

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Crispin Sartwell, "Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief," *The Journal of Philosophy* 89, no. 4 (1992): 167–80.
2. Crispin Sartwell, "Knowledge is Merely True Belief," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (1991): 157–65, see 159.
3. *Ibid.*, 160.
4. *Ibid.*, 159.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, 162.
7. The formulation here about justification emphasizes a view called *externalism*, which we will discuss shortly. And we will see what externalism is in terms of its opponent, internalism. There are other dimensions of justification, such as the coherentism-foundationalism distinction. This book focuses mostly on the internalism/externalism debate, though later there will be some treatment of coherentism and foundationalism.
8. Plato, "Meno," in *Platonis Opera*, ed. John Burnet, *Perseus Digital Library Project, Tufts University*, ed. Gregory Crane, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903).
9. Stephen Hetherington, "Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (2007): 41–69.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, 46.
12. The examples given here come primarily from the tradition that emphasizes the problem Gettier presents in the context of what we will call causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge. It is good to remember that Gettier's original formulation of the problem doesn't come out of this context.
13. This is a modification of Alvin Goldman's original use of this example in Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976): 771–91.
14. This is a modification of Bertrand Russell's original use of the stopped clock example: Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (New York: Allen and Unwin, 1948).
15. This example is based on Keith Lehrer's original Nogot example. Keith Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1990).

16. Fallibilism also plays a central role in Stephen Hetherington's treatment of the Gettier problem: Stephen Hetherington, "Knowing Fallibly," *Journal of Philosophy* 96, no. 11 (1999): 565–87; Stephen Hetherington, "A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 26 (2001): 307–24; Stephen Hetherington, "Fallibilism and Knowing that One is not Dreaming," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 32 (2002): 83–102; Stephen Hetherington, "Fallibilism," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2005), <http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallibil>.
17. Linda Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems," *Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (1994): 65–73, see 66.
18. For a very good overview of responses and solutions to the Gettier phenomenon, see Robert K. Shope, ed. *The Analysis of Knowledge: A Decade of Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). For an excellent collection of seminal essays on the Gettier problem, see George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, eds., *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978). Another solution to the Gettier problem says we should just be content with justified true belief, since there is so much difficulty with knowledge: Jonathan Kvanvig, "Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: *Meno* Problems and Epistemological Axiology," in *Epistemology*, ed. Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim (Blackwell, 2008), 492–506.
19. Gilbert Harman and John Dreher are early advocates of the no-false-ground strategy: Gilbert Harman, *Thought* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973); John Dreher, "Evidence and Justified Belief," *Philosophical Studies* 25 (1974): 453–39.
20. Richard Feldman, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003).
21. This appears to be the position of William Lycan: William Lycan, "On the Gettier Problem Problem," in *Epistemology Futures*, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford, 2006), 148–68.
22. Ram Neta has an example like Coffeehouse Terrorist Country, and he thinks the person knows in it: Ram Neta and Guy Rohrbaugh, "Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 85 (2004): 396–406, see 400. See also Juan Comesaña, "Unsafe Knowledge," *Synthese* 146 (2005): 395–404.
23. John Greco, "Knowledge and Success from Ability," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 142, no. 1 (2009): 17–26.
24. *Ibid.*, 19.
25. This is a modification of the Archie example given by Pritchard and Greco in the following works where they are critical of each others' thoughts: Duncan Pritchard, "The Value of Knowledge," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/knowledge-value>; Greco, "Knowledge and Success from Ability," 17–26. Pritchard also presents his case against Greco using the force field example in: Duncan Pritchard, "Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements," *Philosophical Quarterly* 58 (2008): 437–47; Duncan Pritchard, "Achievements, Luck, and Value," *Think* 25, no. 5 (2010): 19–30.

26. Duncan Pritchard, "Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited," *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 1 (2008): 66–88. Pritchard follows Mylan Engal in using the phrase "veritic luck."
27. Also, Greco's virtue-based view of knowledge doesn't, in Pritchard's view, account for situations where one has knowledge as due to no achievement of one's own, like when the person shows up in Chicago and asks where the Sears Tower is. (Pritchard acknowledges this example originally comes from Jennifer Lackey in Pritchard, "The Value of Knowledge.") The person asked is very knowledgeable. Through testimony the person has knowledge where the Sears Tower is. As Pritchard says, "There seem to be cases of knowledge which clearly are not (by anyone's lights) cognitive achievements, and also cases of cognitive achievements which clearly are not (by anyone's lights) cases of knowledge" (Pritchard, "The Value of Knowledge").
28. Pritchard, "Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited," 77–78, where Pritchard makes this point for Greco's specific virtue epistemology.
29. Pritchard, "Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements," 437–47. See also Duncan Pritchard, "Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34 (2009): 33–45, where he talks about instrumental luck.
30. Ernest Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," *Philosophical Perspectives* 13 (1999): 141–53.
31. Greco, "Knowledge and Success from Ability," 26.
32. Ibid.
33. Baron Reed essentially says the same thing in Baron Reed, "A New Argument for Skepticism," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 142, no. 1 (2009): 91–104. He says the Gettier problem can be expanded into a new argument for skepticism which even externalists can't decisively counter. Gettier, consequently, tells us that any beliefs people have are fallible.
34. Hetherington talks about the boundary between Gettier and non-Gettier situations: Stephen Hetherington, "Gettier Problems," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2005), <http://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier>: "If we do not know what, exactly, makes a situation a Gettier case and what changes to it would suffice for its no longer being a Gettier case, then we do not know how, exactly, to describe the *boundary* between Gettier cases and other situations." The boundary we are talking about is between far off and nearby possible worlds. This boundary is often vague because many people have different assessments of where it is. In fact, we will see that many of the problems of disagreement come from the vagueness of the boundary.
35. Duncan Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), see 247. The epistemic anxiety Pritchard talks about is based on the realization that one can never have adequate reflective grounds in response to skepticism. Pritchard views epistemic anxiety as due to internalist (which will be discussed in greater detail later) limitations.
36. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
37. Some early defeasibility approaches are: Peter Klein, "A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no. 16 (1971): 471–82; Risto Hilpinen, "Knowledge and Justification," *Ajatus: Yearbook of the Philosophical*

- Society of Finland* 33 (1971): 7–39; Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, “Knowledge: Undeclared Justified True Belief,” *Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969): 225–37. One of the best overviews of defeasibility approaches is Shope, ed. *The Analysis of Knowledge: A Decade of Research*. Marshall presents an interesting defeasibility account in combination with a causal account: Marshall Swain, “Knowledge, Causality, and Justification,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 69, no. 11 (1972): 291–300. Robert Meyers’s book has a good overview of the defeasibility approach: Robert G Meyers, *The Likelihood of Knowledge* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988). In this book he argues for fallibilism without skepticism.
38. Richard Feldman describes a serious problem for defeasibility theories regarding misleading defeaters: Feldman, *Epistemology*, see 34–36.
 39. Murat Baç, “Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to Be Learned from Suspicious Externalism,” *Organon F: Filozoficky casopis* 16 (2009): 127–45. Murat Baç comes to a very similar position about the fallibility of the knowing process when responding to the work of John Pollock, whom he describes as having an externalist defeasibility response to Gettier: Pollock, he says, attempts to take justification out of the equation, and to hard wire knowledge and justification to the way the world is. This can’t be done, since human attempts to know are essentially fallible. The problem is that truth doesn’t end up “loudly announcing that it is in fact truth.” What I take Baç to be saying is that justification announces, as best it can, that a belief is true, and something can always go wrong with the announcement. Truth and justification can always come apart, for the fallibilist. Luciano Floridi and Linda Zagzebski say the latter as well: Luciano Floridi, “On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem,” *Synthese* 142 (2004): 61–79. Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems,” 65–73.
 40. Alvin Goldman was one of the earliest people to describe the causal approach to Gettier in Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 64, no. 12 (1967): 357–72.
 41. Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Pritchard thinks the Gettier problem is primarily due to reliance on internalist strategies for justification: Duncan Pritchard, *Knowledge* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), see 17.

Chapter 2

1. There is much more to say about possible worlds. In fact, entire fields of study within philosophy of language and logic are devoted to discussing what statements with *could* mean, and whether the concept of *possible worlds* best helps understand them. These fields are called possible worlds semantics, modal logic, and epistemic logic. More will be said about possible worlds. In fact, this book argues that we can better understand how justification works by talking about possible worlds. For a revealing description of how possible worlds analysis is used to talk about luck, see Duncan Pritchard, “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited,” *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 1 (2008): 66–88.
2. Duncan Pritchard, “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism*, ed. John Greco (Oxford: Oxford, 2008), 437–55.

3. To see descriptions of the alternatives, see Duncan Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Jennifer Lackey, "What Luck is Not," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (2008): 255–62.
4. Ernest Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," *Philosophical Perspectives* 13 (1999): 141–53; Pritchard, "Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology."
5. See Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and see Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," *The Philosophical Review* 104 (1995): 1–52.
6. DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," 1–52.
7. Stephen Hetherington, "Actually Knowing," *Philosophical Quarterly* 48, no. 193 (1998): 453–69, see especially 465. The following quote from Lars Gundersen's book represents the view Hetherington attacks: "In order to know, one has to get things right in a manner that secures truth, not merely in the actual situation, but also in a range of hypothetical situations." Lars-Bo Gundersen, *Dispositional Theories of Knowledge: A Defence of Aetiological Foundationalism* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003), 2.
8. Hetherington, "Actually Knowing," see 456. He says, "One knows that *p* even when one might not have done so—indeed, even when one might easily not have done so. For short: one knows *luckily* that *p*. Equivalently: one knows that *p* even while *almost* not doing so" (463).
9. *Ibid.*, see especially 465.
10. Stephen Hetherington, "Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (2007): 41–69, see page 50.
11. I have adapted these examples from: Brent Madison, "Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 89, no. 1 (2011): 47–58.
12. Henry Kyburg, *Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).
13. John Greco does a good job of pointing out how the lottery problem is a challenge for any epistemology that takes induction as a source of knowledge: John Greco, "Worries about Pritchard's Safety," *Synthese* 158 (2007): 299–302.
14. There is some precedent in the literature for solving the lottery problem by talking about farther out luck: Jonathan Vogel, "Speaking of Knowledge," *Nous* 14 (2004): 501–9. Though Vogel doesn't talk about possible worlds, he believes the lottery problem can be solved by recognizing that, in the lottery cases under issue, the reference class for setting the probability of a win shifts.
15. For a good argument that probabilities influence how far out possible worlds are, see Robert Williams, "Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 77, no. 2 (2008): 385–420.
16. I have modified this case of the quantum lottery from the following two works: John Hawthorne, *Knowledge and Lotteries* (Oxford University Press, 2005); Greco, "Worries about Pritchard's Safety," 299–302. John Hawthorne's book is an excellent description of how to solve the lottery problem from a perspective that is essentially invariant about knowledge; what "know" means doesn't change throughout different contexts.
17. Duncan Pritchard, "Epistemic Luck," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 29 (2004): 191–220, especially 187 and 197.

18. Duncan Pritchard, "Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34 (2009): 33–45, see 36.
19. Pritchard, "Epistemic Luck," 197. See also Pritchard, "Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?," 37.
20. If we take all the possible outcomes for a truly random process as all on the same level, it would seem all outcomes are equally near. For an explanation of this, see Martin Smith, "What Else Justification Could Be," *Nous* 44, no. 1 (2010): 10–31, especially 20.
21. The following are excellent resources for describing how probability influences the ordering of possible worlds: Lars Gundersen, "Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 85, no. 1 (2004): 1–20; Williams, "Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity," 385–420. For example, Williams says, on page 407, "the hope will be that worlds where dropping a plate leads to it shooting off sideways will count as *atypical* by the lights of the chancy laws; and hence further away from actuality than worlds where such improbable coincidences do not arise."
22. Robert Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," in *Studies in Logical Theory*, ed. Nicholas Rescher, 98–112 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968); David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973).
23. Robert Williams has a good explanation of the similarity criteria, given by Lewis and Stalnaker, for closeness: Williams, "Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity," 385–420.
24. See Jeffrey Rosenthal, *Struck by Lightning: The Curious World of Probabilities* (London: HarperCollins, 2005). Martin Smith points out, convincingly, how often we can't know things that are highly probable: Smith, "What Else Justification Could Be," 10–31. Juan Comesaña describes a method of making sense of what seem at first probabilities that don't conform to intuitions about knowledge. Once we take into account different ways of computing probability, such as in conditional probability analysis, intuitions of knowledge can be shown compatible with probability analysis: Juan Comesaña, "What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 90 (2009): 1–20.
25. Duncan Pritchard points this out in Pritchard, "Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?," 33–45. Keith DeRose also talks about this: Keith DeRose, "Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1996): 568–79. For more resources that point out disconnects between probabilities and nearness, see Jonathan Adler, "Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) As a Good Truth-Ratio," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2005): 445–58.
26. Smith, "What Else Justification Could Be," 10–31.
27. Considerations of the discrepancies in nearness assessment based on similar probabilities leads Christoph Kelp to conclude invariantist solutions are not viable. Christoph Kelp, "Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 46 (2008): 221–44; Christoph Kelp, "Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety, and Cognitive Achievements," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34 (2009): 51–53; Christoph Kelp, "Knowledge and Safety," *Journal of Philosophical Research* (2009): 21–31. See also, DeRose, "Knowledge, Assertion and

- Lotteries,” 568–79. We will talk much more about contextualism as an option for thinking about knowledge and disagreement.
28. For example Mark McEvoy and Duncan Pritchard disagree on how likely it is that a newspaper will misprint the results of a lottery. McEvoy asserts newspapers make misprints quite often, or at least more often than Pritchard thinks, and he believes this means these error possibilities are quite near as a result. Mark McEvoy, “Safety, the Lottery Puzzle, and Misprinted Lottery Results,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34 (2009): 47–49; Mark McEvoy, “The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 34 (2009): 7–20; Pritchard, “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?,” 33–45.
 29. For good discussions of the different senses of tethering in Plato’s thought, see Mark Kaplan, “It’s Not What You Know that Counts,” *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985): 350–63, and Robert K. Shope, ed. *The Analysis of Knowledge: A Decade of Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
 30. Jack Crumley describes this situation well in Jack S. Crumley, *An Introduction to Epistemology*, 2nd ed. (Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press, 2009), 54, where he says, “Our ability to tie down a true belief is merely our ability to give an *account*, or an explanation of why we think that our belief is the right or correct belief.” Duncan Pritchard does a good job of describing the value of justification over just a true belief in Duncan Pritchard, “The Value of Knowledge,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2008), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/knowledge-value>: “For example, if one knows the way to Larissa, rather than merely truly believes that such-and-such is the correct way to go, then one is less likely to be perturbed by the fact that the road, initially at least, seems to be going in the wrong direction. Mere true belief at this point may be lost, since one might lose all confidence that this is the right way to go. In contrast, if one knows that this is the right way to go, then one will be more sanguine in the light of this development, and thus will in all likelihood press on regardless (and thereby have one’s confidence rewarded by getting where one needs to go).”
 31. I borrow the phrase “reflective luck” from Duncan Pritchard. He defines reflective luck as follows: “Given only what the agent is able to know by reflection alone, it is a matter of luck that her belief is true.” Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck*, 175.

Chapter 3

1. Michael Thune talks about how the parity principle is central to the understanding of peer disagreements: Michael Thune, “Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” *Philosophy Compass* 5, no. 8 (2010): 712–24. Though in the following he is talking specifically about religious disagreements, I think he would say the parity principle applies to ordinary disagreements as well: “Throughout this literature, it is generally assumed that one’s awareness of the fact that there are sincere, morally and epistemically virtuous, intelligent, and thoughtful people who hold religious beliefs incompatible with one’s own threatens to undermine or defeat any justification that one’s particular religious beliefs may otherwise hold. This threat stems from the intuition that one rationality ought to treat like cases alike. That is, the existence of apparent epistemic symmetry between the religious

- beliefs of practitioners from a variety of different traditions is thought to result in a situation where it would be epistemically arbitrary to affirm any one 'exclusive' belief (or set of beliefs) over another" (712).
2. Some prominent skeptics include Barry Stroud and Peter Unger. Unger says we can't have knowledge about any of our cherished beliefs because we can't rule out all the alternative things that could be happening: Peter Unger, "An Argument for Skepticism," in *Epistemology: An Anthology*, ed. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 42–52, see especially 52. Barry Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Barry Stroud, "Scepticism, 'Externalism,' and the Goal of Epistemology," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 68 (1994): 290–307.
 3. Duncan Pritchard, "Neo-Mooreanism Versus Contextualism," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 69 (2005): 1–24; Duncan Pritchard, "Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism," *Acta Analytica* 20 (2005): 3–25.
 4. G. E. Moore, "Proof of an Eternal World," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 25 (1939): 273–300.
 5. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Fred Dretske, "Epistemic Operators," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970): 1007–23; Fred Dretske, "Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment?," in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 13–26. Fred Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (Cambridge, MA: CSLI Publications, 1999).
 6. Dretske, "Epistemic Operators," 1007–23.
 7. Gail Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure," *Philosophical Studies* 29 (1976): 249–60.
 8. Two of the best critics of contextualism are Jason Stanley and Patrick Rysiew: Jason Stanley, "On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism," *Philosophical Studies* 119 (2004): 119–46, Patrick Rysiew, "The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions," *Noûs* 35 (2001): 477–514; Patrick Rysiew, "Contesting Contextualism," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 69 (2005): 51–69.
 9. Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," *The Philosophical Review* 104 (1995): 1–52; David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," in *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader*, ed. Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 220–39; Stewart Cohen, "Contextualism Defended," in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, ed. Matthias Steup (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 56–62; Stewart Cohen, "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76, no. 2 (1998): 289–306.
 10. Hillary Putnam, "Brains in Vats," in *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 1–21.
 11. Timothy Williamson, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Chapter 4

1. This restaurant example is derived from similar examples developed by David Christensen: David Christensen, "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News," *The Philosophical Review* 116 (2007): 187–217.
2. Brian Frances does an excellent job of talking about the challenge of disagreement, especially when the person has similar skills: Bryan Frances, "Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors," forthcoming in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* (2011).
3. Richard Feldman appropriately points out that the opponent doesn't have to be an epistemic peer to challenge one: Richard Feldman, "Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement," *Episteme* 6, no. 3 (2009): 294–312, see 300–301.
4. In this list I have borrowed from Jennifer Lackey's and Brian Frances's formulations of what it takes to be an epistemic peer: Jennifer Lackey, "A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance," in *Social Epistemology*, ed. Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock, and Alan Millar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 298–325. Frances, "Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors," 1–20. Others have written on what it means to be an epistemic peer: Earl Conee, "Peerage," *Episteme* 6, no. 3 (2009): 313–23; David Christensen, "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy," *Philosophy Compass* 4, no. 5 (2009): 1–15; Robert Audi, "The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement," *Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy* 86, no. 335 (2011): 5–29; Feldman, "Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement," 294–312.
5. Thomas Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence," in *Disagreement*, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111–74. Richard Feldman discusses the significance of higher- and lower-order evidence for the epistemology of disagreement: Feldman, "Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement," 294–312.
6. Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence," 160. I discuss higher- and lower-order evidences more in the following: James Kraft, "Conflicting Higher and Lower Order Evidences in the Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion," *Forum Philosophicum* 15, no. 1 (2010): 65–89.
7. Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence," 159.
8. Ernest Sosa, "The Epistemology of Disagreement," in *Social Epistemology*, ed. Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock, and Alan Millar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 278–97, see 286
9. *Ibid.*, 286.
10. John DePoe talks about a similar case where a woman is arguing that childbirth is more painful than a man passing a kidney stone. There is no need for each to reduce confidence, since each has access to different evidence: John DePoe, "The Significance of Religious Disagreement," in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously*, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.
11. Sosa, "The Epistemology of Disagreement," 278–97.

12. Peter van Inwagen, “‘It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and For Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence,’” in *Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today*, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 137–53, see 142.
13. Sosa, “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” 296.
14. Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” 298–325.
15. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” 114.
16. Tyler Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in *Externalism and Self-Knowledge* (CSLI, 1998), 21–83.
17. Richard Fumerton, “You Can’t Trust a Philosopher,” in *Disagreement*, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 91–110, see 106.
18. Alvin Plantinga here gives an example of the revision of a basic belief with the addition of challenging new information: Alvin Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 343–344.
19. Michael Bergman has a formulation very much similar to our conservatism defeater: Michael Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” *Episteme* 6, no. 3 (2009): 336–53, see 343.
20. Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 304. In the following Feldman talks about how debilitating symmetries surface even for the externalist: Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” in *Epistemology Futures*, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford, 2006), 216–36, 439.
21. Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 300–301.
22. *Ibid.*, 300–301. See also Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreement,” in *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*, ed. Alan Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137–57; it is central to his argument that the peers share evidences.
23. Michael Thune, “‘Partial Defeaters’ and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* (2009), see 13. For Thune, some justification, but not all, is lost in epistemic peer disagreement. Thune also uses insights gained from the epistemology of ordinary disagreement to talk about religious disagreements in the following essay, and he here also recognizes the connection between symmetry recognition and reduction: Michael Thune, “Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” *Philosophy Compass* 5, no. 8 (2010): 712–24.
24. Conee, “Peerage,” 315.
25. Hilary Kornblith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” in *Disagreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29–52.
26. Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” see 2.
27. René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 11.
28. Roger White, “On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers,” *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology* 6, no. 3 (2009): 233–50.
29. In Chapter 2 we have described views that don’t rely on similarities for the assessment of the nearness of error possibilities. One of the scholars active during the

- first consideration of the issue of nearness of possible worlds is Jonathan Bennett, and he thinks that closeness determinations necessarily involve assessments of similarity: Jonathan Bennett, *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 195.
30. A criticism Kit Fine presents in the following essay of David Lewis's work on counterfactuals is relevant here, the future similarities problem: Kit Fine, "Review of Lewis's *Counterfactuals*," *Mind* 84 (1975): 451–58. Without going into all the details of how this challenges Lewis's evaluation of counterfactuals, Lewis's response is that even though possible worlds that are extremely similar to the actual world seem to be closer, they really aren't when we take into account the past dissimilarities. The same can be said about epistemic peers in a disagreement. For a similar criticism as that of Kit Fine, see Eugene Schlossberger, "Similarity and Counterfactuals," *Analysis* 38 (1978): 80–82.
 31. Sosa, "The Epistemology of Disagreement," 278–97.
 32. Robert Audi emphasizes the problem here: Audi, "The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement," especially 19. The opponent can have background relevant to the issue that one has absolutely no idea about. These differences that one doesn't even know about make it difficult to determine whether the other is a peer.
 33. Robert Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," in *Studies in Logical Theory*, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 98–112. David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973).
 34. Here is just a small sample of those criticisms of similarity as a basis for ordering possible worlds: There are no set weightings for a similarity assessment: Michael Tooley, "The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals," *The Journal of Philosophy* 100 (2003): 371–77; contextual factors can't be codified in a set of rules for closeness: Douglas Kutach, "Similarity is a Bad Guide to Counterfactual Truth" (paper presented at the The American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Portland Oregon, March 22, 2006); The standards of similarity vary across different contexts of use: Boris Kment, "Counterfactuals and Explanation," *Mind* 115 (2006): 261–309; it is difficult to determine which respects of similarity are relevant, and which irrelevant: Bennett, *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*.
 35. Earl Conee highlights this concern: Conee, "Peerage," 313–23.
 36. James Kraft, "Religious Disagreement, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers," *Religious Studies* 43 (2007): 417–32; James Kraft, "An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion," *Ars Disputandi* 9 (2009).
 37. Lackey, "A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance," 307.
 38. *Ibid.*, 308.
 39. Fumerton, "You Can't Trust a Philosopher," 91–110.
 40. Earl Conee considers these kinds of concerns: Conee, "Peerage," 313–23.

Chapter 5

1. To see beautiful pictures of Radha and Krishna together as well as the wonderful grounds of the Temple, go to the following website: <http://www.radhamahavdh.am.org>.
2. William Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), especially 36.
3. Wayne Proudfoot, "Explaining Religious Experience," in *Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Michael Peterson, et al. (Oxford: Oxford, 2000), 36–39.
4. Teresa of Jesus, "Religious Experience," in *Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Michael Peterson, et al. (Oxford: Oxford, 2000), 7–9.
5. John DePoe, "The Significance of Religious Disagreement," in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously*, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.
6. Philip Quinn also emphasizes the fact that there is always a mistake possible in even the most vivid understanding of a religious experience: Philip Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga," in *Rational Faith*, ed. Linda Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 14–47.
7. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
8. Recent research says most Christians say non-Christian faiths can lead to salvation. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, "Many Americans Say Other Faiths Can Lead to Eternal Life," *Analysis* (2008), <http://pewforum.org/Many-Americans-Say-Other-Faiths-Can-Lead-to-Eternal-Life.aspx#4>.
9. Mother Teresa, *Come Be My Light: The Private Writings of the Saint of Calcutta* (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1969), 341–3.
11. Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006), 25.

Chapter 6

1. For good sources describing the different approaches, see David Basinger, *Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001); Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., *The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Griffiths, *Problems of Religious Diversity* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Robert McKim, *Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity* (New York: Oxford, 2001); Nathan King, "Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief," *Philosophy Compass* 3/4 (2008): 830–53.
2. Swami Vivekananda, "Paper on Hinduism Delivered to the Parliament of the Religions," in *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, ed. Swami Prajnananda (Almora: Sre Gauranga Press, 1915) 15–16.
3. Hick solves the tension among religions "by the proposal that they do not in fact conflict because they are claims about different manifestations of the Real to different faith communities." John Hick, "Religious Pluralism," in *A Companion to*

- Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 607–14, see 612. See also John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1989); John Hick, “The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism,” *Faith and Philosophy* 14 (1997): 277–86.
4. John DePoe, “The Significance of Religious Disagreement,” in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously*, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76, 12.
 5. René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 11.
 6. Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 29–39.
 7. See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, ed. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 3–35; Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, ed. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 115–54.
 8. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
 9. Jean François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), 38.
 10. *Ibid.*, 37.
 11. See Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” *The Philosophical Review* 104 (1995): 1–52; and Keith DeRose, “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in *Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 187–205. For a good description of different types of contextualism, see Duncan Pritchard, “Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 64 (2002): 19–55; James Kraft, “An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion,” *Ars Disputandi* 9 (2009). Jonathan Schaffer discusses how the skeptic equivocates, from the perspective of contextualism, with the word *know*: Jonathan Schaffer, “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” *Philosophical Studies* 119 (2004): 73–103, see 75.
 12. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
 13. See Bill Brewer, *Perception and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); Bill Brewer, “Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience,” *Philosophical Issues* 14 (2004): 61–77; William Alston, “Back to the Theory of Appearing,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 13 (1999): 181–203.
 14. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,” in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. David Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 18–43, see 31.
 15. *Ibid.*, 42. The understanding of authority as essentially dogmatic and coercive is a vestige of the Enlightenment: see 32–33.
 16. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 270.

17. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," see 42.
18. *Ibid.*, 31–33; Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 270.
19. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," 34–36.
20. *Ibid.*, 31.

Chapter 7

1. William Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
2. *Ibid.*, 271.
3. *Ibid.*, 271.
4. *Ibid.*, 271–2.
5. Jerome Gellman makes a similar point: Jerome Gellman, "In Defense of a Contented Religious Exclusivism," *Religious Studies* 36 (2000): 401–17, see 409.
6. Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience*, 270.
7. Philip Quinn, "Epistemology in Philosophy of Religion," in *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*, ed. Paul K. Moser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 513–38, see 534.
8. Michael Bergmann is one of the most prominent epistemologists to apply externalism to issues of ordinary religious disagreements. And, because of articles like the following, and because of personal conversations with him, I believe he would apply externalism to religious disagreements as well: Michael Bergmann, "Rational Religious Belief without Arguments," in *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology*, ed. Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, Forthcoming), 27 pages.
9. Philip Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga," in *Rational Faith*, ed. Linda Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 14–47, see 35. For a more extensive treatment of the debate between Quinn and Plantinga, see my essay: James Kraft, "Philip Quinn's Contribution to the Epistemic Challenge of Religious Diversity," *Religious Studies* 42 (2006): 453–65.
10. See Alvin Plantinga, "Rationality and Public Evidence: A Reply to Richard Swinburne," *Religious Studies* 37, no. 2 (2001): 215–22, especially 217. See also Alvin Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179. Alvin Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism," *Faith and Philosophy* 3 (1986): 298–313, see 311.
11. Michael Bergmann, "Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure," *Episteme* 6, no. 3 (2009): 336–53, see 342.
12. Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in *The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity*, ed. Phillip Quinn and Kevin Meeker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172–92, see 182.
13. Bergmann, "Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure," 345–46.
14. Plantinga expresses well the stance, as an externalist, one can take toward the other: "The other person has *made a mistake*, or *has a blind spot*, or hasn't been wholly attentive, or hasn't received some grace she has, or is in some way epistemically less fortunate": Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," 182. For a good description of Plantinga's position, and the strategy of the externalist

- in general, see Nathan King, "Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief," *Philosophy Compass* 3/4 (2008): 830–53.
15. Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief*, 371.
 16. Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga," 39–43.
 17. Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief*.
 18. *Ibid.*, 210.
 19. Hick says, "The arbitrariness of Alston's position is highlighted when we remember that if he had been born into a devout Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist family he would, using the same epistemology, be equally arbitrarily claiming that his Muslim, or Hindu, or Buddhist beliefs constitute the sole exception to the general rule that religious experience produces false beliefs!": John Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism," *Faith and Philosophy* 14 (1997): 277–86, see 278.
 20. Alvin Plantinga, "Ad Hick," *Faith and Philosophy* 14 (1997): 295–98, see 298.
 21. Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," 182.
 22. William Lane Craig, "Theism and the Origin of the Universe," *Erkenntnis* 48 (1998): 47–57; William Lane Craig, "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings'," *Faith and Philosophy* 27 (2010): 72–78; Quentin Smith, "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," *Philosophy of Science* 55 (1988): 39–57; Quentin Smith, "Why Steven Hawking's Cosmology Precludes a Creature," *Philo* 1 (1998): 75–93.
 23. John DePoe, "The Significance of Religious Disagreement," in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously*, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.
 24. David Basinger, *Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), 11.
 25. David Basinger, "Hick's Religious Pluralism and 'Reformed Epistemology': A Middle Ground," *Faith and Philosophy* 5 (1988): 421–35, see 430.
 26. *Ibid.*, 425 and footnote 27.
 27. David Basinger, "Religious Diversity: Where Exclusivists Often Go Wrong," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 47 (2000): 43–55, see 50. For Gellman on rock-bottom beliefs, see Jerome Gellman, "Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief," *Faith and Philosophy* 10 (1993): 345–64, see 355.
 28. Basinger, "Religious Diversity: Where Exclusivists Often Go Wrong," 47; Basinger, "Hick's Religious Pluralism and 'Reformed Epistemology': A Middle Ground," 430.
 29. Gellman, "In Defense of a Contented Religious Exclusivism," 403.
 30. *Ibid.*, 403; see also Gellman, "Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief," 353. Gellman could use the following quote from Wittgenstein as support for his view: "Whenever we test anything we are already presupposing something that is not tested." Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1969), #163.
 31. Gellman, "In Defense of a Contented Religious Exclusivism," 409. See also Gellman, "Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief," 350–352.
 32. Gellman, "In Defense of a Contented Religious Exclusivism," 402.

33. *Ibid.*, 403.
34. Jerome Gellman, "Epistemic Peer Conflict and Religious Belief: A Reply to Basinger," *Faith and Philosophy* 15 (1998): 229–35, see 233.

Chapter 8

1. William Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 271–72. See also William Alston, "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," *Faith and Philosophy* 5 (1988): 433–48.
2. David Christensen argues for the need for a neutral, independent source of support during epistemic peer disagreement: David Christensen, "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy," *Philosophy Compass* 4, no. 5 (2009): 1–15.
3. Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience*, 271–72.
4. Richard Fumerton and Richard Feldman talk about the alternative systems problem: Richard Fumerton, "Theories of Justification," in *Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*, ed. Paul Moser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 204–33; Richard Feldman, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003), 66.
5. Jerome Gellman, "Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief," *Faith and Philosophy* 10 (1993): 345–64, especially 353–55.
6. For some of the seminal work, see Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); Daniel Batson, "Rational Processing or Rationalization?: The Effect of Disconfirming Information on a Stated Religious Belief," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32 (1975): 176–84; Daniel Batson and W. Larry Ventis, *The Religious Experience: A Social-Psychological Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
7. Jerome Gellman, "Epistemic Peer Conflict and Religious Belief: A Reply to Basinger," *Faith and Philosophy* 15 (1998): 229–35, see 233.
8. Jerome Gellman, "In Defense of a Contented Religious Exclusivism," *Religious Studies* 36 (2000): 401–17, see 403.
9. John DePoe talks about how exclusive and vivid religious experiences provide grounds for thinking one has evidence the other lacks, and this can prevent a reduction in confidence: John DePoe, "The Significance of Religious Disagreement," in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously*, ed. Jeremy Evans and Daniel Heimbach (Nashville Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2011), 48–76.
10. Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in *The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity*, ed. Phillip Quinn and Kevin Meeker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172–92, see 182.
11. Quentin Smith, "Big Bang Cosmology and Atheism: Why the Big Bang is No Help to Theists," *Free Inquiry Magazine* 18, no. 2 (2007), http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=smith_18_2. William Lane Craig, "The Caused Beginning of the Universe: A Response to Quentin Smith," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 44, no. 4 (1993): 623–39. William Lane Craig, "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings,'" *Faith and Philosophy* 27 (2010): 72–78.

12. Mother Teresa, *Come Be My Light: The Private Writings of the Saint of Calcutta* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 1–2.
13. Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” *Noûs* 41 (2007): 478–501.
14. For more discussion of this view, see the following: James Kraft, “Religious Disagreement, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers,” *Religious Studies* 43 (2007): 417–32.
15. The following includes more discussion of the relation between epistemic humility and tolerance: Philip Quinn, “On Religious Diversity and Tolerance,” *Daedalus* Winter (2005): 136–39; James Kraft, “Religious Tolerance Through Religious Diversity and Epistemic Humility,” *Sophia* 45 (2006); James Kraft and David Basinger, eds., *Religious Tolerance Through Humility: Thinking with Philip Quinn* (Berlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008); James Kraft, “Epistemic Humility in the Face of ‘Violent Religions,’” in *Religious Tolerance Through Humility: Thinking with Philip Quinn*, ed. James Kraft and David Basinger (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 65–74.
16. Patrick Rysiew is one of the best critics of contextualism with this approach: Patrick Rysiew, “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” *Noûs* 35 (2001): 477–514; Patrick Rysiew, “Contesting Contextualism,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 69 (2005): 51–69.
17. James Kraft, “An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement About Religion,” *Ars Disputandi* 9 (2009).

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