculous. The single human being is a piece of *fatum* from the front and from the rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be. To say to him, 'Change yourself!' is to demand that everything be changed, even retroactively. And indeed there have been consistent moralists who wanted man to be different, that is, virtuous—they wanted him remade in their own image, as a prig: to that end, they *negated* the world! No small madness! No modest kind of immodesty!" (*TI* "Anti-Nature" §6).
  26. This has not prevented commentators from attempting to construct "doctrines" from the *Nachlass* regarding will to power, eternal recurrence, and the like. Yet Nietzsche simply does not offer complete sets of philosophical concepts that could be marshaled into something like a "doctrine," much less an ideology. Any reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought of this sort (such as I myself presented in Chapter 1) is always at best partial and incomplete. Turning to the *Nachlass* thus becomes an interpretive necessity for those determined to make Nietzsche into a traditional philosopher who engages in traditional sorts of philosophical activities. As I have already argued, this is a methodological approach that remains insensitive to the form of Nietzsche's philosophy, which, in its purposeful and rhetorical style, is decidedly *not* a good example of conventional philosophizing.
  27. *BGE* §25.
  28. *BGE* §4.
  29. *GS* §373.
  30. *HH* §515.
  31. Some commentators, recognizing the constitutive contradictions at the center of Nietzsche's thought, have proposed reading Nietzsche "against" himself. Lawrence Hatab, for example, seeks to do this in order to produce a democratic politics that need not privilege equality as its centerpiece, a project more invested in staking out a theory of democracy and how Nietzsche can serve it, than in Nietzsche interpretation *per se*. Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics* (Chicago: Open

- Court Books, 1995). Conway deploys this strategy in a slightly different manner in *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*, brilliantly separating out the diagnostic Nietzsche from the *décadent* Nietzsche in order to deploy former against the latter, thereby revealing the unwitting *décadent* confession contained within Nietzsche's philosophy. See, especially, chapters 1 and 5; cf. also Daniel W. Conway, "Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche: The Deconstruction of Zarathustra," in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). My own reading of Nietzsche's contradictions obviously owes much to Conway's methodological innovations. However, Conway reads Nietzsche's devolution of his task to others as a "dangerous game" that he ultimately fails to play successfully, arguing that Nietzsche's "signature teachings, which he at one time hoped might catalyze a rebirth of tragic culture in Europe, have become bargaining chips in a pathetic scheme to broker the discipleship of his decrepit readers" (170). While nothing disproves Conway's masterful interpretation here, he is more persuaded than I by Nietzsche's account of his own and his readers' deficiencies. In my view, the overwrought grandiosity of Nietzsche's proclamations of *décadence* are themselves meaningful as symptoms: Nietzsche's diagnoses of modernity's horror are better read as projections of his own "dis-ease," in particular when it comes to sexuality and gender, the place where he becomes most essentialist and thus most in need of redemption. But this contradictory display of sickness gives us due reason to reject Nietzsche's redemptive immoderacy, thereby only committing us only more firmly to his revolutionary endeavor. Thus, I agree that Nietzsche seeks readers who will take up his project in unexpected ways, producing "a hybrid production, a bastard son born to him and his readers." Conway, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*, 155. But I think Nietzsche's self-revelation successfully *authorizes* that production, a project that is even more illegitimate than Conway may have believed insofar as it is no longer necessarily a "son."
32. This is certainly the case regarding the readings offered in this book; indeed, this is the very experience and situation of Nietzsche interpretation. But by inducing this experience, I think Nietzsche is encouraging us to realize just how aptly this characterizes the situation of *all* interpretation—of ourselves, others, events, cultures, politics—of the "world" in sum. *Every* will to truth ultimately undoes itself, revealing its "certainty" as the metaphysical need it actually serves.
  33. *Z* II:12 "On Self-Overcoming."
  34. *GM* II:24.
  35. *TI* "Philosophy" §1.
  36. *GM* I:14.
  37. *A* §46.
  38. *GS* §344.
  39. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
  40. *A* §52.
  41. *EH* "Destiny" §1.
  42. *GM* III:19. Nietzsche says such dishonesty characterizes "all philosophers," whose dishonesty at least is unwitting. They "are not honest enough in their work, although they all make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic . . . while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of 'inspiration'—most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract—that they defend with reason they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent that name, and for the most part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize 'truths'—and *very* far from having the courage of the conscience that admits this, precisely this, to itself" (*BGE* §5).
  43. *GM* III:26.
  44. *CWP*.
  45. *EH* "Destiny" §1.

46. *EH* "Clever" §10.
47. *GM* III:23. In the Preface to *The Birth of Tragedy* (§5), Nietzsche explicitly links Christian morality with "unconditional" morality, using them synonymously, although it may be more accurate to say that, for Nietzsche, Christianity epitomizes unconditional morality and sets the standard for all other moralities.
48. *GS* §110.
49. *BGE* §4.
50. *BGE* §192.
51. *BT* P§5.
52. *EH* P§3.
53. *A* §55.
54. *GM* I:10.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Or, as Nietzsche memorably puts it in the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil*, Christianity is "Platonism for the people."
57. *GS* §372. Nietzsche, by contrast, claims to write in "blood and aphorisms" (*Z* I:7 "On Reading and Writing").
58. *TI* "Philosophy" §1.
59. *BGE* §10.
60. *GS* §343.
61. *GS* §120.
62. *BGE* §4.
63. *Z* II:12 "On Self-Overcoming."
64. *Ibid.*
65. *TI* "Skirmishes" §39.
66. See, for example, Luc Ferry and Alain Renault's *Why We Are Not Nietzscheans*, trans. Robert de Loazia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Geoff Waite, *Nietzsche's Corps/E: Aesthetics, Politics, Prophecy, or, the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); and, to some extent, Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986). In Alan Schrift's commentary on reactionary readers' attempts to reify Nietzsche as an incontestable racist (in a volume that seems intended as a clear response to *Why We Are Not Nietzscheans*), Schrift suggests that the best response to such an interpretation is not necessarily step-by-step refutation, but rather effective demonstration of the kinds of progressive political projects that are possible through engagement with a dangerous thinker like Nietzsche. Alan Schrift, "Nietzsche's Contest: Nietzsche and the Culture Wars," in *Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Alan Schrift (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). This section is one attempt to make good on Schrift's suggestion.
67. That this reevaluation may ultimately lead to the overcoming of Nietzsche's own philosophy, insofar as it can be seen, in its entirety, as one gigantic *critique* of emasculation, is but one more argument in favor such a reevaluation—an argument Nietzsche himself recommends, and a movement of overcoming he himself suggests inheres in the very definition of life (*GM* III:27).
68. *EH* "D" §2.
69. Note that Nietzsche here relies on a variation of the same word [*schneiden*, to cut], that he used to refer to the dilution and emasculation [*verschneiden*, *verschnitten*] of modern masculinity. Here, the explicitly privative character of the word is foregrounded via the *aus*—affixed to its beginning, demarcating specifically a cutting *out*.
70. *TI* "Skirmishes" §41.
71. *TI* "Anti-Nature" §2.
72. *A* §7.

73. *EH* "Clever" §3.
74. *TI* "Anti-Nature" §1.
75. *TI* "Anti-Nature" §2.
76. As noted already, some kind of "moderation" or uncommitted "intercourse" seems much more in keeping with the sexual metaphors of Nietzsche's perspectivist view of truth, truth-seekers, and the activity of truth-seeking than either abstinence or monogamy (much less marriage). But because Nietzsche cannot reside contentedly at this in-between place, he resorts to an all-or-nothing principle of sexual moralism, wherein all *is* nothing and thus abstinence is the only option if philosopher-man is to survive his terrifying encounter with woman-truth. As Nietzsche himself concludes in this aphorism, "the most poisonous things against the senses have been said not by the impotent, nor by ascetics, but by the impossible ascetics, by those who really were in dire need of being ascetics" (*TI* "Anti-Nature" §2).
77. Insofar as some feminists argue that this hierarchy is constitutive of sexuality as well—namely, that domination and subordination are essential to sexual desire and definitive of sexual activity—then an overthrow of gender hierarchy would necessarily also demand a reevaluation of sexuality and sexual desire. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, "maybe feminists are considered castrating because equality is not sexy." Catharine MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 145.
78. In Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990). Itself an important liberatory tool, the sex/gender distinction differentiates between *sex*, considered to consist of biological aspects of the body like genitals, hormones, chromosomes, gonads, body fat and hair distribution, et cetera, and *gender*, the social roles, qualities, and characteristics contained in and entailed by the words "man" and "woman." Gayle Rubin is often credited with its innovation; see her "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); cf. Donna Haraway, "'Gender' for a Marxist Dictionary: the Sexual Politics of a Word," in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
79. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 6.
80. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 6–7.
81. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 7.
82. Frances Nesbitt Opper acknowledges Nietzsche's role in inaugurating precisely such radical interrogation of sex and gender; see her *Nietzsche on Gender: Beyond Man and Woman* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005). On the issue of subjectivity in particular, Butler acknowledges Nietzsche's importance, citing his authorizing insistence in the *Genealogy* that there is no being behind doing, no doer behind the deed (*Gender Trouble*, 25). Cf. Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 45–46.
83. *GM* III:28.
84. *TI* "Errors" §8.
85. *GS* §318.
86. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 86–88.
87. As Socrates notes in the *Republic*, the possibility of women guardians has to be admitted insofar as men and women "differ in this alone, that the female bears and the male mounts." Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 454e.
88. Eve Sedgwick, *Tendencies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
89. *EH* "Clever" §10; cf. *GS* §276; *EH* "CW" §4.
90. *EH* "Clever" §10.
91. As we will see in the next section, eternal recurrence may thus be Nietzsche's only explicit formulation of a politics of no future.
92. *TI* "Socrates" §2.



93. As transsexual woman Julia Serano notes in a revolutionary tone, “so it’s no wonder that most people assume that I must be mentally ill, because in this culture, wanting to be a woman is something most people find literally unimaginable. And when I do have SRS [sex reassignment surgery], my surgically constructed genitals will no doubt be seen by some to be an abomination or a blasphemy. Because my cunt will be the ultimate question mark, asking, How powerful can the penis really be if a sane and smart person like me decides she can do without it? And if the world supposedly revolves around the penis, then my SRS will knock it off its axis. And phallic symbols will come crashing down like nothing more than a house of cards.” Julia Serano, *Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity* (Emeryville, CA: Seal Press, 2007), 231.
94. *TI* “Anti-Nature” §5.
95. *TI* “Skirmishes” §19.
96. *BGE* §41.
97. *GM* III:12.
98. Cf. the Nietzschean resonances in Donna Haraway’s understanding of “situated knowledges” as embodied perspectives in her critique of scientific objectivity. Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991). Nietzsche, of course, claims this observer’s neutrality for himself, attributing his objectivity to his depth of experience with both sickness and health: “This dual descent, as it were, both from the highest and the lowest run on the ladder of life, at the same time a *décadent* and a *beginning*—this, if anything, explains that neutrality, that freedom from all partiality in relation to the total problem of life, that perhaps distinguishes me” (*EH* “Wise” §1).
99. See, for example, the volumes *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990); *Feminist Politics: Identity, Difference, and Agency*, ed. Deborah Orr et al. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); and *Radically Speaking*, ed. Diane Bell and Renate Klein (North Melbourne, Australia: Spinifex, 1996), especially sections 2 and 3. See also Jan Rehmann, “Deconstructing Postmodernist Neo-Nietzscheanism,” *Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination* 2, no. 1 (2007); Rosemary Hennessy, *Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Suzanne Danuta Walters, “From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Fag?),” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 21, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 830–69.
100. Raising this critique to the level of righteous and resentful indictment, Martha Nussbaum accuses Butler of a “hip quietism” that colludes with “evil.” Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody,” *The New Republic*, February 22, 1999, 220(8):37–45.
101. Gender Public Advocacy Coalition: About GenderPAC, <http://www.gpac.org/about>, emphasis added (accessed 5/19/08).
102. Pauline Park, “GenderPAC, the Transgender Rights Movement, and the Perils of a Post-Identity Politics Paradigm,” *The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law* 4 (2003):747.
103. For a persuasive defense of this view, see Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
104. Cf. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin, 2006).
105. Wendy Brown claims this explicitly with regard to feminism, when she writes that “post-structuralist insights were the final blow to the project of transforming, emancipating, or eliminating gender in a *revolutionary* mode.” Wendy Brown, “Feminism Unbound: Revolution, Mourning, Politics,” in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 111, emphasis in original. Foucault’s methodological proscriptions regarding the study of configurations of power-knowledge have also been taken to discount the possibility of revolutionary breaks or transformations; as he himself notes, “there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all

- rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case." Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 95–96.
106. Brown, "Feminism Unbound," 114.
  107. Brown illustrates the tendency of identity politics to cling to injury as the primary source of meaning and comfort (and thereby rendering it a slave morality consumed by *ressentiment*). Wendy Brown, "Wounded Attachments," in *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
  108. Brown, "Feminism Unbound," 113–14, emphasis added. Note that my analysis differs from Brown's insofar as I do not read Marx as offering a Communist future in order to redeem a corrupt past. I do not see Marx solely as an Enlightenment thinker who invests too much hope in the redemptive capacities of reason and human power to rectify the past's mistakes. Rather, I think Marx follows through on the elimination of origins already begun in Rousseau's *Second Discourse*, where the historicization of a state of nature which Rousseau himself admits is likely irretrievable, if not an outright fiction, makes possible the elimination of the need for origins altogether. Indeed, Marx insists that he will not begin in any fictitious "primordial state" but rather with the empirical premises of productive activity. Karl Marx, "Estranged Labor," *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, ed. and trans. Martin Milligan (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007), 68. Thus, in rendering history the history of class struggle, Marx renders the origin of that struggle irrelevant, if not ideological. Yet Marx *may* retain a revolutionary or utopic future promise. My aim in this part of the chapter is to make headway in the project of thinking revolution not simply without a past, as Marx does, but without a future as well.
  109. Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). For a denser and complementary (if less irreverent and polemical) theorization of queer futurelessness, see Shannon Winnubst, *Queering Freedom* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
  110. Which Tavia Nyong'o notes may be a kind of nostalgia on Edelman's part for a political moment already past, a moment when "homosexuality" did indeed pose an ominous and spectral threat to the social order. Tavia Nyong'o, "Do You Want Queer Theory (or Do You Want the Truth)? Intersections of Punk and Queer in the 1970s," *Radical History Review* 100 (Winter 2008), 115.
  111. Elsewhere, Edelman concedes this implication with regard to time itself, arguing that the constant imperative to turn time into history "makes all subjects queer," insofar as "we aren't, in fact, subjects of history constrained by the death-in-life of futurism and its illusion of productivity . . . The universality proclaimed by queerness lies in identifying the subject with just this repetitive performance of a death drive, with what's, quite literally, unbecoming." Lee Edelman, "Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable Discussion," *GLQ* 13, no. 2–3 (2007), 181.
  112. Cathy Cohen, "Punks, Bull-Daggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?" in *Black Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
  113. Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).
  114. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.
  115. Janet Jakobsen, "Perverse Justice: AIDS, Economics, and the 'War on Terror,'" paper presented at Harvard University, March 13, 2008.
  116. Puar calls this simultaneity of enfranchisement of certain homosexuals within the fold of American citizenship and the abjection of perversely sexualized terrorist bodies of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and anyone else who "looks like a terrorist" *homonationalism*, a configuration of ascendant whiteness wherein certain gay and lesbian subjects are interpellated as the proper citizens of a sexually exceptional U.S. polity while perverse others are queered as the monster terrorist fag, thereby rendering perversity always already an Orientalized attribute of non-Western cultures while allowing the United States to remain an exemplar

- of sexual openness and toleration. Puar rightly notes that homonationalism upholds the implicit separation of homosexuality and race/racialization, such that the homonational subject is presumptively white while the immigrant or terrorist other is presumptively heterosexual. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*.
117. Although Puar rejects Edelman's futureless politics, it is because she overlooks the broad sweep of the term queer within his project, an understandable oversight given his penchant for reducing queerness to white gayness. But what she says, in supposed criticism of him, is in fact harmonious with his construal of queerness and reproductive futurity, if we understand "queer" as the refusal to sacrifice the present for the sake of the future. Insisting that reproduction not be privileged in defining queerness, Puar argues we must rather "understand how the biopolitics of regenerative capacity already demarcate racialized and sexualized statistical population aggregates as those in decay, destined for no future, based not upon whether they can or cannot reproduce children but on what capacities they can and cannot regenerate and what kinds of assemblages they compel, repel, spur, deflate" (Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 211). But whether reproductive or not, the issue is ultimately futurity itself, in whose ideological name biopower regulates populations according to various and shifting criteria like "health, vitality, capacity, fertility, 'market virility,' and so on" (211).
118. Edelman, *No Future*, 22.
119. Indeed, we must not confuse Edelman's project with something like a politics of subversive redeployment of signifiers, as advocated by the Judith Butler of *Gender Trouble*, or the perpetual refiguration of identity's constitutive outside, as suggested by the Butler of *Excitable Speech*. This is nothing but humanist futurism in a new guise. As Edelman notes, "No doubt, as Butler helps us to see, the norms of the social order do, in fact, change through catachresis, and those who once were persecuted as figures of 'moralized sexual horror' may trade their chill and silent tombs for a place on the public stage. But that redistribution of social roles doesn't stop the cultural production of figures . . . to bear the burden of embodying such a 'moralized sexual horror.'" Edelman, *No Future*, 107.
120. Edelman, *No Future*, 29.
121. *Ibid.*, 31.
122. *Ibid.*, 17.
123. *Ibid.*
124. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 23–24.
125. *Ibid.*, 24. I do not deny the unfortunate tendency of queer resistance to exert its own set of normativizing tactics through its valorization of transgression, in both academic and activist contexts. However, I do wish to contest the necessity of this development as the essential logic of queerness, and to recommend against abandoning queerness in the face of this often-disappointing development.

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