

Notes

Dialogue 1 Synopsis

1. Whitehead (1929), p. 63: 'The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.'
2. Nietzsche (1962), p. 32: 'Thus all of them together form what Schopenhauer in contrast to the republic of scholars has called the republic of creative minds: each giant calling to his brother through the desolate intervals of time. And undisturbed by the wanton noises of dwarfs that creep past beneath them, their high spirit-converse continues.'
3. Nietzsche (1968), p. 33.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
5. Nietzsche (1973), p. 96.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
7. Nietzsche (1968), p. 34.
8. Plato (1969), pp. 99–183. The references to the Theory of Forms, Recollection and the purification of the soul are based on Plato's account in *Phaedo*.
9. Waterfield (1987). See this essay also for an exposition of the view that Plato's adherence to his Theory of Forms ended with the *Parmenides* and for a criticism of Cornford's view of the continuity in Plato's conception of Forms (see below).
10. Cornford (1960), p. 4.
11. See also Plato (1996) and Whitaker's introduction (1996). Whitaker takes the view, I believe, that the fate of the Theory of Forms in Plato's philosophy, following *Parmenides*' devastating criticisms, is somewhat more equivocal than Waterfield (1987) is prepared to allow.
12. That is, not by mere sense experience.
13. TLP 6.54.
14. Rhees (1998), Chapter 1: 'Plato and the growth of understanding'.
15. The phrase 'logical significance of facts' is borrowed from Hertzberg (1992), where he employs it—I believe—in the course of making a similar point.

16. See, for example, Plato (1987), 146a–8d.
17. See TLP.
18. PI 373: ‘Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is.’
19. Hacker (1972); Baker and Hacker (1985).
20. See, for example, Rhees (1998).
21. PI 1 ff.
22. Rhees (1970c), p. 82.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
25. That is, PI and the later philosophy versus TLP.
26. I will use the phrase ‘psychological concept’ to refer to all concepts to do with mental life. This is consistent with Wittgenstein’s use.
27. PI 23.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Cf. *ibid.* 7.
30. See especially PI 243–486.
31. See, for example, Winch (1993) for a discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on how words refer to sensations.
32. PI 219.

Dialogue 2 Facts, Concepts and Philosophy

1. Z 567: ‘How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what *one* man is doing *now*, an individual action, but **the whole hurly-burly of** human actions, the background against which we see any action.’ (my emphasis)
2. PI, p. 195.
3. *Ibid.* 7.
4. *Ibid.* 123; see also BT, p. 179: ‘Learning philosophy is really recollecting. We remember that we really use words in this way.’
5. PI 1 ff.
6. *Ibid.* 82.
7. See, for example, Plato (1987), 146a–8d.
8. ROC 119 and 120.
9. OC 501.
10. By ‘global scepticism’ I mean trying to doubt the nature of reality as such and in general.
11. For example, OC 612.
12. PI 217.
13. OC 559.
14. PI 217.
15. Cf. OC 139.
16. *Ibid.* 501.
17. Rhees (1998); see also Rhees (1970a) and (1970c).
18. Cf. PI 16.
19. Emmett (1990), pp. 213–31.

20. In particular she had in mind Bernard Williams (1981), Jonathan Lear (1982 and 1986) and Lynne Rudder-Baker (1984). Whereas I do not defend Emmett on this point, elsewhere I shall criticize the transcendentalist approach.
21. Emmett (1990), p. 215.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
23. This point will be developed at length in the dialogues that follow.
24. We shall be examining this in more detail in Dialogue 5.
25. Wolgast (1987), p. 151.
26. Cf. PI 120.
27. See, for example, OC 450 and 625 and CE, p. 383.
28. This may be said without having to deny that the limit of doubt is not fixed.
29. OC 56.
30. Phillips (1999), p. 53.
31. Cf. PI, p. 195.
32. See Dialogue 3 for an account of the concept *speaking* as it is used here.
33. CV, p. 51e: 'It will be hard to follow my portrayal: for it says something new, but still has egg-shells of the old material sticking to it.'
34. PI 217.
35. The limitations of thinking of the employment of a concept as the application of a rule will be discussed at length in Dialogue 3; the important point here is that the application of a rule is at least an *aspect* of the employment of a concept—and it is an *essential* aspect.
36. Hacker (1972), pp. 156–66; Baker and Hacker (1985).
37. Hacker (1972), pp. 160 and 163.
38. Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 333.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 330; Hacker (1972), p. 166.
41. Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 333.
42. Hacker (1972), p. 165.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
44. Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 333.
45. Hacker (1972), p. 165.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
47. Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 336.
48. PI, p. 195.
49. Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 336.
50. PI 16. It may be argued that often there are no or very often no such discrete reactions to samples in the formation or learning of a concept. This is not the point. Even if the use of samples is *implicit*, it remains an aspect of the use of language.
51. See RFM, p. 200.
52. See TLP.

Dialogue 3 Concepts, Speaking and Persons

1. Rhees (1970c), p. 74, and (1969a), p. 135.
2. Gaita (1991), pp. 101–15.
3. PI 2 ff.

4. CV, p. 51e.
5. Rhees (1970c), p. 82.
6. PI 1 ff.
7. Rhees (1970c), pp. 76–7.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
11. Gaita (1991), p. 103 ff.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Rhees (1970c), p. 79.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 79 and 82.
16. Rhees (1969b), ‘Preface’ to BB, pp. v–xiv.
17. Rhees (1970b), p. 67.
18. Malcolm (1989), pp. 35–44.
19. Rhees (1970c), p. 83.
20. PI, p. 152.
21. Rhees (1970c), p. 80.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Gaita (1991), pp. 110–11. My emphasis.
24. Rhees (1969b).
25. BB, the *The Blue Book*.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–4.
27. Cf. PI 125.
28. BB, p. 17.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
30. Rhees (1969b), p. xi.
31. Rhees (1970c), p. 80.
32. See Dialogue 2 for a discussion of the scope of the concept of grammar in philosophy.
33. See also Rhees (1998), Chapter 13.
34. Rhees (1970c), p. 82.
35. Rhees (1970a), pp. 46 and 49.
36. Cf. PI, p. 162.
37. Rhees (1970c), p. 83.
38. PI 136.
39. Rhees (1970a), pp. 48–9; PI 156–71.
40. Rhees (1970a), p. 49.
41. Rhees (1998), p. 112; PI 125.
42. Rhees (1970c), p. 74.

Dialogue 4 An Instinct for Meaning

1. PI 1.
2. The passage does not contain *only* two points of departure for Wittgenstein. For a point of view on Wittgenstein’s the reasons for choosing this passage—with which I am sympathetic—see Walker (1990), pp. 99–109.
3. PI 1, footnote.

4. Ibid. 2–32.
5. Ibid. 7.
6. Ibid. 19 and 20.
7. Ibid. 33.
8. Ibid. 56.
9. Ibid. 143.
10. Ibid. 145.
11. Ibid. 143.
12. Ibid. 146.
13. Ibid. 147.
14. Ibid. 146–9.
15. Ibid. 151.
16. Ibid. 152.
17. Ibid. 154.
18. Ibid. 177.
19. Gaita (1991), pp. 110–11.
20. PI 179.
21. Ibid. 180.
22. Ibid. 184.
23. Ibid. 187.
24. Ibid. 185.
25. Ibid. 188.
26. Ibid. 201.
27. One may argue that the plausibility of Wittgenstein's case here lies in the fact that he imagines his example series as being worked out in complete isolation—it has no companions. If one imagines the working out of the series interacting with the working out of others, or being used in calculations engaging with other assumptions, and so on, then it may seem less easy to present the behaviour of the pupil as being anything other than an aberration. The meaning of the formula $+2$ also lies in its relations to mathematics as a whole, not just to an isolated exercise. My own view is that whereas this does lead to complexities that Wittgenstein seems not to have anticipated, it does not return us to the position he is attacking—his argument being that we cannot form a general conception of formulae as having determinate sense independent of their working out in practice. Wittgenstein's argument still captures the essence of this—which in all probability was his only purpose.
28. PI 190.
29. Ibid. 202.
30. CE, p. 399.
31. See Dialogue 2, Section 3.
32. At this juncture in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein moves on to expound the so-called 'private language argument' (PI 243 ff.). This is no accident as the argument is an extension of the case against mentalism. Up to this point the argument has been that in essence the concept of following a rule is not the concept of an experience or mental state that accompanies a practice. However, the private language argument is more than just a corollary to this, for it argues that it makes *no sense* to speak of a rule (and hence of a language) as *founded* on subjective judgement. It is therefore a keystone

in the attack on mentalism. I do not intend to rehearse the argument here, though I shall refer to it from time to time and discuss it in more detail in Dialogue 5.

33. RPP1 630, footnote: ‘“Forms of life” was a variant here. *Trans.*’
34. In LW1 365 the variant is: ‘The signs of hope are modes of this complicated pattern of life.’
35. Quoted from unpublished notes here translated by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker in: Baker and Hacker (1985), p. 242.
36. ‘Steady ways of living’ here refers to the instinctive regularity that belongs to the notion of rule following as explained previously.
37. Baker and Hacker (1985), pp. 238–43.
38. See, for example, Newton Garver (1994).
39. Goethe, *Faust I*, opening scene in the Studierzimmer.
40. Wolgast (1994), pp. 587–603.
41. Rhees (1997).
42. PI 109.
43. See PI; I say ‘apparently’ for it is now known that Wittgenstein willed his literary editors to publish his writings ‘as they think fit’, which means that we are not in a position to dismiss any of his extant remarks see Rhees (1996), pp. 56–7.
44. Wolgast (1994), pp. 588, 601 and 603.
45. CE, p. 368 ff.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 373.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 387–9.
48. Wolgast (1994), p. 591.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 601–2.
50. See PI.
51. Wolgast (1994), p. 591.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 593.
53. PI 244; Wolgast (1994), p. 600.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 592, footnote.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 599.
56. Wolgast does refer to one example that seems to be of this type, namely a suggestion by Cockburn that a baby has fundamentally different reactions to humans than to objects (*ibid.*, p. 595). Her concerns about the apparent ambiguity of a baby’s reactions seem to me to stem from her only being willing to consider the narrowest time-slice from the baby’s reactions.
57. CE, p. 371.
58. Wittgenstein used the expression ‘basic forms’. We might equally adopt Hertzberg’s description of them as ‘independent reactions’ (Hertzberg (1992), p. 30). I shall be discussing his account of primitive reactions in Dialogue 5.
59. Z 541.
60. Wolgast (1994), p. 593.
61. See PI.
62. See Part II of PI.
63. See especially *ibid.*, p. 166; and for a full discussion see Mulhall (1990).
64. Though not only in these notes.
65. The second remark does appear to speak inconsistently inasmuch as ‘being sure that someone is in pain’ and ‘doubting whether he is’ do not obviously

qualify as pre-linguistic behaviour, so that when he speaks of the language-game as an *extension* of primitive behaviour, a more consistent sense would have emerged if he had said that the *rest* of the language-game is an extension of primitive *linguistic* behaviour. On the other hand, one may still wish to retain the continuity with the first remark and explain away the inconsistency as merely an unfortunate choice of example. Rhees favours the former interpretation; however in the course of his argument he does not quote 'our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation', which is precisely that part of Wittgenstein's remark that favours the alternative interpretation. Rhees does not comment at all on Wittgenstein's use of the term '*pre-linguistic*'—the significance of which I shall discuss later in this dialogue. I am less nervous than Rhees in adopting Wittgenstein's terminology here, and likewise with his speaking of language as an *extension* of primitive behaviour, because I do not think that these ways of speaking necessarily imply a *theory* of concept-formation. See Rhees (1997).

66. PI 7.

67. I do not think that a new-born child's progression from incoherent movement to increasingly coherent behaviour could be described as *learning* in the sense in which language is learned.

68. Z 545.

69. Ibid. 541.

70. Rhees (1997); Malcolm (1982), pp. 3–22.

71. Rhees (1997), p. 7.

72. Z 541.

73. Rhees (1997), p. 2.

74. Ibid.

75. See Zettel 651: 'Shrugging of shoulders, head-shakes, nods and so on we call signs first and foremost because they are embedded in the use of our *verbal language*'.

76. Ibid. 541.

77. Ibid.

78. Rhees (1997), pp. 2–3.

79. PI 244.

80. Rhees (1997), p. 2.

81. Z 541.

82. Wolgast (1994), p. 601.

83. Gaita (1991), pp. 110–11. My emphasis.

84. Wolgast may well be right that the spontaneous babbling of infants is as a matter of fact 'one source of language'.—Certainly this is how an adult treats them. This is not a point of contention.

85. CE, p. 397.

86. PI.

Dialogue 5 Concepts of the Subject

1. In philosophy 'experience' is frequently used on its own to mean something more like 'immediate experience' or 'sense perception', even though its use in common parlance is much wider in scope. I will also use it this way, depending on context.

2. PI 243–315.
3. See, for example, Winch (1993), pp. 122–3.
4. Nagel (1974), pp. 435–50.
5. Hanna (1990), pp. 350–6; see also Hanna (1992), pp. 185–90.
6. Mounce (1992), pp. 178–84.
7. See, for example, Hacker (1987).
8. See, for example, Stern (1994), pp. 552–65.
9. Nagel (1974), p. 441.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 446–8.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 449–50.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
14. Cf. PI, p. 152.
15. Note that I do not doubt that in particular instances we do attribute experiences on the basis of evidence; only, this cannot be at the bottom of the exercise of these concepts.
16. Nagel (1974), p. 438.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 442, footnote.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Winch extended this same philosophical principle to failures of understanding even *within* our own society. See Winch (1997b), pp. 193–204.
21. See, for example, Winch (1972), pp. 8–49.
22. Nagel does not deny this in principle, and indeed does not have to deny it. See Nagel (1974), p. 443.
23. Mounce (1992), p. 178.
24. Malcolm (1985), pp. 45–66.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
28. Hacker (1972), p. 289.
29. Mounce (1992), p. 184.
30. Hacker (1972), p. 251 ff.
31. Cf. Mounce (1992), p. 182.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
33. PI 580.
34. PI 244.
35. Hacker (1972), p. 289.
36. Hertzberg (1992), pp. 24–39.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 39, endnote 11.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
40. PI, p. 152.
41. Hertzberg (1992), p. 33.
42. Mounce (1992), p. 182.
43. Z 540.
44. See Z 532 ff.
45. It might be worth emphasizing here that normally when we speak of human or animal *behaviour* we are already *not* speaking of merely physical

movement. The concept of behaviour already takes for granted psychological concepts.

46. One may ask what makes the difference between the moral *attitude* and moral *judgements*. I think this is shown in the fact that the attitude is manifested in ways of thinking, feeling and acting that are woven together and pervade our lives. This differs from a mere system of judgements. The point, then, is that these ways of thinking, feeling and acting are expressed through moral concepts that are not reducible to concepts of any natural phenomena.
47. PI, p. 184.
48. Ibid.
49. One might wish to argue that the uncertainty of our behaviour towards the fly is itself the product of philosophical uncertainty. But I see no reason to *assume* this, and Wittgenstein is surely right that there is such uncertainty that exists independently of thought.
50. Part II of PI.
51. LW1 791.
52. PI, p.155.
53. See Dialogue 2.
54. The assumption here is that we are dealing with a concept that does not *contain* a fact.
55. Z 567.

Dialogue 6 Metaphysics, Instinct and Language-games

1. CV, p. 74e. This is quoted as in the original translation published in the 1980 edition (p. 64). In the revised translation of 1998, the phrase 'primeval chaos' has been amended to 'the old chaos' (or alternatively 'the former chaos'). If 'old chaos' does not mean something like 'primeval chaos', then it is not clear to me what it is supposed to mean. For this reason I prefer to retain the original translation, which is more vivid and serves my present purpose better.
2. Cf. BT, p. 199, for a variant translation of the same sentence in German: 'An entire mythology is laid down in our language'.
3. Mounce (1973), pp. 347–62.
4. Ibid., p. 359. One may wish to question whether or not the reactions themselves are irrational. However the important point is to distinguish between the primitive reaction, on the one hand, and the belief that may or may not arise from it, on the other. If I am subject to the spooky feeling that if I am able to avoid stepping on the cracks between the paving stones then, in some nebulous way, I will be 'all right', one might say that this is an absurd and irrational reaction. But I think we would hesitate before saying that in exhibiting this reaction *I* had fallen into irrationality, unless I took it seriously and allowed it to enter into my beliefs about how I should promote my well being. A similar example: 'touch wood'. We see the attraction of a thought that we otherwise recognize could not found a rational belief.
5. Ibid., p. 353.
6. Ibid., p. 355.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
8. *Ibid.*
9. See especially Dialogue 4.
10. PI 125.
11. I use the word 'metaphysical' here to refer specifically to confused conceptions of the natures of things. Philosophy also has its own legitimate concepts—which we might also call a language-game—that have been forged to facilitate the application of its critical methods, that is, for the elucidation of the grammars of concepts. See also my comments on the use of 'metaphysics' in Dialogue 2.
12. See Dialogue 5 for an earlier discussion of secondary uses of words.
13. PI 278.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

Dialogue 7 Epilogue

1. See PI 133.

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Index

- abstract/abstraction, 6, 155
action, 23, 58, 86, 118, 138, 209, 214
 ambiguity of, 129
 and behaviour, 15, 21
 courses of, 138–40
 and intelligence, 117
 and intention, 17
 and language/linguistic/speaking,
 24, 41, 86, 109, 111, 113, 124,
 138, 147–8
 and rules, 22, 42–4, 117
 as ‘second nature’, 21
 and thought, 21
 see also behaviour; describe; human;
 logical
aesthetic judgement, 169
analysis, 11, 18, 29, 58, 68, 126, 163,
 196, 197, 203
analytic, 69
 vs. empirical, 70–1
 and grammatical propositions, 73
 vs. synthetic, 71
 see also a priori; empirical; synthetic;
 tautology
animal(s), 21, 39, 41, 44–5, 57, 60, 63,
 117, 120, 124, 127, 129, 138–9,
 142, 144, 145–6, 156, 162–3, 167,
 184, 185, 190–1, 220
 see also attitude; behaviour; instinct;
 experience; subjective
a priori, 84, 115, 116
 vs. empirical, 81
 prejudice, 7, 65, 172
 proposition, 10, 72, 81
 speculation, 135
 /synthetic, 71–3
 theorizing, 5
 truths, 79
 see also analytic; empirical; synthetic
arbitrariness, 53
 of concepts, 10, 69, 73, 75, 77–9
 of grammar, 10, 75–6
 see also autonomy
arithmetic, 76, 114
assumption(s), 6–7, 87, 110, 113, 148,
 165–6, 217, 221
attitude
 towards animals, 181
 child’s attitude towards an adult, 91
 towards language, 13, 195
 interpersonal, 91
 moral, 185, 221
 towards philosophy/philosophical,
 2, 95
 towards a soul, 92, 181–7
 see also opinion; subjective
Augustine, Saint, 88, 110–12
automata, 116
autonomy/autonomous, 135, 149, 186
 of grammar, 10, 74–5
 of language, 74
 see also arbitrariness
avowals, 175, 178

Baker, G. P., 74–6, 214, 215, 218
Beardsmore, R. W., xi
bedrock, of language, 53, 70, 81,
 115–16, 175
 see also foundation; ground; justify
behaviour(s)/behavioural, 15–16,
 19–20, 23, 40–1, 58–9, 68, 118,
 120–2, 127, 133–4, 136, 140, 165,
 171, 182, 221
adult’s, 186
animal, 41, 142, 144–6, 167, 184,
 190, 220
concepts as an extension of, 125
non-conceptual, 125
pre-conceptual, 185
external/outward, 154–5, 161,
 178, 186
game-like, 144
as a gesture, 142–3
human, 125, 161, 214
instinctive, 21–2, 24, 111, 117, 123,
 125–7, 134, 144, 151

- behaviour(s)/behavioural – *continued*
 intelligent, 117
 interpersonal, 185
 language/language-game as, 121,
 124, 134, 139, 141
 learned, 21
 linguistic/non-linguistic, 58,
 111, 135, 148, 150, 157, 184,
 191, 219
 pre-linguistic, 121, 126, 134–5,
 141–3, 146–7, 150, 219
 natural, 124, 140–1, 146, 184
 pain-behaviour, 121, 128, 145, 161,
 173, 178–9, 180–1, 183
 primitive, 121, 124–5, 127, 130,
 134–5, 138–45, 148, 150–1,
 185, 219
 as a prototype of a way of thinking,
 141–6
 rule-governed, 40–2, 113
 speech as/speaking as, 23, 113, 139
 vocal/non-vocal, 149
see also animal; describe; determine;
 explanation; human; instinct;
 natural; pain; pattern;
 primitive; sensation; thought
- behaviourism/behaviouristic, 15–16,
 153, 161
- boundary
 between concepts, 190
 view from the, 134, 157, 194–5
see also midst, view from the
- builder(s), Wittgenstein's, 12, 18,
 87–8, 90, 92–3, 85, 99, 223–4
- cause/causality, 3, 73, 82, 104, 120,
 123–4, 126–35, 142, 145, 147, 184
see also determine; experience;
 explanation; psychological
- certainty, 53, 61, 115–17, 123, 124,
 147, 190, 193, 197
see also doubt; subjective
- child(ren), 49, 58, 82, 84, 91, 93, 97,
 99–100, 102, 107, 124, 128,
 139–41, 145, 149–50, 153, 179,
 184–6, 189
- circular/circularity, 10, 28, 40, 46–52,
 55, 57, 59, 63, 66, 73, 83, 90, 160,
 174, 210
- Cockburn, David, 218
- colour, 49, 112–13, 115, 118, 153,
 167, 169–70, 193, 205–6
 colour-blind, 49
- compulsion
 logical/of a rule, 203
 to mangle concepts, 190
 to speak in a particular way, 207
see also logical
- concept-formation, 15–16, 21–6, 72–3,
 109–11, 118, 120, 123, 125–9,
 133, 135, 141–3, 151, 163, 176,
 193, 196, 202–3, 207, 219
- concept possession, 84, 109, 135,
 151, 210
- conceptual confusion, 17–18, 21,
 202, 205
- conscious/consciousness, 24, 122,
 154–5, 167, 181–4, 199, 210, 223–4
- constitute/constitutive of
 concepts, 5–6, 9, 25, 57–8, 63, 65,
 72, 86, 94, 97, 100–1, 103, 109,
 169, 179, 186, 210
 grammar/logic/a rule, 35, 42, 46, 122
 language, 203
 life/form of life, 4, 14, 23, 106, 120
 persons/selves, 10, 13, 136, 211
 psychological phenomena, 59, 60,
 62, 84, 147, 210
 understanding, 70, 82
- constitution
 of a concept, 57, 63, 65, 175
 of facts, 66
 of human form of life, 210–11
 of our selves/souls, 18, 151
 of a person(s), 12, 86, 93
- contingent, 5, 35, 56, 65, 129
- convention(s), 9, 158
- Cornford, F. M., 213
- criterion/criteria, 58, 100, 106–7, 113,
 137, 140, 159–60, 169, 172–80, 182
see also describe; implicit;
 justify; rule
- crying, 121, 145, 178, 185, 195
- Descartes, 12
- describe/description (of), 19, 170
 actions/behaviour, 41, 55, 112, 118,
 130, 186, 214, 219

- describe/description (of) – *continued*
- bird, 175
 - circumstances of doubt/knowledge, 21, 66–7
 - colours, 118
 - concept(s), 38, 48
 - criteria/defining features, 159–60,
 - experience(s)/perception, 60, 72, 162, 167–8
 - vs. explanation, 32
 - facts, 33–4, 57, 59
 - a game/rules of a game, 40–4, 63
 - grammar/language/language-game, linguistic, 9–10, 30–6, 38–9, 43–50, 54–7, 59, 63–4, 66, 71–2, 76, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93–4, 102, 108–10, 112, 114, 116, 120, 132–3, 135, 142, 145, 159–60, 174, 176–7, 210, 218
 - how/what we can learn, 49, 110
 - the ‘inner’, 177
 - intentions, 19
 - logic/necessity, 35, 49, 66
 - meaning, 36, 43
 - mode of description, 74
 - musical harmonies, 206
 - pain/manifestation of pain, 27, 121, 178
 - person, 47
 - the practice of a people, 49
 - primitive behaviour/reaction, 121, 123, 144
 - vs. reason, 35
 - a rule, 40, 47
 - sounds, 170, 205
 - speaking, 108
 - sub-atomic phenomena, 73
 - subjective qualities/state of mind, 114, 170, 185
 - symptoms of a disease, 57, 159, 174
 - how to use ‘tomorrow’, 49
 - see also* explanation
- determine/determination of
- behaviour, 125
 - a cause, 124, 131
 - a concept, 5, 22, 34–5, 38, 47, 54, 56–8, 65–72, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84, 100, 104, 106–8, 118, 127–9, 151, 157, 160–1, 169–73, 175–8,
 - 180, 182–3, 186, 188–91, 204–6, 214
 - facts, 72
 - a game, 144
 - grammar, 161
 - language/language-game(s), 121–2, 124, 146, 179, 182, 202
 - meaning/sense, 6, 23, 51, 75, 93, 112–13, 115–16, 154, 173, 178–9, 183, 217
 - what is a proposition, 107
- discourse, 3, 5–8, 12–13, 20, 29, 36–9, 45, 47, 53–4, 57, 62, 64, 71–2, 80, 84–5, 94, 97, 104–5, 150, 162, 170, 189–90, 194–6
- see also* human
- doubt, 30, 32, 65–7, 77, 97, 121, 123–5, 131, 134, 147, 150, 177, 200, 214–15, 218
- see also* certainty
- egocentric, 158, 161
- Emmett, Kathleen, 56, 214–15
- empirical
- vs. analytic, 70–1
 - non-empirical knowledge, 4
 - non-empirical necessities, 56
 - non-empirical relation to grammar, 56
- fact/description/truths, 9, 31, 49, 55–6, 70, 79
- investigation/hypothesis, 20, 42
- object, 95
- problems, 32
- properties of language, 34
- proposition(s)/sentence(s), 60, 81, 116, 150, 177
- study of linguistics, 33
- see also a priori*; analytic; synthetic
- empiricism/empiricist, xii–xiii, 3, 49, 133, 158, 161, 175, 209
- see also* idealism; rationalism; positivism
- epistemology/epistemological, 158, 161, 164
- essence(s)
- of a colour/experience/object/sensation, xii, 154, 175, 193

- essence(s) – *continued*
- of a concept/grammar/
 - language-game, 33, 115, 117, 192, 217
 - the experience of/perception of, 193–4
 - of Forms, 4
 - of the world, 80
- European, 213
- experience(s), 163, 169, 209, 217
- and animals/bats/creatures/robots, 163–6
 - of a cause, 123, 131, 133
 - compare, 172
 - and concept-formation, 76, 167
 - concepts prior to, 3, 209
 - of depression, 171
 - description of, 114
 - of essence/meaning/words as meaningful, 191–4, 205
 - use of ‘experience’ in philosophy, 219
 - expression of, 154
 - form of/organisation of, 167, 194
 - go together with/accompany language, 133
 - knowledge of what it is like, 164, 167–8
 - mental processes, 209
 - necessary feature of, 72
 - of our selves/the mind, 155–6
 - primitive/primitive expression of, 205, 207
 - and reading, 114
 - reflect on, 169
 - ‘secondary’, 207
 - sense, xiii, 3, 56, 213
 - subject of/subjective/personal, 21, 154, 156–8, 161–2, 164–7, 187, 195
 - subjective character of/quality, 154, 162–4, 167–8, 170–2
 - understanding, 4, 171
 - visual, 60–2
 - see also* perception
- explanation
- behaviourist, 24
 - causal, 61
 - of concepts(s)/language/meaning, 44, 55, 103–4, 106, 111–12, 117, 131, 149, 174
 - vs. description, 32
 - vs. elucidation, 10
 - of an expectation, 171
 - follow an, 99
 - learning by/teaching by, 99, 103
 - mentalist/mentalistic, 110, 113
 - metaphysical, 61
 - in philosophy, 29, 32, 53, 194
 - of a rule, 116
 - scientific, 211
 - theoretical, 80
 - see also* description; theory
- facts of living, 118
- see also* form(s) of life; pattern
- fallow deer, 44–6, 48, 50–2, 57
- form(s) of life, xii–xiii, 6, 16–19, 23, 25, 114, 118–20, 125, 136–7, 140, 151, 161, 164–5, 176, 182–6, 189, 191, 195, 209–10, 218
- see also* facts of living; pattern
- Forms, theory of, xii–xvi, 2–4, 29, 79, 192–3, 209, 211, 213
- foundation(s)/foundational
- of a concept(s), 127, 128
 - concepts, 23
 - of a form of life, 119
 - of language/language-game, 52, 54, 70, 119, 121, 128, 150, 180
 - of philosophy, 200
 - of a way of thinking, 211
 - see also* bedrock; ground; justify
- foundationalism/foundationalist, 125, 127, 135, 150
- anti-foundationalism, 74
 - see also* bedrock; ground; justify
- Gaita, Raimond, 86, 89, 92–3, 114, 149–50, 215–17, 219
- game, 40–4, 55, 63, 95, 98, 101, 114, 144
- see also* language-game; prototype
- Garver, Newton, 218
- Goethe, 218
- grammar, 8–11, 19–20, 30–40, 42, 44–50, 54–7, 60, 62–3, 67, 71–2, 74–6, 79–81, 83, 85–6, 90, 93–102, 104–6, 108, 114, 120, 122, 146, 150, 153, 155, 159, 161,

- grammar – *continued*
 172–3, 178, 183, 188–9, 193–5,
 197–8, 200, 205, 208, 210, 214,
 216, 222
- grammatical
 confusion(s), 95–6, 198–9
 distinction(s), 169
 forms, 45, 74
 insight(s), 126, 162
 investigation(s), 8–9, 31, 61–2, 86,
 111, 151, 210
 joke, 208
 movement, 193
 necessities, 65
 novelties, 44
 observation(s)/point(s)/
 proposition(s)/remark(s)/
 statement(s), xiii, 22, 48, 53, 60,
 62, 72–4, 80–1, 111, 117, 126,
 140, 146, 148, 150
 relation(s), 33
 rule(s), 56
- greeting, 19, 136–7, 139, 149–50
- ground/groundless/ungrounded,
 21–4, 27, 52–3, 110–11, 113,
 116–17, 120–2, 127, 130, 133,
 135, 147–9, 151, 210
see also bedrock; foundation; justify
- Hacker, P. M. S., 11, 74–6, 119, 156,
 168–9, 172–5, 178, 214–15, 220
- Hanna, Patricia, 156, 173, 175, 220
- herd, 198–9
- Hertzberg, Lars, 25, 178, 180–1, 213,
 218, 220
- human
 action/activity, 15, 19, 58, 64, 91,
 110, 117, 134, 137, 194, 214
 agreement, 119
 vs. animal, 21
 behaviour, 20, 118, 125, 161, 214,
 220
 being, 20, 22, 26, 30, 32, 64, 119,
 121, 124, 134, 172, 181
 concepts/discourse, 85, 164–5
 form of life, 6, 16–17, 118, 120, 140,
 184, 209–10
 history/natural history, 64, 208
 hurly-burly, 118
 interaction, 19
 kind, 211
 knowledge/understanding, 9, 211
 life, 14, 16–17, 20, 53, 59, 61–2, 64,
 67, 84, 99, 109, 114, 118–20,
 136–9, 147–8, 175, 203
 person/soul/subject, 4, 17, 185
see also person; primitive; soul
 humanity, 25, 92
 hurly-burly, 29, 118, 194, 214
 hypothesis/hypothetical, 32, 42, 180
see also theory
- idealism, 206
see also empiricism; rationalism;
 positivism
- illusion, 61, 192, 207
- implicit/tacit, 54, 118, 182, 215
 application of criteria, 174–5
 understanding of concepts, 98,
 100–1, 103, 106
- ineffable/ineffability, 56, 169
see also show
- instinct/instinctive, 23, 111–12, 122
 animal responses, 21, 142, 144
 behaviour/ways of acting, 21–2, 24,
 111, 116–17, 121, 123, 125–7,
 134, 144, 151
 and concept-formation, 22, 25, 123
 form of life/patterns of life, 25, 119
 and grammatical confusion, 199
 and the herd, 198–9
 intersubjective relations, 190
 and metaphysics/philosophy, 26,
 195–6, 198–201, 221
 nature of language/language-game,
 21–3, 26, 109–12, 116–17,
 120–2, 126, 132, 142, 144, 151,
 178, 202
 reactions, 23, 130–2, 142, 151, 191,
 200–2
 and ratiocination, 117
 rules/nature of rule-following, 24,
 112, 218
 and superstition, 200
 and thought, 21
 uncertainty, 190–200
 use of language, 23–4, 26, 132
 and vocalisation, 149
see also behaviour; natural;
 primitive; spontaneous; theory

- intention/intentionality, 17, 19–20,
22–3, 58–60, 62, 67, 84, 93, 102,
120, 137–41, 146, 148, 152, 159,
184, 186–7, 210
- intimacy
of our relations to concepts, 106,
196
of our relations to language, 8, 208
of the possession of concept, 26,
211
- introspect/introspection/introspective,
116, 155, 159, 167, 191–2
- intuition, 116, 123, 131–2, 134
- justify/justification
for an assertion/judgement, 53, 173,
180
for applying a criterion, 173
for a concept/grammar/
language/word, 20–1, 23–4, 52,
54, 74–6, 100, 117, 120, 127,
159, 161, 170, 174, 187, 189,
193, 210
for identifying a bird, 175
for recognising an expression of
pain, 180
for a rule, 115–16
subjective, 173
see also bedrock; foundation;
ground
- Kant, Immanuel, 3, 61, 71–2
- know/knowledge, 2–4, 12, 16–17, 21,
26, 69, 82, 93–4, 97–9, 101–3,
109, 115, 124, 130, 143, 150,
163–4, 166–72, 174, 190, 197,
200–1, 204–5, 210–11
- language-game, 12–14, 18–21, 23,
32–3, 40, 57, 57–63, 65–7, 73–4,
76, 83–4, 87–90, 94–5, 98, 102–3,
106–7, 112, 115–24, 126–43,
145–8, 151, 157, 159–61, 164,
169–70, 178–82, 185–7, 189, 191,
195–6, 200, 202–5, 208, 210, 219,
221–2
- Lear, Jonathan, 215
- linguistic(s), 15–16, 18–20, 23–5,
32–3, 35–6, 39–44, 50, 52, 56,
58–9, 61–3, 68, 70, 76, 80–1, 84,
96, 101, 105, 110–12, 114,
116–18, 120–2, 124–5, 130,
132–8, 142–3, 147–8, 150, 153–4,
157–60, 164, 170, 175, 182,
184–5, 187, 191, 195, 202–3, 219
- extra-linguistic, 191
- non-linguistic, 42–3, 59, 124,
134–6, 148, 150, 157, 184–5,
191, 202
- pre-linguistic, 131, 133–5, 137, 139,
140–3, 146–7, 150, 184, 195,
219
see also action; behaviour; describe;
empirical; primitive; rule
- logic, 6, 13, 33, 63, 64, 71–2, 79,
116–17
book, 32
and concepts, 34–5, 38, 46, 66, 68
describability of, 32, 35, 50
formal, 34
and grammar, 32, 34
and language/language-game(s), 32,
66, 96, 104
and meaning, 6, 34–5
and natural history, 64
and necessity/'must', 40, 64–5, 113
and syllogism, 6
see also necessity
- logical
circle, 130
compulsion/'must'/necessity, 13,
64, 69, 79, 203
constitution/structure of concept,
63, 67
constraints on concepts, 38
extension of use of word, 205
force of language-game, 64
vs. factual, 67
limit to concepts, 80
link language and action, 113
nature of philosophy/conceptual
inquiry, 6, 8, 30, 64, 79, 84
propositions, 71
possibility of a concept, 62
relations between concepts, 6, 8, 11,
14–16, 19–20, 24, 36, 38, 58,
111
significance/status of facts, 5–6, 9,
63–6, 68, 72, 213
space, 46, 75, 204

logical – *continued*

structure of language-game, 131
 structure of the world, 79–80
 thought/character of thinking, 15, 66
 traps, 81
see also necessity

Malcolm, Norman, 92, 141, 145,
 168–9, 172, 216, 219, 220

meaning, 6, 11, 17, 23, 33–7, 39–40,
 43–4, 47–8, 50, 54–5, 69, 73, 89,
 93, 95, 97–8, 100–4, 110–12, 132,
 135, 142, 150, 154, 156, 158, 168,
 173, 177–8, 191–4, 205, 216–17

meaningful/meaningless, 23, 103–4,
 130, 192, 205

mental, 11, 15–16, 21, 57, 95, 112,
 114–15, 154–7, 161, 173, 176–7,
 180, 184, 186, 193, 208–9, 214,
 217

see also mind; psychological;
 psychology

mentalism/mentalist, 15–16, 21, 109–13,
 115–17, 122–3, 135, 151, 217–18

metaphor/metaphorical, 100, 170

metaphysics/metaphysical, 25–7,
 29–30, 53, 61, 80, 154, 198,
 200–3, 206, 208, 211, 221–2

see also philosophy; superstition

method(s)

and language use, 9, 12, 82, 88,
 115, 117

philosophic/philosophical, 8, 28–30,
 47, 49, 126, 197, 210, 222

of science, 95

midst

of concepts, 211

of life, 4, 23, 134

of ourselves, 211

philosophy from the, 195

understanding from the, 195

view from the, 157, 194–5

see also boundary

mind(s), 4, 24, 26, 36–7, 112, 115,

154–7, 190, 194, 196–7, 201, 213

philosophy of, 156

state of, 113–14, 171, 173

see also self; soul

moral, *see* attitude

Mounce, H. O., xi, 156, 200–1, 220–1

Mulhall, Stephen, 218

myth/mythology, 131, 148, 199–200,
 208, 221

see also superstition

Nagel, Thomas, 156, 161–6, 168–9,
 220

name/naming, 44–5, 110, 112, 121,
 158, 192–3, 207

natural

behaviour, 121, 124, 134, 140–1,
 143, 146, 184–5

expression(s), 7, 62, 128, 138,
 145–6, 186

history, 30, 63–4, 131

home/setting for concepts, 7, 90

intentionality, 138, 186

instinct, 144

perception, 165

phenomena, 63, 221

science, 63

uncertainty, 190, 197

use of language, 9

naturalism, 185

necessity, 3, 6, 13, 26, 29, 35, 38, 40,
 55–6, 63–9, 71–3, 79, 113, 116

see also logic; logical

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 213

nonsense, 34, 39, 50, 89–90, 98, 139,
 153

philosophical, 168, 203

object(s), 11, 22, 45–7, 55, 76–7, 82,
 95, 110, 112, 125, 128, 147, 151,
 153, 169, 183–4, 192–4, 209, 218

objective/objectivity

of concepts/language, 38–40, 47,
 52–3, 156–61, 173, 189

fact, 35

mode, 162, 167

phenomenology, 162–3, 165

of philosophy, 187–9

physicalist theory, 162

transcendental, 189

opinion

agreement in, 119

vs. attitude, 92, 163, 181–2

see also attitude

- ostensive definition, *see* private ostensive definition; *see also* private language argument
- pain, 27, 61, 121–2, 124, 127–9, 133–4, 145, 148, 153, 157, 161, 168–9, 173, 175, 178–86, 189–90, 195, 204, 206, 218
- pain-behaviour, 121, 128, 145, 161, 173, 178
- Parmenides, 213
- pattern
 - of acting/behaviour/interaction, 16, 41, 136, 183, 191
 - of language-game, 41
 - of life, 119, 218
 - see also* form of life; facts of living
- perception, 22, 26, 53, 61, 78, 108, 133, 153, 157–8, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 180, 192, 206, 209
- of meaning, 193–4
- sense, 111, 219
- see also* describe; essence; experience; natural; theory; visual
- person, xiii, 4, 6, 10, 12–13, 15–17, 21–2, 24, 41–2, 44–7, 58, 68, 82, 85–7, 91–3, 96, 106, 108, 116, 136, 139, 142, 159, 163, 166, 168, 170, 172–3, 176–84, 186–7, 189–91, 195, 201, 207, 209–10, 215
- first, 58–9, 84, 121, 175–6, 178, 180
- third, 58, 121, 176, 178–80, 182
- see also* self; soul; subject
- phenomenology, 162–3, 165
- see also* objective
- Phillips, D. Z., 66, 215
- philosophical
 - confusion/perplexity, 29, 36, 65, 95, 98, 190, 196–200, 202, 204, 208
 - problem, 2, 5, 7, 9, 17, 26, 30, 32, 51, 64–5, 67, 94–6, 104–5, 155, 188, 190, 196, 201
 - reflection, 2–4, 6–7, 11, 27–9, 38, 51, 54, 80, 105–6, 152, 177, 189, 194–6, 198, 210–11
 - see also* metaphysics
- Plato, xii–xiv, 213–14
- positivism, 3, 49, 70, 172
- see also* empiricism; rationalism
- practice(s), 5, 12, 20, 32, 35, 49, 57–8, 62–3, 65, 68–72, 74, 76–8, 81, 115–17, 122, 160–1, 164, 166–7, 172, 175–6, 194, 203, 210, 217
- see also* training
- pragmatic, 194, 208
- pragmatism, 165
- primeval chaos, 199, 221
- primitive
 - behaviour, 121, 124–5, 127, 130, 134–5, 138–45, 148, 150–1, 167, 184–5, 219
 - being, 117
 - conception/to a concept, 169, 181, 184
 - experience, 205
 - expression(s), 140, 146, 148, 180, 207
 - feature of form of life/human life, 138, 147, 184
 - form of greeting, 139
 - form of intention/intentionality, 138–9, 146
 - investigation, 125
 - judgement, 167
 - (to a) language/language-game(s), 23, 99, 120, 122, 124, 143, 170, 180–1, 185–6, 195
 - (non-) linguistic
 - behaviour/expression/reaction, 25, 111, 120, 125, 130, 135, 142–3, 150, 170, 157, 180, 203, 219
 - logically, 184
 - means of communication, 117
 - people, 201
 - philosophical reactions, 203
 - preoccupation, 146
 - how 'primitive' is used, 121, 134
 - reaction(s)/responses, 26, 118, 121, 122–4, 126–30, 134, 141–2, 144–5, 148, 151, 176, 178–81, 183, 201, 218
 - recognition of sympathy, 180
 - root of doubt, 125
 - rule-following, 42

- primitive – *continued*
 sense, 139
 sign/system of signs, 39, 43
 state of a creature, 117
 subjective impressions, 206
 use of language/a word, 170
see also instinct
- private
 insight, 24
 mental object, 209
 world, 15
- private language argument, 24, 154,
 156, 158–9, 161–3, 171, 205, 217
- private ostensive definition, 15, 24,
 26, 112, 157–8, 161–2, 168–9,
 180, 192–3, 195, 205
- proposition(s), 100, 107
 that are allowed, 188
 analytic, 71, 73
a priori/synthetic, 10, 71–3
 describe the uses of, 33
 empirical, 71, 81, 60, 116, 150
 excluded from doubt, 32
 and the expression of belief, 100
 factual/falsifiable, 60, 69, 72, 79
 grammatical/logical, 60, 64, 66,
 71–3, 81
 of human history/natural
 history, 63–4
 as an item of experience, 194
 the logic of, 34
 of philosophy, 71
 pragmatic context of, 194
 and private ostensive definition, 168
 how ‘proposition’ is used, 108
 of science, 32, 63
 senseless, 78
 striking us as immediately true, 116
 can be true or false, 106–7
 how a word occurs in a, 33
- propositional sign, 107
- prototype
 articulation of a concept, 145
 game, 144
 language/language-game, 124,
 131–2, 134, 142–3
 speaking/verbal expression, 146
 way of thinking, 121, 131, 134,
 141–3, 145, 147
- psychology, 150, 202
- psychological
 cause, 207
 concept(s), 15–16, 25, 57–8, 62, 84,
 92, 102, 111, 152–3, 156–7,
 161, 164, 172–3, 176–8, 181–2,
 185–90, 192–3, 195, 214
 phenomenon, 59
 utterance, 177
see also mental; subjective
- psychology
 child, 150
 quirk of, 202
- puzzlement, 11, 68, 105, 109, 155–6,
 188, 197, 201
see also philosophical
- rationalism/rationalistic, xii–xiii,
 15–16, 17, 21, 109, 112–13, 117,
 122, 151, 209
see also empiricism; positivism
- reading, 102, 114
- reality
 application of a picture to, 208
 and concepts/grammar/language/
 thought, 20, 75, 77, 84, 87, 103,
 133–4, 194
 of discourse/language, 6, 12–13,
 50, 105
 of experience/mental
 states/subjective qualities,
 154–6, 162–3, 193
 of Forms, 3, 192
 grip on, 82
 historical, 123, 131
 idea of, xiii, 105
 of our lives/the mind/the subject,
 155, 167, 197
 nature of, 13, 72, 75, 82, 84, 196, 214
 and philosophy, 190, 193
 theories of, 194
- reason, 2, 15–16, 18, 21, 26, 35, 38–9,
 55, 72, 117, 119, 201
- reduction/reductionism/reductionist,
 10, 154, 162
- relativistic, 53
- Rhees, Rush, 4–5, 8–9, 11–18, 25, 55,
 85–9, 91–8, 101–5, 108, 126,
 141–3, 145–6, 213–16, 218–19

- Rudder-Baker, Lynne, 215
- rule(s), 41, 43, 101
 accord with, 22, 41–2, 114
 application of, 42, 44, 94, 113,
 116, 215
 and bedrock, 115
 of chess/game, 40–1, 43, 63, 95, 114
 and concept-formation, 77–8
 construction of/formation of, 40, 72
 and criteria, 174
 and definition, 103
 describe a/description, 39–40, 42–7,
 55, 116, 203
 draw consequences of, 115
 entanglement in, 105, 202
 of evidence, 177
 and examples, 117
 expression(s), 115–16,
 follow/following/obey, 13, 24, 40–2,
 100–1, 115–17, 122, 151, 158–9,
 189, 218
 formation rule, 40, 113
 governed, 22, 40–4, 55, 94, 109,
 111–13, 117, 151, 170, 187–8
 and grammar/grammatical, 42, 56
 grasp of, 40
 and instinct, 112
 interpretation of, 43
 and language, 94, 96
 learning, 116
 linguistic, 24, 32, 39, 43, 52, 56, 70,
 114, 117, 158–9, 203
 and loop-holes, 117
 mathematics as a collection of, 64
 for naming, 158
 nature of, 40, 113
 for numerical series, 113
 objectivity of, 40, 159
 and practice(s), 115, 117
 for projection into new context,
 170
 and psychological concepts, 161
 and sentence formation, 107
 and subjective judgement, 217
 system of, 40, 43
 understand/understanding, 24, 94,
 114–15
 for a word/signs, 39, 44, 108, 158
- Russell, Bertrand, 123
- samples, 77–8, 215
- sceptic/sceptical/scepticism, 6–8, 12,
 35, 50, 52, 65–7, 85, 96, 105, 108,
 155, 201, 214
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 213
- Schubert, Franz, 192, 207
- science/scientific, 29, 32, 34, 63, 73–4,
 81, 95
- secondary, use of language/words, 27,
 170, 185, 187–8, 192, 203–8, 222
- self/selves, 10, 27, 29, 86–7, 106, 116,
 136, 151, 155–6, 210
 knowledge, xiii, 211
 reference, 69
see also person; soul; subject
- sensation(s), 24, 26, 121, 135, 153,
 157–8, 163, 168, 171, 175, 193,
 206, 214
 concept, 160
 behaviour, 121
 expression of, 122, 145
 of privacy, 205
- sense-data, 193
- sense experience, *see* experience
- sense perception, *see* perception
- show/showing (contrasted with
 saying), 10, 50–1, 54, 195, 210
- signal(s), 41, 87–90, 92–3, 99, 114, 182
- Socrates, xiv
- sophists/sophistry, 3–4, 13
- soul(s), xiii, 3–5, 18, 25, 92, 155,
 181–4, 186–7, 208, 211, 213
see also person; self; subject
- space, 3, 48, 78
 aural, 185
 visual, 182, 185
see also logical space; visual
- speaking, 11–16, 18, 21, 23, 85–9, 92–4,
 96–8, 104–5, 107–9, 113–14, 119,
 126, 135, 138–9, 143, 149, 151,
 161, 186, 193, 195, 206, 210, 215
- speech, 12, 15–16, 18, 23–4, 33–4, 54,
 56, 69, 89, 92–4, 98, 103–4, 106–7,
 109, 117, 123, 139, 149, 194
- spontaneous/spontaneity, 9, 21, 23–4,
 74, 81, 91, 99, 111, 117, 120–2,
 127, 133, 144, 149, 185, 196–7,
 204–5, 219
see also instinct

state

- of affairs, 16, 65, 78–9, 118, 194
- brain, 154
- introspective, 191
- mental/of mind, 113–14, 154, 171, 173, 176–7, 193
- of a person, 166, 183
- physical, 154, 162
- subjective, 111, 131, 154–6, 159, 161, 163, 170, 172, 178, 185–7, 195

Stern, David, 220

- subject(s), 9, 91, 116, 153, 156–8, 161–2, 166–7, 184–6, 189–90, 195, 210, 219

see also person; self; soul

subjective

- analogue to grammar, 155
- in animals/lives of creatures, 156, 164
- attitude/dispositions, 185, 195
- certainty, 115–16
- character/quality, 153–6, 162–3, 166–7, 169–72, 184
- circumstances of language, 158
- component of
 - concept/language/language-game, 153, 161, 178, 188, 195
- concept(s), 153, 155, 162–4, 167–8, 204
- correlate of outward life, 116
- dimension of our life/form of life, 161
- epistemology, 161
- experience/feeling/impressions, 21, 154, 156–7, 161–2, 164–7, 187, 193, 195, 206
- general nature of, 156
- intersubjective/intersubjectivity, 172, 181–2, 184–6, 189–90, 195
- judgement(s), 51–4, 157–8, 175, 189, 217
- justification, 173
- knowledge, 167
- mode, 110, 162–3, 182, 186–7, 189–90
- phenomena/phenomenon, 51, 157, 193
- reaction(s)/response(s), 153, 160–1, 169, 172, 181, 195

realm, 155

relations to

- colours/experience/language, 26, 153, 157
- source of confusion, 191
- state(s), 111, 131, 154–6, 159, 161, 163, 170, 172, 178, 185–7, 195
- use(s) of language/a word
- subjectivity, 25, 51–3, 152–3, 155–7, 161–4, 170, 189, 195
- superstition/superstitious, 27, 48, 200–2, 208
- see also* metaphysics
- sympathy, 121, 124, 180, 182–3
- synthetic, 71–3, 79, 84
- see also a priori*; analytic; empirical

tautology/tautological, 69, 71

see also analytic

technique/technical, 12, 14–15, 22, 25, 55, 82, 85–8, 95–9, 105, 108, 117, 158, 161, 186–7

see also practice; train

theory(ies)/theoretical/theorize

a priori, 5

of concept(s)/concept-formation, 3, 19, 109, 125–7, 129, 133, 138, 141–3, 146, 148, 177, 209, 219

vs. fact, 5

and form of life, 17

of Forms, xii–xiv, 3, 213

of instinctive reactions, 23

of knowledge, xiii

of language, 15, 18, 23, 56, 61–2, 146, 132

mentalist, 15, 21

metaphysical, 25, 80

of mind, 194

of perception, 206

and philosophy, xii, 17–18, 210–11

physicalist, 162

rationalist, 15, 21, 109

see also explanation; Forms

theorists, 209

thinking, 32, 54–5, 63, 66, 69, 82, 84, 196, 201

language and, 91

prototype of a way of, 121, 131, 134, 141–3, 145, 147

and speaking, 105

- thinking – *continued*
 subject/things, 91, 135
 way(s) of, 52, 84, 146, 211, 221
- thought(s), 209
 behaviour not the result of, 21, 141
 and feeling, 171
 form of life not the product of, 119
 language not the result
 of/anticipated in, 21, 52, 121–2,
 134, 147
 logical, 15
 metaphysical urges not the product
 of, 26
 origin of, 2
 relation to reality, 134
 superstitious, 208
 thoughtless, 21
 and uncertainty, 190, 221
- time, 3, 25, 36–7, 46, 48, 52, 58, 95,
 98, 101–4, 109, 157
- train/training, 8, 86, 99, 101, 110
see also practice
- transcendent/transcendental/
 transcendentalist, xiv, 4, 20, 39, 53,
 61–3, 75–6, 80, 84, 150, 157, 189,
 195, 215
- truth, 4, 36–7, 69, 105, 107–8, 196, 204
- visual
 experience/perception, 53, 60–2
 image, 78
 judgements, 168
 ‘room’, 193–4, 206–7
 signs, 182
 space, 182, 185
- ways of living, 118–19, 150, 218
see also form of life; pattern of life
- Walker, Margaret Urban, 216
- Waterfield, R. A. K., 213
- Whitaker, A. K., 213
- Whitehead, A. N., 213
- Williams, Bernard, 215
- Winch, Peter, 145, 214, 220
- Wolgast, Elizabeth, 61, 126–34, 137–8,
 141, 146–51, 215, 218–19
- works by Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books, 216
- The Big Typescript*, 32, 63, 78, 198,
 199, 214, 221
- Cause and Effect: Intuitive
 Awareness*, 117, 119, 120,
 123–4, 131–3, 147, 215, 217,
 218, 219
- Culture and Value*, 125, 200, 215,
 216, 221
- Last Writings on the Philosophy of
 Psychology, Volume I*, 122, 124,
 207, 218, 221
- Last Writings on the Philosophy of
 Psychology, Volume II*, 177
- Notes for Lectures*, 154, 155
- On Certainty*, 32, 116–17, 148,
 214, 215
- Philosophical Investigations*, 30,
 32, 34, 60, 61, 74, 107, 112,
 115, 118–19, 121, 125, 135,
 138, 170, 173, 183, 193, 206,
 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220,
 221, 222
- Remarks on Fraser’s Golden
 Bough*, 200
- Remarks on the Foundations of
 Mathematics*, 64, 101, 119,
 121, 215
- Remarks on Colour*, 49–50, 214
- Remarks on the Philosophy of
 Psychology, Volume I*, 30, 118,
 122, 124, 218
- Remarks on the Philosophy of
 Psychology, Volume II*, 118, 121,
 125, 190
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 50,
 213, 214, 215
- Zettel*, 30, 32, 66, 75, 117, 118, 121,
 124, 134, 150, 200, 214, 218,
 219, 220, 221, 223, 224
- world, xii–xiii, 2–5, 10–11, 13,
 15, 17, 27, 30–1, 64, 69–85,
 88, 91, 93, 97, 106–7, 110,
 120, 133–4, 139, 164, 166–7,
 187, 194, 197–8, 202–3, 207,
 209, 211
see also essence; logical; private
 worldly, 30, 65–6, 68–9, 71, 77, 79
 other-worldly, 4